THE Daily News. TUESDAY. SEPTEMBER 24, 1912. WHAT WAR WITH GERMANY WOULD MEAN.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LV, Issue 109, 24 September 1912, Page 4

THE Daily News. TUESDAY. SEPTEMBER 24, 1912. WHAT WAR WITH GERMANY WOULD MEAN.

"The mastering necessity of the hour is a full accommodation with Germany," says the Nation, which is carrying on a very vigorda's propaganda to bring that idea into being. Jt says that a national conference may soon be held on this point at Manchester, with Lord Courtney in the chair. The Nation complains bitterly of the illiberal foreign policy of the Liberal Government, which dors not make friends with Germany. It publishes a striking article by Baron De I'oiest, which points (tut how our antagonism to Germany began in trade jealousy and selfishness. And in another article it vividly points out what a war with Germany would mean in detail. Ihe first root of anli-Gern-an-ism in this country was the Protectionist antipathy to the growth of German trade, founded ou (he falhcj that the well-being of one trading nation was the damnation of anotli-r. The first German Navy Law was passed in the year 1!IOO. But it was uoi due," he savs, "to a >ponlaneous. rcasonle.-.s determination on the part of the German Government to become a liot-cia-, naval Power. It sprang from causes rl.v traceable during the preceding J, (:li !r. the beginning of that dee,'de ihe rapid development of German indnstry and commerce began to be noticed , moid, and especially in England. Tiir-iiigiimrt, .tile Wj

its expansion was 'CviUi hn-rcas-ill;: jealousy by JOn.-ii-h merchants and manufaclurci<. who S;l u their supremacy threatened by German enterprise. Intercourse between ()„. i, v:> countries grew swiftly; German goods .were sold oil the English market in increasing i|U;intites. (o the advantage of the Em'1 i-1' consumer, but to the temporary disadvantage of certain English producers. Promptly an anti-German agitation iirose; tlie interests adversely affected | by the keener competition began to clamor for protection and assistance, the growth of German trade, the increase in German prosperity, it was argued, were injurious to England; we should be ruined by the influx of such goods 'made in Germany'; while almost as •dangerous' as German imports at home were German competition and German commercial expansion in Oriental and tropical countries. If the expansion of German trade were ruinous to the British naiion. then a British Government^

was bound io use every means in its power to check and hinder that expansion. Two weapons were ready to hand —fiscal policy and foreign policy. The first, the naked weapon of Protection, they feared for some years to touch; the second came more easily to hand. Opposition to Germany gradually became the dominant purpose of our diplomacy; all other objects were overshadowed by this new rivalry. The growth of these sentiments could not fail to alarm the German Government and the German people. It was small wonder that the position appeared to them perilous. and that they took steps to guard against the threatened danger. The passing of the Navy Law in 1900 was followed by a hardening of the situation. The anti-German trend of our foreign policy found full expression in the conclusion of .the understandings with France and Russia. The Triple Entente came into being to confront and counterbalance the Triple Alliance. And simultaneously Mr. Chamberlain, seeking for a new and popular policy, caught eagerly at the .anti-Gorman prejudice, and cmbarked on his Tariff Reform Propaganda. National antipathies were inflamed and aggravated in order that they might bo exploited in the interests of a party, and German belief in the hostility of Great Britain was confirmed and deepened. A diplomacy which can produce such results as that, a diplomacy of which the net achievement is to have estranged more widely than ever twonations bound to each other by every bond of mutual interest, stands condemned," concludes -Baron De Forest. "Professional experts and the political opinion which follows their views have, we arc afraid, inoculated a considerable body of British opinion with the idea than an Anglo-German conflict is inevitable," snvs the Nation. "Such a war, far from being inevitable, far from being profitable to either party, would be extremely difficult to bring about, would involve all the commercial interests of both countries in something like ruin. For its size (says 400 miles square), the North Sea is probably in a commercial sense th'e most important in the world. Unless by some miraculous event at its very beginning the whole fleet of one or the other combatant could be mysteriously destroyed, we must suppose that British merchant and passenger steamers would cease to visit the ports either of the North Sea or of the Baltin, There would be an appalling slump on the Stock Exchange., A huge loan must be negotiated, and in a week or two -Consols would drop to 60. All our Home railway stocks and all our industrial securities would" fall as'fast as the s~hares of Vickers and Armstrongs and all the other purveyors of war material rose. A host of merchant houses and financial houses would immediately be -involved in disaster. It would 1)e extraordinary if all our great banks survived the failures of many customers. The effect of the partial, and perhaps, almost Complete; cessation, of a trade which must run up well above 100 millions sterling annually can hardly be exaggerated. It would be felt in every corner of 'England and Scotland." The Nation, discussing Baron De Forest's article, says: "There is not th<? slightest danger of such a war taking place if are brought clearly before the eyes of the people, and if members of Parliament, Ministers of the fcrgwn. captains of industry, merchants rind-, .financiers can only be brought to see the ruin.and confusion which would wait upon such madness." Yet in view of these facts and opinions there is a sinister unrest at the moment in European'politieal circles, and we cannot afford to ignore the significant facts outlined in a cable published yesterday morning. To be forewarned is, wo know, to be forearmed, and there is more' wisdohi in this epitomisatio'n of the wisdom of the countryside than even in the afterthought that suggests the folly of locking the stable door after the steed has been stolen.