LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REFORM

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 100, 5 January 1912, Page 2

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REFORM

THE NOMINATIVE SYSTEM DEFENDED. (By .the Hon. Oliver Samuel, M.L.C., in the DunedinStar). I thank you, Mr. Editor, for the compliment you .pay me in inviting me to express my views on "Legislative Council Reform." It is a, subject which has naturally, engaged my attention, and on which I hold strong opinions. Under the party system, which dominates our Legislature and our Government, it seems to me that, whatever may be the case with a nominated bodv, aii elective body must, of necessity if not aided by another body not subject to the like disadvantages," be unfitted to do good work in legislating. Even when Parliament, the Press, and the Public are not approaching, or in the throes of, a General Election, the atmosphere of the House of Eepresentatives is so affected that little or no regard is paid to anything which does not seem likely to conduce to the success of one's party or to injure the other side. The merits of a question are practically disregarded in very many cases, there being neither the requisite time nor the adequate inducement to consider them.

. Without adopting the uncharitable notion that meonbers of the House spend most of their time in party intrigues and squabbling, it is certain that they are compelled to devote their special attention to "roads and bridges" (for success in obtaining public money for their districts is essential, in order to retain the "confidence" of their constituents), to propitiating those who can assist them in attaining then* own ends, and in attending to the voluminous correspondence which they daily receive from constituents and others.

Bills not appearing to be likely material for electioneering purposes—however they may affect the welfare and happiness of the people—must be, and are, frequently passed without due consideration, and, towards the end of every session, even unread.

The Council is very much less affected by these disturbing influences than the House, for no other reason than that it is not elective. But to make it also elective would deprive its members of the advantages they now enjoy, and render them in this reject as inefficient for the purposes of legislation as are the members of the House.

Nor do I think that to elect some and nominate others would have any good result, while to differentiate in this respect would introduce a disturbing element in the Council.

It is alleged tliat the Council has been made a dumping ground for men who cannot, and do not, render good service there to the people, and that gratitude for past and hope for future favors have sapped the independence of the Council and" impaired its usefulness. But even if this is so, the fault is not that of the "nominee" system. The people elect the House of Representatives, that House selects the Government, and that Government selects the Legislative Councillors, as they also do the Supreme Court and Native Lands Court Judges, the High Commissioner, the Auditor-General, Soli-citor-General, Public Trustee, and all other permanent officials. If there have been and may in future be men appointed as Councillors on political, party or personal grounds, not fitted for the position, does not this also apply equally in the case of appointments to the other offices I have named?

If the Government for the time being cannot be trusted to select men fitted for Legislative Councillors, can they be trusted to select Judges, an Auditor-General (to be a check on the Government themselves), a Public Trustee (with whom the Goyemment have constantly financial dealings), and magistrates? If a Government does not properly discharge its duties and functions, should not it be rather removed from office than have those duties and functions taken from it and placed in the hands of the electors at large, who cannot possibly possess the requisite knowledge of the individuals available for appointment to enable them to judge of their fitness for the special duties required of them?

As usual, when dissatisfied with the way in which a law is administered, we are prone to cry out, "Alter the law," instead of "Improve the administration of the law." I remember that in the "eighties" Bills were more than once introduced in the House (of which I was then a member) to make the offices of Governor and of justices of the peace elective, because it was alleged that undesirable appointments had been made, and that the "nominee system was undemocratic"—especially in the case of a Governor, in whose selection the people of New Zealand has neither directly nor indirectly any voice. I think that the limiting of the term of office of a Legislative Councillor has weakened the confidence of the public in the independence of the Council, but to make it electivo would destroy its independence (in another sense) and its usefulness, deprive the people of the services of some of those who are best fitted for the special work of the Council, and inevitably bring the Council into conflict with the House of Representatives. It might be possible to further limit the functions of the Council in respect of "policy Bills," so that the deliberate will of the elected representatives of the people might not be capable of being set at naught, and that the "politics" or "party color" of those appointed should not be material to the party making the appointments, and the places of residence of the individual councillors might be disregarded. But, above, all. it should be universally recognised that in the case of appointments to the Council (as, for instance, in the case of appointments to the Supreme Court Bench) the paramount duty of the Government is to select fit persons, and that it is discreditable and improper to appoint any person a member of the Legislative Council on any other ground than that his appointment is desirable in the interests of the people of New Zealand as a whole.