Behind the Scenes

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 135, 29 November 1911, Page 5

Behind the Scenes

THE MOROCCAN' NEGOTIATIONS. GERMANY AND BRITAIN. STATEMENT BY BRITISH FOREfGN MINISTER, By Cable—Press Association—Copyright. London, November 27. In the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey delivered his important speech on the recent relations between Germany and Britain. Rising to move a resolution, " That the foreign policy of the Government be now considered," he said that the recent disclosures by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs were incomplete.

The German notification of July 1 implied the re-opening of the Morocco question. On July 3he told the German Ambassador that the Cabinet must discuss the situation, and on the 4th, after the Cabinet meeting, he intimated thai Britain must consider her treaty obligations and her own interests in Morocco, and that Britain was unable to recognise any arrangement come to without her.

Then came a period of silence when certain information caused the apprehension that Germany contemplated the partition of Morocco. The German Government told Sir William Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, on the 12th, that it was not intended to arrange a partition with France and Spain. The newspapers then reported the demands concerning the French Congo. Sir Edward Grey on the 21st intimated that if the negotiations to rectify the Congo boundaries were unsuccessful, embarrassment would arise. The Ambassador replied that he had no information.

Mr. Lloyd-George spoke after consulting the Premier and himself. The German Ambassador in London then made an exceedingly stiff communication.

Sir Edward Grey then replied that Mr. Lloyd-George's speech could not haw created surprise in Germany, unless there was some tendency to think thai Britain might be disregarded. (Cheers.)

6ir Edward Grey, continuing, said that the British Ambassador in Berlin subsequently made further assurances. Sir Edward Grey added Uiat England's relations with France and Russia did not encourage provocation against Germany. The cardinal point of British policy was tt»at it could not sacrifice friendship with, other countries, and could not force the pace of improved relations with Germany; but England would respond in the tone and spirit of the Chancellor's recent speech.

A STRIKING SPECTACLE. A GREAT ASSEMBLAGE. AX ILLUMINATIVE AND PATRIOTIC SPEECH. THE WORK OF THE DIPLOMATS. Received 28, 10 p.m. London. November 28. The House of Commons presented a striking spectacle. The galleries were crowded with peers, ambassadors, attaches, and a number of Eastern visitors and foreigners. The House was restless until Sir Edward Grey tosp. Then the tensity was only broken- by cheers. The speech evoked occasional illuminative and patriotic phrases, the greatest applause being when he justified Mr. Lloyd-George whole-heartedly. He spoke for an hour and twenty minutes with deliberation and great clearness, reading important passages. Sir Edward Grey declared the Moroccan negotiations were Btill important, serious and delicate, and he intended to confine his speech to that subject. It was impossible for the Government to postpone full settlement longer, despite the risk of disturbing the discussion which had not yet taken place between France and Germany. Herr von Kidcr-lin-Wachter's. disclosures were published contrary to diplomatic custom, without notifying Britain. Sir Edward Grey said he knew nothing until he read the statement in the newspapers. It was understood that the exigencies of the situation rendered it impossible for Britain to be consulted. Herr von KiderlinWachter had already denied that France insisted on going to Fez in defiance of Germany. Finally information was received leading him to apprehend that Germany contemplated a settlement, including the partition of Morocco, after negotiations whereto it was not intended Britain should be a party, though it was true Britain was not interested herself in Morocco politically. By the AngloFrench agreement of 1904, however, Britain expressly reserved the possibility of a disturbance of her economic and strategical conditions. Soon after Sir W. Gosehen's interview on the 12th, German newspapers reported that Germany had made demands in the French Congo to an extent to which it was obvious neither the French Government nor the Chamber of Deputies could agree.

Sir Edward Grey therefore saw Count Metteraich on the 21st, and said that Britain's silence must not be interpreted to mean that she was not interested in Morocco. The Government, he said, would be glad if a settlement were arranged on a basis of the rectification of the Congo frontier, but was anxious because it appeared that Germany's demand was not a rectification of the frontier but a cession of the Congo, which it was impossible for France to concede. If negotiations were unsuccessful a very embarrassing situation might arise. lie pointed out to Count Metteraich that it was rumored that Germans were binding at Agadir and negotiating with the natives, suggesting it might be for the purpose of acquiring concessions, and that the German flag might even be

hoisted at the port., which was the most suitable on the coast for a naval base. On July 1, when Count- Metternich came to the Foreign Office notifying the despatch of the Panther on the ground that German firms required protection, he explained that the Panther would be withdrawn when the position in Morocco resumed a quiet aspect. This communication was accompanied by an explanation making it dear that Germany regarded a return to the status quo doubtful, if not impossible, and that slue contemplated a definite solution of Morocco between Germany, France and Spain. Sir Edward Grey, realising that the whole Moroccan question was being reopened, consulted' Mr. Asquith, and then invited Count Metternich to an interview on the 3rd, and informed him that the situation was so important that it must be discussed by Cabinet. Accordingly, after Cabinet had desired Count Metternich to inform Germany, he saw the latter on the 4th, and said it was impossible for Britain not to be interested in Morocco, and that she must take into consideration her treaty obligations, with France. Many days of silence followed, Count Metternich not being instructed to make any comment ion the Cabinet's communication.

Received 28, 1i1.30 p.m. The, longer the Panther remained at Agadir the greater the risk of developing a situation which would make it difficult to withdraw, and render it necessary for Britain to take steps to protect British interests. Count Metternich replied that he was unable to give information, but was sure Germany did not intend to acquire commercial monopolies. The same day Mr. Lloyd-George's speech was delivered, he, Mr. Asquith and Sir E. Grey had a feeling that public opinion would 1 be misled if the subject was longer ignored. Mr. Lloyd-George claimed no pre-emi-nence or predominance in Britain's international affairs, and no menace such as saying "Hands off!" to anyone anywhere. The purport of his speech was, " Where Britain's interests are affected we must not be treated as of no account." If the time ever comes when this cannot be said we shall cease to exist, at anyrate as a great Power. (Great cheering.) Unfortunately, Mr. Lloyd-George's words were soon forgotten. <•

Count Metternich on the 24th informed Sir E. Grey that not a man had landed in Agadir. Germany regretted the credence given to the insinuation from hostile quarters and that Germany never thought and never would think of creating a naval port in Morocco. Such an idea was an hallucination, and moreover if the demands were rather high they were ready to make France concessions in Morocco in addition to colonial! matters. He added that the chauvinistic tone of the French and British press, which was menacing to Germany, hampered a settlement.

Sir E. Grey asked if he could communicate the statement to Parliament with a view to Mr. Lolyd-George's spe«ch.

Count Metternich then made the communication contained in Herr von Kider-lin-Wachter's speech. The stiffness of the communication caused Sir E. Grey to say the surprise created in Germany alone seemed to be a justification for Mr. Lloyd-George's speech.

Sir E. Grey added that since it was inconsistent with German dignity to give an explanation of the Agadir incident, the tone of Germany's communication made it inconsistent with British dignity to give a public explanation of Mr. Lloyd-George's speech. (Cheers.)

He told Count Metternich it was not intended to do or say anything to embroil negotiations between Germany and France, but it would evidently be a difficult situation if they failed. Count Metternich on the 27th made a communication, saying he trusted that Sir E. Grey had gathered the conviction that Germany's pourparlers with Franc* did not touch British interests. He asked Sir E. Grey to inform Parliament accordingly, without giving details of the confideafltial communication. He added that territory would eventually be exchanged and would be exclusively German and French. Therefore it was advisable to leave the matter to the two parties immediately concerned. Germany seriously wished' to diminish the points of friction with France in her colonial sphere. A public statement of Britain's desire for a successful conclusion to the pourparlers would help to calm public opinion in France. Sir E. Grey said the House would observe that the tone of this was exceedingly friendly. From that date onward no further difficulties arose. He expressed appreciation to Count Metternich, who replied regretting British public opinion had been misled.

Sir E. Grey answered: "What could be expected when ships were suddenly sent to the most suitable, port for a naval base?" Even a denial of intention to establish a naval base had not been published. However, he hoped the present communication might be taken as a new shirting place.

Sir E. Grey added that Herr KiderlinWachter staled that Germany never intended taking the port. If Britain had been told this at the first, much miswould have been avoided. The French Government consulted Britain at every point where it was likely that British interests would be affected.

It. wa< understood that Captain Faber's speech had somewhat intensified the bitterness. He could only say that Captain Faber's speech was not official. There were speeches made in Germany equally open to objection. The people seemed to take a delight in suggesting the country was on the verge of war. The world seemed to be suffering from a fit of political aJcnhoism. Personally, he never believed Germany would breakoff negotiations, but Germany's statement was not agreeable to calling a Moroccan conference.

lie suggested the possibility of a most deliberate diplomatic situation, but that there was no prospect of war. He hoped

his statement would act as a sedative regarding the general foreign policy. He thought it wisest for Britain to expand further as little as possible, especially in Africa. Germany's strength was a guarantee that no one would seek to quarrel with her, but German public opinion ought to be reminded that a nation having the biggest army, with a yery big navy, and building a bigger na\ T y, must do all possible to prevent national apprehensions. Addressing the Radicals, he declared it would be disastrous if Britain proclaimed that under no circumstances would she give a friendly Power assistance. That reversion to the policy of "splendid isolation" necessitated building battleships against the united nations of Europe. He did not believe Germany had aggressive designs. Hear von Kiderlin-Wachter had spoken of a "clean slate." Sir E. Grey endorsed that sentiment, and hoped that Britain would take a part in removing the Moroccan trouble, which would contribute materiality to the expectation of peace. He concluded amidst loud and prolonged cheers. air. Bonar Law, leader of the Unionists, declared the Premier should have spoken in the House of Commons instead of delegating the duty to Mr. LloydGeorge. An Anglo-German war was inconceivable. He desired that every cause of friction with Germany should be removed. Britain did not want more territory. She had sufficient responsibilities already.