THE WAR SCARE

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 191, 10 February 1912, Page 9 (Supplement)

THE WAR SCARE

WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED. Lieutenant Alfred Dewar, R.N., discusses in the Pall Mall Gazette what might have happened during the recent war scare, when it was alleged that the British Navy was not in a postition to deal effectively with the situation. He writes:—The German fleet consisted of four Dreadnoughts and 11 pre-Dread-noughts. Their position was probably known within certain determinable limits; but let it be supposed it was unknown. The First Division of the Home Fleet, consisting of 11 Dreadnoughts, was at Cromarty, more than a match for the opposing fleet in strength and homogeneity. But at Queensferry was the Second Division, consisting of eight preDreadnoughts. Queensferry is 160 miles from Cromarty—that is, at ■ a squadron speed of 18 knots, nine hours away. The question rises swiftly to one's, mind: Could a hostile fleet have fallen on the Second Division? Now, first of all, Queensferry is a protected harbor, approached by a (for large ships) narrow channel, eight miles long. This channel was, we may/presume—though, perhaps; too many presumptions are dangerouspatrolled by destroyers and commanded at its entrance by the guns on Inchkeith and on the coast of Fife. ■. THE FORTH CHANNEL. These guns are neither over-numerous nor over-powerful, but still they count for something, and certainly for a margin of time, if—another assumption—we assume, them manned night and day. Those who talk of a fleet falling suddenly upon another must remember this long channel of the Forth. To neglect it would be analogous to neglecting some such factor as friction in the sphere of physical science. The practical thinker must take these things into account. Let us, reduce the whole now to an expression of time. The enemy would have been sighted at least 20 miles off the Forth—that is, at 18 knots, 1.2 hours. To silence Inchkeith would require at least an hour, if it were posible at all. For the ascent of the channel another hour must bo allowed. The Second Division is presumably not going to acquiesce tamely in this business, and, in conjunction with the destroyers and the batteries, would probably damage and disable several ships. This phase would swallow another hour at least. Four hours have elapsed. Steaming much more .slowly back, the enemy would take a few hours to draw off, and would not be, off May Isand till about the seventh hour. Now, to consider the consequent movements of the Fris,t Division. And first it must be remembered that the German Fleet never approached the Scottish coast. Had it done so, or if its position were at any time indeterminate, it was clearly the business of the First Division to get to sea, and the position it should have assumed is clearly dependent on that of the Second Division. WHAT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN. Reducing a very obvious principle of applied strategy to the circumstances of the occasion, the First Division ought to have been within such distance of the Second that a hostile fleet could not approach the Forth, silence the batteries, and ascend the channel without getting the First Division on its back. It may, perhaps, be contended that the result of the First Division putting to sea would have been to draw into sharper and sharper prominence the flickering tongues of mutual antagonism. This is to indulge in an. excess of strategical refinement. But let us suppose the First Division still at anchor at Cromarty, and receiving news of the enemy approaching the Forth. From Cromarty to the Forth is 160 miles, or about nine hours at 18 knots. This interval is too great to permit it teaching the spot in time to render actual assistance to the Second Division, but, hearing of the enemy at the sixth hour descending the channel, the First Division would keep to the eastward, and the fleets would probably meet some 30 or 40 miles east of May Island about the ninth hour from the initiation of the critical phase. It must be confessed, however, that such strategy, while probably resulting in the enemy's complete defeat, would be open to severe criticism, for the two divisions ought to be within such distance as will permit of a simultaneity of attack and supportthat is, nor more than four hours apart.