ITALY AND TURKEY

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 88, 4 October 1911, Page 3

ITALY AND TURKEY

HOW TURKEY DEFEATED GREECE. STORY OF THE WAR OF 1807. Turkey's last appearance as a combatant, apart from her numerous interval campaigns, was in 1897, when Greece attempted to seize the Turkish island of Crete, defied the demand of the Powers for the withdrawal of the Greek army from Crete, and on the mainland despatched irregular forces across the Turkish frontier at the beginning of April of that year. On April 17 Turkey declared war, and, after a short but disastrous campaign for Greece, hostilities elided on May Ifl. This war involved practically two distinct campaigns, in Thessaly and in Kpirus. Upon the Thessalian frontier, j says one historian, the Turks, early in i .March, had concentrated six divisions (about. 58,000 men), 1500 sabres and 136 guns, under Edhem Pasha. A seventh division was rendered available a little later. The Greeks numbered about 45,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and !)6 guns, under the Crown Pripec, On both sides there was a considerable dispersion of forces along the frontier. The Turkish navy, an important factor in the war of 1877-7S, hail become paralytic ten years later, and .the Greek squadron held complete command of the sea. Expeditionary forces directed against the Turkish line of communications might liavo influenced the course of the campaign; but for such work the Greeks were quite, unprepared, and beyond bombarding one or two insignificant, ports on the coastline, and aiding the transport of troops from Athens to Volo. the navy practically accomplished nothing. On April !) and 10 Greek irregulars crossed the frontier, either with a view to provoke hostilities or in the hope of fomenting a rising in Macedonia. On April 18 Edhein Pasha, whose headquarters had for some time been established at Elassona, ordered a general advance. The Turkish plan was to turn the Greek left and to bring on a decisive action, but this was not carried out. At Mati, covering the Toad to Tyrnavo, the Greeks entrenched them- 1 selves. Here sharp lighting occurred on April '2l and 22, during which tho Greeks sought to turn the right (lank of the superior Turkish central column. On April 2.'! fighting was renewed, and the Greeks were threatened on both flanks. I In the evening a general retreat was ordered, and the loose discipline of the Greek army was at once manifested. Humors of disasters spread among the ranks, and wild panic supervened. In great disorder the mass of the Greek army fled southwards to Pharsala. There was no pursuit, and (he Turkish com-j ruander-in-chief did not reach Larissa till i April 27. | GREECE IX RETREAT.

Larissa being abandoned by the Greeks,! Yelestino, tin- junction uf the Thcssnliaji railways, where there was a strong position covering A'olo. seemed to be the natural railyinfr point for the Greek army. Whether by direction or by natural impulse, however, the mass of the Greek troops made for I'harsala, where some order was re-established, and preparations were made to resist attack. The importance of Velestina was recognised by sending a brigade thither by railway from I'harsala, and the inferior Greek army was thus split into two portions, separated by nearly 40 miles. On April 27 a Turkish reconnaissance on Yelestino was repulsed, and further lighting occurred on April 2!> and 30. in which the Greeks, tinder Colonel Smolensk!. held their own. .Meanwhile the Turks marie preparations to attack I'harvila. and on .May o I he Creeks were driven from their positions in front of the town by three divisions. Further lighting followed on .May (i, and in the evening the Greek artny retired in fair order upon Domokos. "Again delaying, Kdh< in I'asha did not attack Domokos till May 17, giving the Greeks lime to entrench their positions. The attack was delivered in three columns, of which tin' right was checked and the ccntri' failed to take the Greek trenches anil suffered much loss. The left column, however, menaced the line of retreat, and the Greek army abandoned the whole po-itinn during the night. The Greek forces being much demoralised, the intervention of the Czar was invoked by telegraph: and the latter sent a personal appeal to the Sultan, who directed a suspension of hostilities. Oil May -20 ail armistice was arranged. In kpirns at the outbreak of war about 1.3.00(1 Greeks, including a cavalry regiment and live batteries, the whole under Colonel Mauos, occupied a line of defence from Aria to IVeta. The Turks, about 25.01 H) strong, with fortyeight guns, tinder Aclimet' tlifshi I'asha. were distributed mainly at lanninn, Pen tepagadia. ami in front of Arta. On April IS the Turks commenced a three days' bombardment of Arta; but successive attempts to take the bridge were repulsed, and during the night of April 21 they retired on Philippiada. 2G miles distant, which was attacked and occupied by Colonel Manos on April 23. The Greeks then advanced to Pentepagadia meeting with little resistance. Their difficulties now began. After some skirmishing on April 27 tile position held by 1 heir advanced force near TToinoptilos was attacked on April 28. The attackwas renewed on April 2!). and no Greek reinforcements were forthcoming when needed. A retreat, was ordered, which <1 uicklv degenerated into panic-stricken flight to and from Arta. Reinforcements, including 2.">W( Epirote volunteers, were sent to Aria from Athens, and on Mav 12 another incursion into Turkish territory began. The Greeks fought well, and being reinforced by a battalion from the left and. for a time, fairlv held their own. Oil the ni.uht of May M a retreat was ordered and well carried out. Thi> volunteers landed at the mouth of the I.urn were attacked and routed with lieavv loss.

A MISMAN'Anm CAMPATfJX. I in- <-am| ;;iiu 11 in Kpirus thus failed as .-..wpN-lcly !is I hiit in Thc-salv. Under lie t enns o! till' treaty of peace. si«^ni-,i nil September 21). ;inil iirrnnired bv"th.Kuropean Powers, Turkey obtained ail indemnity of €4.00(1,1)01), and a rectification of the Tlic—Gillian frontier, earrvinu with it some strategic advantage. History records few move unjustifiable wai-., "writes Sir (itorjje Sydenham Ularke, than (lint which (irecce jrratiiit-"ii-ly provoked . The Creek troops on several occasions showed tenacity and endiirance. !mt discipline and cohesion were manifestly wnntin<r. Many of the ollicers were incapable; the c:i tnpai.uu w.i- •ri;i vel v mismanaged : ;nid politic.-, which led to I he war. impeded it s operations. On the other hand, the fruits of the (.crman tuition, which in ISSO. anil received a powerful siimnluby llie appointment of (.Yneral von dor rioltz in were shown in the TurL-'-h army . The mobi)i.-ation was on the whole smoothly carried out. and the new!v-voinp]cted railways jjrcatlv faciiitilled the concent ral ion on the frontic Che yomw school of ollicers trained in Von d"r CoHz d ; - ahilitv •"■'illen i,t I, kos was Well li:in(1! I'd. Tin. sitjierii.r iciidine was. however, not conspicuously successful; anil wliile tlie v;ink and lile ""•V! s,l "wed ex-cellcnt miliiiiry (|iialitics,[ 1 )■ n i: icaT conditions and the Drienlal pre-' di'iciion for half-measures ami for denvfull responsibility and full powen to commanders in the Held enfeebled tin' conduct of the campaign. On account

lof the total want of careful and systematic. peace training on both sides, a war> , which presented several interesting r j strategic problems provided warnings in j >place of military lessons. j

ITALY'S LAST CAMPAIGN. ' ANINGLORIOUS CHAPTER OF HISTORY. THE DEFEATS IN ABYSSINIA. The Italian Army has seen only orte campaign of any consequence since the conclusion of the Continental wars of the middle of last century. This was the termination to a former disastrous adventure in Africa, when an attempt was made to establish a protectorate over the independent State of Abyssinia. The Italians in this case first came on the scone of Assab, a port near the southern entrance to the Red Sea, which an Italian company had acquired by purchase from the local Sultan, and sold to the Italian Government in 18S2. After several missions to open up relations with Menelek, then pretender to the throne of Abyssinia, Beilul was occupied by the Italians in 1885, and the port of Massowah was taken over from Egypt shortlv afterwards.

ThU latter act was greatly Tesented by the Abyssinians, for by a treaty concluded with a (British and Egyptian mission in the previous year, free transit of goods was to be allowed through this port. Matters came to a head in January, 1887, when the Abyssinians, in consequence of a refusal from General Gene to withdraw his troops from Waa and Tula, surrounded and massacred 400 Italian troops at Dogali. Reinforcements were sent from Italy, and in April, 1888, the Italian forces, numbering 20,000 men, I came into touch with the Abyssinian armv; but negotiations took the place of fighting, with the result that both forces retired, the Italian only leaving some 3000 troops at Eritrea, as their i colony was now called. On the death of the Emperor John in 1880 Menelik pr.oI claimed himself Emperor, and received I the submission of Gontlar. Gojain and | several other provinces. As it happened, i Count Antonelli was with Menelik when | he claimed the throne, and promptly I concluded with him on behalf of Italy a friendly treaty, to be known hereafter as the famous Uccialli treaty. In eonsequence of this the Italians occupied j Asmara, made friends with Mangasha, j and received Ras Makunnen. The Italians became more and more friendly with Mangasha and Tigre, two princes who refused to acknowledge him, and the apprehensions of Menelik increased, till at last, in February, IS!).*!, be wrote denouncing the Uccialli treaty. Meanwhile the Dervishes were threatening Eritrea, and after a series of actions J in 1593 and 1894, the Italian commander, I General Baratieri, pushed his forces un- [ supported too far to the south. Menelik was advancing with a large army in national support of Mangasha, and'the subsequent reverses at Amba Alagi (Decern-' bcr 7. 18M) and Makalle (January 2.'), I.SUOi forced the Italians to fall back. Reinforcements of many thousands were meanwhile-arriving at Massowah, and in February Baratieri took the field at the head of over 1,1.000 men. Menelik's army, amounting to about 90.000, had during this time advanced, and was occupying a strong position at Abba Gariina. near Adnn. Here Baratieri attacked him on March 1, but the dill'ieulties of the country were great, and one of the four Italian brigades was pushed too far forward. This brigade was attacked by overwhelming numbers, and on the remaining brigades advancing in support, they were successively cut to preees by the encircling masses of the enemy. The Italians' lost nearly 4000 killed and wounded and 2000 prisoners, wliilM the Abyssinians owned to a loss of over .WOO. General Unldissera advanced with a large army of reinforcements to avenge this defeat, but the Abyssin- | ians, desperately short of supplies, had ' already retired, and beyond the peaceful I relief of Adigrat no further operations | tool; place. A peace was signed at Addis ' Abbaba in the following October, and j negotiations on the question of frontiers , were commenced, which were only ! brought to a conclusion in the autumn I of

THE SAXI'ST. A POWERFUL MOSLEM ORDER. HISTORICAL SKETCH,. There is a groat, consensus of opinion among people in a position to judge that l ho act ion or inaction of the African Mohammedans will havp a very important bearing on the war. Will tiipy come to •Jip assistance of Turkey ? If they do Italy will prohahly have a big task in front of her. A recent, cablegram stated that the Ranusi (Semiosi), a great Mo thainmcdan brotherhood, scattered all over North Africa, have promised to join in the defence of Turkey. Dr. Karl Kuiiun, the well-known African missionary and explorer, has declared that Italy has put her hand into a hornet's nest, and a Times correspondent states that events are shaping in a fashion calculated to stir Islam to its depths throughout Africa, and the consequences may possibly he momentous to the interests of the African Powers. The Samisi, to whom special reference lias been made in connection with the war, is described by Dr. Margolionth, as a Moslem sect founded by the Sheikh Sanusi, with whose name the modern movement called Panislarnism is often connected, though Moslem authorities in Egypt deny the connection. The founder of this community, one Mohammed Ibn Ali, of Mustaglmam, born in 17! H, is said to ! hare first organised it in Meccah in the year but to have been compelled to quit Arabia in <1843, when be migrated to Tripolitaine. He had by this time acquired numerous adherent's both in Asia anil Africa, and received ail ovation in Egypt on his way westwards, but declined tn make P>oulak his headquarters, although a zawiyah, or '■' hermitage," was offered him by the Pasha. In'lSs.j Ik; established himself at a point called •laghbub, two or three days' journey from siwa. and till his death'in 185!) was occupied in spreading his system and gaininj; adherents. According to the I'Vriich historian.-, of (he movement, his dot-trine savored strongly of Wahlinbism ill respect of its purilanisni—e.g., prohibition of tobacco and music. Though calling himself a Malakite. he introduced certain a Iterations in the prayer-ritual, with a rule that the rosary should be curried in the hand, not worn; and like oth.-r founders of orders he prescribed a \ v ~t''in of religious exercises over and ali.'Ve the regular performance of worship. The practice followed by himself, of receiving visitors only at special hours ot the day and alter appointment, is mentioned by his enemies as an inni,\ation and contrary to the custom of the Prophet. In the main, however, his idea was u> unite Moslem against, European influence, from which he failed to dissociate that of the Turks. In the hvar: of Africa, then, he proposed to touud .in Islamic stale, whither all .Moslems who wished to he (juit of 1h,...,. pernicious influences could resort for renig,-. Alter his death his work was continued In his sons Sheikh al-.Mahdi and Mohammed Sharif. who, however, tlioivM tit, to adopt a conciliatory attitowards the 'lurks. The 'former it! 'he year IS!M or lSil.l secretly left: ■1 igr.buli. and established himself in Kafra, in the Eastern Sahara. Ilis death, was announced in 1902, but this was de-

nieel by many of his followers, on the ground, it was thought, that a Mahdi does not die.

! The supposition that the Sanusi chief | is accumulating vast stores of arms and unmniiition in his remote home, and organising an army of Moslems throughout the world, is one that has often been circulated by alarmists, who have found people willing to believe it. In 180(1 a French adventurer, the Marquis de Mores, started from Gabcs with the view of traversing the Sahara and reaching Kafra, where he intended offering himself as commander-in-chief to the .Mahdi, whose fortes he would lead in triumph through the Sudan and Egypt, driving the English into the sea; his small company was massacred by the Tawarik at Beresof, and this danger to the British occupation of Egypt was never realised, nor was it discovered what forces the Mahdi had under his command. Although the adherents of the Samusi Mahdi appear to be equal in defending themselves when attacked, t heir conduct lias by no means been such as to justify the contention of the alarmists; M. le Cliatelier is unable to connect them directly with the. murders of French exploring parties in the Sahara; indeed, he gives the authorities of Jaghbub credit for saving one. In 1885 the Sanusi M;ibdi declined to help his rival of Khartoum, that Mohammed Ahmad who spread "fire and sword" in the Sudan, dust as they refused assistance to other European nations'against the French, so they declined to help the Turks against the Russians. ISo far as they lias interfered in disputes between tribes and governments, it appears to have'been with the view of conciliation. When in IDG'S an English'officer'published an alarmist article about the S'anusih ill a leading English review, the' Egyptian reformer, Sayyir l'ashid. took the trouble to re : fute it in liis own journal.