The Daily News. MONDAY, JULY 15, 1912. THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LV, Issue 48, 15 July 1912, Page 4

The Daily News. MONDAY, JULY 15, 1912. THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM.

The'.exact naval requirements of Great Britain in the Mediterranean have just been' the subjeet of a conference between the "British Prime Minister, the First Lord, of the Admiralty and Lord Kitchener, qs a result of which a policy of materially strengthening the Empire by concentrating the British fleet in, the North 'Sea been decided upon. This is an indication, of course, that the European situation i - graver and more complicated than is generally supposed. Seven years agb, writes Mr. Archibald Hurd in the May. Fortnightly, the Admiralty withdrew a number of ships from ' distant waters in order- to strengthen the "honie guard." In view of the new German proposals it is now announced that a further concentration will be effected. The Atlantic fleet, raised in strength from six to eight battleships, is being recalled from its base at Gibraltar to Home waters, and the battleships ,of the Mediterranean fleet will in future be based upon Gibraltar and their number will be eight instead of six, and a new cruiser squadron will be associated with them. Seven years ago we'brought home our battleships from China, 1 and' now we are bringing our battleships in 1 the Mediterranean nearer the strategical centre. It is a significant movement which cannot fail; to impress the peopl| of the United Kingdom with the serious view which the authorities take of thfc naval situation, and must surely occasion grave misgivings in distant parts' of the Empire as to whether the momejnt has not come .when they should take a hand in defending British interests by direct and large contributions—not in men, for we have a surplus of' population, but in ships and money. Another writer on naval topics, "Xavalis," in the National Review, takes an equally serious view of the outlook and the necessity for change. "It was 1 recently proposed," he writes, "that the Mediterranean fleet, which under the Fisher regime was reduced from eight to si?f, should be increased from six to eight,, but it was to be moved to Gibraltar" and regarded as one of the squadrons of the Home (loot. Yet if it is withdrawn from the Mediterranean the consequences will be incalculably mischievous. In a war waged by Britain against Germany and Austria, the entire Mediterranean will be commanded by the Austrian fleet. Egypt and Malta with their scanty garrisons .Trill be left open to attack and capture. In a waj- waged bv the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance, France will be deprived of naval support which is indispensable to her. if her Algerian troops are to be moved swiftly to her Mediterranean ports and placed in line. For u'hile only two of her Dreadnoughts will be complete before 1015, by that (year Ttaly will have certainly four, and possibly six. ready for sea. and Austria four. Far from weakening the Mediter-

ranean fleet or withdrawing it, we must face the necessity of reinforeing it with new and powerful ships, or else of enormously strengthening the defences and the British garrisons in Malta and Egypt. Another factor in the situation is that the Government of Italy is likely to renew the Triple Alliance within the next twelve months. Although there is a strong party in Austria which openly advocates war with Italy, there is little doubt that the retention of Italy, with her strong and rapidly-growing navy, in the Central European alliance, is earnestly desired by Germany. The power of being able to use the Italian and Austrian fleets

together in the Mediterranean, anc thereby compelling Britain to weaken hei North Sea fleet in order to meet thi necessity of safeguarding her innei line of communication with her Easten Empire, is a power that Germany \voul< doubtless be willing to pay for hand somely with concessions, and also wit] moral and material support." The is lands which Italy has been picking up i] the Aegean Sea will become of great va lue to the partnership. They are of littl value to Turkey, but may foe of grea use to a Power provided with man; cruisers and battleships. Many of th> islands in the archipelago—and Rhode for one—possess seaports with excellen liarbors. Good harbors, in which' war ships can shelter, and which can bi 3onverted by adequate fortification nto naval bases, are precisely wha ihe rising naval Powers are anxiousb seeking, for ships are of no use withou )ases. To any Power or group o 'owers that may be looking forward ti ;he possibility of a naval war witl Slreat Britain it is no less desirable • t< >btain naval bases in the Mediterranean ireat Britain's inner line of communi ation with her Eastern Empire ban it is to obtain naval leases on thi African coast, between Gibraltar anc he Cape of Good Hope, commanding lef 1 outer line of communioations. Aus ria, for instance, is very poorly pro r ided with naval bases.' She has noni 'xcept her Adriatic ports. ' A stronj Laval base in one of the islands of thi irchipelago, that her cruisers couk ttilise, would be of valuable advantagt ;o jher, and would be a commensurati tource of weakness to Great Britain iince in thesje times it is commonh istimated that it takes.three blockading iruisers to "contain" one that is with Ira'wn into a fortified base. Hence thi istablishment of naval bases by any o ;he Triple Alliance Powers in island: :aptured from Turkey must compe 3ritain to weaken her naval strengtl it the point where the First Lord o: he' Admiralty has frankly declared hat she is chiefly threatened —namely n the North Sea. Lord Kitchener's >pposition to the withdrawal of ships rom the Mediterranean, which would essen the security of Britain's hole ipon Egypt, and impair the safety oi ;he approaches to the Suez Canal iroiight about the conference which has ustj been h(jld ; and which has de:ided to strengthen the present weak squadron of cruisers in the Mediterran!an| also to make arrangements with France, probably in the shape of a 'ormal alliance, whereby British interesta n the Mediterranean would be protected, [t ij only right that in this matter Bri:ain' and France stand together. Pressure of outward circumstances has been rraijually drawing them into an alliance. Seneral BernhaTdi, the great Prussian lavalry leader, in his recently-published wok, "Germany and the Next War," has aid-it down as a principle that the balmce of power in Europe ■ must be destroyed and France completely overthrown at the first favorable opportunity, as the preliminary to an attack on 3ritain. Professor Oncken, another Germanvpublicist, has insisted that Germany should strengthen her army so as to be iblekt any moment to overpower France

and thus strike indirectly at England. The j outcome : of this moving, of the pawns will probably, result in a FrancoBritish Alliance which will effectually check the aspirations of Germany, in the Supremely remote chance of her assuming, a attitude towards either of these Powers, as well as counterbalancing any possible Eastern aggression.! / j ' ==r '