The Daily News. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1912. OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 170, 24 January 1912, Page 4

The Daily News. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1912. OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

During the past two months the foreign policy of Great Britain has been violently assailed by the chief Liberal newspapers and leaders of Liberal thought, who demand a change in the Foreign Office and a more pacific helmsman. It is a rather singular circumstance that we find the foreign policy of & Liberal Government heartily supported by the Conservative party and at the same time violently opposed by a big section of the Liberal party. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, indicated the other day that in opposing the Foreign policy the Liberal newspapers were opposing not his policy but the policy of the Government. The logi-* cal conclusion, therefore, was that if they were 60 opposed to that policy they must,be opposed to the Government they support. The whole trouble has arisen over the Moroccan question. That we were on the brink of war with Ger- [ many a short time back now seems tolerably certain. The Liberals take up the position that the country was almost involved in this catastrophe with Ger-' many in order to enable France to tear up what is known as the Treaty of Algeciras by taking possession of Morocco, whose integrity and independence we were pledged to defend, and, in short, that we again backed the wrong horse. Though we escaped war, they hold that Britain has not escaped the natural and abiding enmity of the German people, enmity that will soon be translated into more Dreadnoughts, more armaments, greater armies. For this unfortunate position they lay the blame at the door of Sir Edward Grey, who, they maintain, ever since he took office, has been' surrounded, influenced and dominated by men in the Foreign Office and the important Embassies who arc obsessed by the belief that Germany is our inveterate enemy and that war with Germany in the near future-is as inevitable as the rising of the sun, and that therefore all other considerations must be subordinated to the one supreme duty of thwarting Germany at every turn, even if in so doing British interest, treaty faith and the peace of the world are trampled, underfoot. The Review of Reviews, Mr. W. T. Stead's paper, dislikes Sir Edward Grey's connection with the Foreign Office and takes the lead in opposition to his policy. Says the Review: — You may look through his speeches from first to last without finding one hearty generous reference to Germany. It is not that Sir Edward Grey dislikes the Germans. He is a man without prejudices. He is simply to-day, as he has been since he took office, in terror of his life lest any rapprochement with Germany might offend the French. Upon this fear the French and our Ambassa-

dor at Paris took such advantage that Sir Edward Grey at last became little more than their marionette. Treaty obligations, British interests, the risk of war —those were as trifles light as air compared with the own supreme paramount duty of keeping in with the French at any cost; nay, even without counting the cost. It was this, and nothing else but this, which threatened —and will continue to threaten—the peace of Europe until a clean sweep has been made of the bureaucratic crew which, through Sir Edward Grey, steers our Ship of State.

The sending of the Panther was a step which everyone, even in Germany, can now see was a mistake. It was probably the result of indecision. The Germans had been. led to believe by the warm welcome given to ( the Kaiser on his visit to London that England would no longer regard German actions with malevolent eye. To send the Panther to Agadir was a popular move in Germany. It was capable of that interpretation; but it could also be explained as a mere measure of precaution for the protection of more or less mythical German subjects and interests in South Morocco. It was an unmistakable hint to Prance that if she meant to hold on td Fez Germany would have a word to say in the final settlement. It was what is vulgarly called a "try on," to see what would happen. Hence.when England took alarm and asked what it meant, the German Government- could not tell them, for the simple reason that the German Government did not know. At least this is the Liberal view of things. There is also reason to believe that at first the German Govern- ■ ment was disposed to take up the attitude that England had already been compensated by France by concessions in Egypt, whereas Germany, having received no compensation anywhere, was justified in dealing directly with France. The misfortune of the Agadir incident was that it alarmed Sir Edward Grey. Agadir is an open roadstead, which could only be converted into a naval base by an expenditure of many millions. Hence, when the Panther appeared there, the first instinct of the militant Section of the Cabinet was to send a British warship to keep her company. After a severe conflict in the Cabinet this pro* posal was abandoned. But as a compromise it was decided to be vigilant and to take the first opportunity of asserting the determination of the British Government to have a voice in the settlement. On the top of the Agadir incident came the story that the Germans were demanding the whole of the French Congo from France. This would have given them another naval base, and it seems to have been this scare of a German naval base in Africa that was the causa causans of Mr. Llloyd' George's memorable speech. There was nothing in the speech but a truism, but uttered when it was, and by the man who made it, the speech resounded through Europe as a hardly veiled declaration of war. This question of a naval base lies at the root of the whole controversy between England and Germany. Germanyhas a world-wide commerce only second to our own. She has colonies or colonial stations in China, in the South Seas, in New Guinea, and in Africa. But between Kiel and the Cameroons she has no station where her ships can coal or refit. Germany has repeatedly tried to obtain naval bases oversea. When she tried to obtain one in the Persian Gulf she was told that we should regard such an' acquisition on her part as an un-, friendly ,act. When she tried to obtain a port in the Red Sea, the Turks, fearing our displeasure, refused to deal. An attempt to obtain a foothold in Madeira was checked by Portugal, relying upon the support of England, who on that occasion was so near action that all leave was stopped in the fleet and everything was in readiness for instant war. Sir Edward Grey evidently thinks that is is necesasry to prevent Germany obtaining any naval base anywhere oversea. This was not Lord Salisbury's opinion. He favored Germany obtaining a naval base in the Mediterranean, holding that the acquisition of stations oversea rendered Germany* less? formidable regarded as a possible enemy. Such stations lead to a scatteringof forces «£ > present concentrated in- the North Sea,' and offer points of attack for an erietay" possessing superior sea-power. Continues the Review:

If we are to have an entente with Germany we shall have .to abandon the theory that British interests demand the shutting out of Germany from any of the few remaining ports in the, world which are available for naval bases. Whether we take Lord Salisbury's view or Sir Edward Grey's, it is unreasonable to expect that the second sea-power in Europe is to be for every deprived of any oportunity to acquire by legitimate means any foothold in any of the seven seas. It may be more convenient for us that she should not have'them. But if we are going to lay it down as an axiom of British policy that she shall never have them, then whatever we may say about our desire for an entente,and good relation with Germany is all wasted breath. If we want an entente we must let her hare naval bases abroad. Unless we do we shall never have an entente. Here is a sharp antagonism of -interests. The price may be. too high for an entente. Well and good; if it is so decided, then the Germanophobe school that dominates our diplomacy and our bureaucracy will have it all its own way. But that is not my opinion, nor do I think it is the opinion of the British people. There is the other side, the Government side, which peculiarly enough, is the Conservative side. We will deal with that to-morrow.