WAS THE FLEET READY FOR WAR?

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 107, 13 January 1912, Page 1 (Supplement)

WAS THE FLEET READY FOR WAR?

THE STORY OF THE CRISIS. In consequence of various sensational but misleading versions of the fleet and the recent crisis, involving England, France and Germany, having been circulated, the London Daily Telegraph publishes the following authoritative statement of the facts: During the height of the crisis the Imperial General Staff, under Field-Marshal Sir William Nicholson, completed in detail a ' scheme for military co-operation with France in case of war. The plans were prepared, it is understood, in consultation with the chief of staff of the French army. At the moment there was grave reason to fear that the French Cabinet might at any moment declare for war as the only solution of the grave difficulties with which it was faced. The "yea" or "nay" of the British Cabinet on the question of the employment of British forces might have turned the scales in the direction either of war or of peace. It is even said that the declaration of war would have, been issued directly the French Cabinet received the necessary assurance. It was at this stage that Sir William Nicholson produced his plan for co-opera-tion. It was proposed, if war should occur, to embark at the earliest possible moment the whole of the British expeditionary force. In accordance with these plans, directly the issue of peace or war ■was assured, the British army would leave these shores. In other words, the country, at the very opening of what might have been denuded of practically all the trained troops available in the British Isles. The only military forces which would have remained would have been the territorial army, and a residuum of regulars. Between 150,000 and 160,000 men were to be despatched instantly, thus acting directly contrary to the whole basis of the military policy of the Cabinet. It will be recalled that army spokesmen have always urged the possibility of this country being invaded by a force of 70,000 men—a claim which the navy has consistently denied. On this basis the Government is pledged to keep the expeditionary force in this country until sufficient time has elapsed to enable the territorial army to be mobilised and trained to such a stage of efficiency in the safety of the British Isles when the moment came for the withdrawal of the regulav troops. ADMIRALTY'S POSITION. The Admiralty was consulted, and the Admiralty refused to countenance such a scheme, even to the extent of working out plans of co-operation with the army, until the whole Cabinet had given its concurrence. Those who had been responsible for the scheme of launching practically the whole British army upon this European adventure suddenly found a difficulty across their path, and the difficulty proved insuperable. This is the truth of the crisis. The truth of these statements may be relied upon absolutely. The rumors that the navy was inefficient and unready to face an emergency were an afterthought. Possibly the explanation of their circulation may be found in a certain feeling of chagrin in military circles at the failure of plans to which so much time had been devoted. It may be advisable to deal with these stories reflecting upon the navy with some particularity in order that the public may be reassured. At the time of the crisis the available British naval force in home waters was considerably more than twice as strong as that possessed by Germany. The Home fleet is so large, it consists of so many units, that it can seldom be assembled at one base. It is also necessary to divide it from time to time in order to secure effective training. With this end in view this portion of the navy is divided into three divisions, and is under the orders of a senior admiral, two vice-admirals, and four rearadmirals, all of them officers of wide and high professional knowledge, in whose ability the country has every reason to place full reliance. These officers interpret the fighting policy of the Board of Admiralty, the chief expert member of which is Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson. This officer inherited from the Board of Admiralty, of which Lord Fisher was the chief expert member, a carefully and 1 anxiously elaborate fighting policy. In accordance with this policy, as every naval officer knows, the fleet has since been trained for war, and it was no mere after-dinner assurance when Mr. Churchill recently stated that the navy was not only strong, but instantly ready for any eventuality. DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLEET. At the moment when plans were being made which might have led to war, the first division of the Home fleet, under the Commander-in-Chief, was at Cromarty, its base commanding the northern exit from the North Sea, while the second division of the fleet was at Rosyth, only three or four hours' steaming distant. The naval authorities thus had concentrated at these two adjacent points on the Scottish coast, 12 ships of the Dreadnought class, of which four were battleship cruisers, two battleships of the Lord Nelson class, and six battleships of the King Edward VII. class. These 20 armored ships mounted 144 12-inch guns, and they were supported by six armored cruisers, superior in offence and defence to the older ships under the German flag. On the other side of the North Sea, the German fleet possessed four vessels only of the Dreadnought class, in addition to 12 older battleships, carrying altogether 88 11-inch guns. It should be added that the British ships also mounted 44 9.2-inch guns, to which' there is no corresponding armament in the battleships of the German fleet, which has no gun between the 12 or 11-inch weapon for battle, and the 6-inch weapon, which is now recognised by the admiralties of the world as no longer available for use in the major operations of naval war. The increased range of torpedo necessarily fixes the distance at which fleets will engage in action. It should be added that the first and second divisions of the Home fleet were admirably supported by two flotillas of destroyers, consisting of nearly SO craft, and the Brit ish East Coast was patrolled, as usual, by a powerful force of destroyers. torpedo-boats and submarines. Moreover, the heavy ships 'and the small craft had associated with them a more complete fleet of the auxiliaries necessary to effective operation than has ever been organised. It should also be added that at the moment the third division of the Home fleet, consisting of the 11 other older battleships and a large number of cruisers and torpedo craft, was in readiness 'for any emergency, while at that time the Atlantic fleet of six battleships and four armored cruisers was in British waters available for use if the necessity arose. The statement that the German fleet was lost sight of by the Admiralty is, of course, ridiculous. The Naval Intelligence Department's province is to ascertain the movements of warships the world over, and in these days of wireless telegraphy even the German fleet could not hide itself, If it would. THE FABER SPEECH. A GRAIN OF TRUTH. The grain of truth in the flaring speech of Captain Faber, M.P., regarding Bri-

tain's unpreparedness during the recent German crisis is (says the Sydney Morning Herald's correspondent) as follows: It is clear in the face of it that what Captain Faber really blurted out was a sort of travesty of the army's complaint that the navy was not ready for war, because it would not guarantee if war came to immediately guard the carrying of -six divisions of soldiers across the Channel. It lias been believed for some time that the help which England was to give the French on land if France were forced into war was a big, compact army of six divisions or regulars, to act in Belgium, if that country were invaded by Germany, or else to the north of the French forces. This is probably correct, and the army officials probably asked tlie Admiralty if they could give them a same passage the instant war broke out. Clearly the Admiralty could take no such risks until they had cleared the sea of the main fleet, the clear first duty of the British fleet in war time. Presumably Sir Arthur Wilson gave this answer, and it was probable made the ground for a- grumble in high military quarters that the navy was not as ready as the army—a grumble of which some echo reached Captain Faber. It is also pretty safely stated that i the grain of truth on which Captain Faber built his story about Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Lloyd-George alone supporting France is that, when the question.arose of how France should be supported if necessary, some members of the Cabinet were in favor of supporting her with the fleet alone, whilst others—possibly these two—held that she ought to be vigorously supported on land as well, if success were to be obtained. There was never any question as to whether support should be given in the last re-' sort, but only as to whether England could wisely transport her army to cooperate with the French. As to the talk as to the division of the fleet in the crisis, it is simply a question for the ordinary man whether he prefers to trust the strategy of Sir Arthur Wilson, admittedly the greatest strategist England has had in recent time, or a retired army captain. One is not going to assume that the idea of concentrating all the fleet in one occurred to Captain Faber and the public, but not to the First Sea Lord of the • Admiralty. The first division of the Home fleet and the first cruiser squadron were at Cromarty—they alone were a tough nut for •the German high seas fleet; and the second division of the Home fleet and the second cruiser squadron were at Queensferry, a few hours away, and in constant touch by wireless, not only with each other, but with their destroyers, which were close by them. The other two divisions of the Home fleet were together the other side of Scotland in the Clyde, and the Atlantic fleet not far away from them at Berehaven. Anyone who assumes that the whole ought necessarily to have been kept together assumes that naval strategy is a very simple matter, unconcerned with questions of reserve, and so on. But, of course, those questions did not trouble Captain Faber. What is far more serious is the allegation of Lord Charles Beresford that there were at the time of the crisis no supplies of oil in the north, and that, as the destroyers there consumed oil, and not coal, they had to draw their supplies from the battleships. It is quite possible that this sudden test did find the navy seriously wanting in some points, such as that, and Mr. Winston Churchill, who is known to be taking up his work with great activity, will probably make these defects impossible of recurrence with his war staff.