German Movements

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LVI, Issue 69, 11 August 1914, Page 6

German Movements

DANGER TO BRITAIN. NORTH SEA COAST. The possibility of Germany violating Belgian neutrality in the event of war with France has exercised British statesmen for many years. An examination of the French frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland, a distance of 140 miles, shows the difficulty of a German direct attack. Of this extent only some -40 miles are not fortified. From the Swiss frontier the Epinal runs one practically continuous line of fortifications; north of Epinal is a gap of 20 miles to near Toul, whence another line of forts continues to Verdun, which is about 20 miles from 'the Belgian frontier. If, I therefore, Germany were to attack France across the frontier actually common to the two countries, she would have an almost impossible task, or, at least, a dreadful costly one, in forcing this line and in employing a mass of probably well over a million men in the space of 140 miles. TURNING THE FRONTIER. If the actual Franco-German frontier is to be turned, it can only be done by crossing the territory by either Switzerland or Belgium, or possibly botlh. An advance through Switzerland must move soutli of the French quadrilateral, Bel-fort-Besancon-Diojn-LangreS. If made in considerable force, it would be dangerous to France, as it would cut the Northern French armies off from the supplies and support of Southern France, but it would be liable to utter disaster if defeated, owing to the presence of the above-named quadrilateral on its flank. On the whole, if we consider the nature of the country and the probable attitude of the Swiss themselves, says a recent writer in the Round Table, a German advance in force through Switzerland seems doubtful. The violation of Belgium by Germany, however, stands on quite a different footing. The map'shows how the small point of Holland which includes Maastricht protects the north and north-east sides of Belgium. If only Belgium is to be violated the German armies must cross south of Maastricht. Some years ago the Germans completed a series of detraining stations on their railways close to the Belgium-Luxemburg frontier. These miles of sidings deal with no traffic in peace time; they can only be meant to teem with troops in war. An advance across Belgium and Luxemburg, north of Verdun and -south of Moostrieht, turns the French frontier and leads direct on Paris. From the southern frontier of Luxemburg to the defence of Liege in Belgium is a distance of about seventy miles, and a turning movement by superior German numbers through this opening would place France at a considerable disadvantage. BELGIUM IN THE WAR. The attitude of Belgium in such a war is therefore a matter of great importance to France. Were Belgium actively with Germany the fact would be worth far more to the latter than merely the addition of the Belgian field army to her strength. In the first place no detacnment would he required, such as would be essential in a hostile country. In the second place the German advance would gain enormously in rapidity and freedom of movement if all the administrative facilities of the Belgian Government were placed at its disposal. On the other hand, French action in Belgium would be correspondingly hampered. With Belgium definitely ranged against Germany, the position is reversed. If Belgium remained neutral, tlip difficulties in the way of the German advance, though greater than in the first ease, would not be insuperable. Unaided, Belgium would not be able to protect her territory from violation. Liege, whic-h is indifferently garrisoned in peace,might lie "jumped" very early in the war, and with that place held or masked, the German armies could secure tlieir flank by masking Nanuir and the bridgc-'heads over the Maas. There is a further point to lie considered. It is possible that Germany would make the turning move-, mcnt through Belgium on an even wider front. She might wish to march troops through the space between Liege and Antwerp; to do this she must pass through Holland. In that case Dutch, as well as Belgian, territory would be violated. BRITAIN'S S>ART. jVliat will he the position of Great Britain? England is primarily a naval power, and the greatest assistance she could give France would be tlmt of her fleet. Tliis would be of immense value, ft would at once neutralise the German naval superiority, would prevent a blockade of French ports, and would xcep open France's communications with her African garrisons. The British fleet could bring powerful indirect pressure to bear by cutting off supplies from Dutch and Belgian ports. Naval action in itself, however, is not sufficient to decide a European war. Trafalgar was followed by Atisterlitz and Jena, and England had to undertake the Peninsula war before she was secure from the domination of Napoleon. Belgium is the key to the French defence, the writer in the [ Round Table emphasises. A British exj peditionaily force of six divisions would [certainly not he a negligible factor in that defence, especially as its presence would probably decide Belgium to throw in her lot with France, with the result for every British soldier landed a Belgium would he found fighting by his side. It is to this point, therefore, if at all. that British reinforcements would probably be sent; and it must be borne in mind that, if help so given is to be of any real use in assisting Krance or influencing Belgium, it must be given at 'tin- beginning of the war. Lut Great Britain has an even more vital interest in the defence of Belgium and Holland. If she stood aside, these two countries might, be compelled to side with Germany, and the probability of a I' rericli defeat would be increased. The result of such a war would probably be the establishment of a German domination in tJhe Low Countries, even if they were not actually annexed. The .Scheldt is ::iN) miles nearer England than Wilhelnishayen. and the Dutch and Belgian coast might, be turned into a formidable base for naval operations against Great Britain. The balance of power would be permanently upset, and Britain s naval supremacy would be gravely imperilled.