ANGLO-GERMAN DISCORD.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LV, Issue 117, 3 October 1912, Page 4

ANGLO-GERMAN DISCORD.

SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY,

THE RIFT IN THE LUTE,

London, August 23. The Vienna correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, .who is generally well-inform-ed, contributes an interesting article to his paper on certain official documents he lias- recently seen which throw light on the diplomatic history of the past few years, particularly on the relations between Berlin and London. In it he says:

"It would appear that the ambitions of some prominent men have not been conducive to the peace of the world, while changes of Government in Great Britain have made some difference as to the general trend of foreign policy. The salient fact, however, is that some time after 1000 date, and progressively for the next few years, the whole of the so-called balance of power underwent a tremendous change. The enemies of Great Britain—or, if the word be too strong, the rival Powers—were France and Russia, and especially Russia. Russia was supposed to be threatening in various ways the integrity of the Indian Empire. France's colonial activity in' Africa was so vigorous that it. was natural for British statesmen in desire to protect their own colonial interests. Germany and Great Britain walked more or less hand in hand in Africa, in the Near East, and in the Far East.

"On the whole, the German Foreign Oiliee was consistently friendly. Wilhclni 11. had dismissed Hismarck, iii 1890, and then confided the highest post in nis Empire to Caprivi. who remained Chancellor till 1894. Bismarck, as I had opportunity of affirming on a recent occasion, while he thought it necessary to insure himself in reference to Russia and the eastern frontier of Germany, was by no means inimical towards England, and made overtures,every now and then, intended to lead to a sort of agreemen between the two nations, or even, possibly, to the entrance of Great Britain into the Triple Alliance. Caprivi was, apparently, heart-whole in-his cordial sentiments towards London. It is true that Hohenloho, who succeeded him in 1804, was more reserved, but when being Minister for Foreign Affairs, became, on October 17, 1900, Chancelior of the Empire, it was apparently understood on all hands that his policy would be guided rather by the example of Caprivi than by that of his immediate predecessor. Unfortunately, tne course of subsequent history has by no means confirmed a view of this kind. CHINA AND THE POWERS.

"Of coure, the real underlying reason of the progressive separation in interests and sympathies between Berlin and London was the sudden and amazing growth of Teutonic colonial ambitions, and the enormous accession of strength in the German fleet, which was the natural consequence of a spirited colonial policy. Various incidents occur in the relationship between two empires Avhich, treated in one fashion, promote the cause of peace, while, treated in another, they provoke an explosion of bitterness. I

can lay my finger on the point whence most of the subsequent divergence issued. It was the different interpretation of tl>-» Anglo-German Entente, which was established in tbo month of October, 1900, during \he course of the campaign in Ch**-*- British and German statesmen J » full accord. After Germany had taken possession of Kiaochau. followed in turn by the acquisitions of Bussja, England and France, it was noticed that no kind of difficulty had been rai«*d by (he English against the sudden outburst of German enterprise in China.

THE BOXER REBELLION. "In April, 1000, broke out the revolt of the Boxers. Then came the nomination of Marshal von Waldersee as Command-er-in-Chief of the international forces. The German Emperor had never told a soul of his intention of appointing one of the highest officers of the Prussian army to the supreme 'command, and both France and Russia, to say nothing of the United States, were inclined to manifest a certain dissatisfaction. England alone accepted, without any murmurs, the nomination of Marshal von Waldersee. Indeed, it does not seem altogether improbable that the British Cabinet, anxious to prove to Berlin its friendly sentiments, had itself suggested the appointment of the German Marshal. The enemy at the time was not Germany, but Russia.

"The Anglo-German understanding guaranteed the integrity of the Chinese territory and the maintenance of the 'open door,' and in Article 111. of the undertaking there was thL> further stipulation—that if any other Power were to seize the opportunity offered by Chinese complication to obtain, under any form whatsoever, territorial advantage, the two contracting parties were to act together to defend their common interests in' China. Now the only 'other Power' which could be referred to was Russia, and the only 'territorial advantage' was the possession of Manchuria. In view of what followed, it was at least a pleasant piece of irony that Wilhelm 11., in his speech at Elberfeld, should have spoken in magniloquent terms of the complete amity, and concord which united the German and the British Powers. CHANGE IN THE SITUATION.

"For a very few months afterwards the situation brusquely phanged. In March, 1901. Count von Bulow—observe the name which will constantly meet us in the course of these revelations—was called upon to explain the exact pertinence of the agreement concluded between Germany and England in the preceding year. 'There are Powers/ he said, 'whose interests in China are especially economic, and others- which pursue political objects. We belong to the first category. That is why we concluded the agreement with England in October, IDOO, in order to maintain the integrity of China as long as possible, on the one hand; and on the other, not to mix ourselves up with China beyond the reach of our commercial interests. But, he went on to say, in noticeable words, 'this agreement has nothing whatsoever to do with Manchuria. We have no national interests of importance in Manchuria.'

"Lord Lansdowne. the British Foreign Secretary, promptly repudiated the interpretation which von Bulow had given in the German Reichstag. In his view the agreement dealt in especial with Manchuria. He maintained that the German Government had taken pains to warn the Chinese against the conclusion of distinct treaties with other Powers. Therefore, according to the British opinion, Billow's speech entirely falsified the purport and scope of the Chinese agreement. And the reasons for the change only made the whole transaction look still more sinister. The object of British policy was to prevent Russia from getting possession of Manchuria; but, according to Bulow, China was to be allowed entire freedom to sign any convention she chose with Russia, against which neither Germany. nor England could make any possible protest. Of course, England desired to get limits to the increasing power of Russia in Asia, and all the more because it soon became manifest how the great Northern Empire intended to deal with China. Russia had, as a matter of fact, taken advantage of the Boxer revolt to occupy the whole of Manchuria.

"The truth, no doubt, was that in a period in which Great Britain was occupied with the Transvaal war, and Wag in bad odor on the Continent, th« GtK* man Chancellor saw his opportunity of showing amiability towards Russia. Tai* was the first real breach in an AngloGerman friendship of long standing, anJ ' as it seemed significant of a serious change of policy, it naturally led Lord Lansdowne and British statesmen to ask themselves with some anxiety whether they could really depend upon help or sympathy from Berlin. The ill-feeling towards our own country occasioned by the Boer struggle was not the cause— > or at all events was not the sole cause—• of the progressive alienation betweea ourselves and our Teutonic neighbors."