AN EXCUSE FOR MOBILISATION.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIV, Issue 45, 15 August 1911, Page 4

AN EXCUSE FOR MOBILISATION.

Britain rarely takes extromc measures in dealing with a national emergency until every avenue for pacific settlement has been closed, and it was therefore a little remarkable that the Government should have ordered the assistance of the War Office so promptly to quell the strike riots in London. It is presumed that the moral effect of an extraordinarily extensive mobilisation of troops would be very great and would make resort to force unnecessary. It is very likely, however, that the authorities seized the excuse of the strike to test existing mobilisation schemes. Recently, there was a likelihood that troops might be needed for the business for which they are embodied. A sudden mobilisation without obvious reason at Home would create unrest on the Continent, and most proba<bly have commercial effects. While mobilisations are effected at stated periods for manoeuvres it is not common in England for very large bodies of troops to be placed on a war footing suddenly. The fact that large bodies of cavalry were, together with all their impedimenta, forage and stores despatched by road is an indication that the necessity for their immediate presence in London was not great, and that the excuse of the strike was taken as a means of training for men and horses and of giving that wonderful organisation, the Army Service Corps, a chance to do the work it would be called upon to do :'n time of war. This gives an opportunity to mention that by far the most remarkable feat an army ever accomplishes is to feed itself adequately, for, as the greatest soldier said: "The march of an army must be gauged by the speed of its slowest waggon." He also showed that "an army crawled on its stomach," thus emphasising the truth that fighting is merely a matter of feeding. No campaign has yet been undertaken wherein modern means of transport (other than by railroad or steam traction) have been used, and a feature of this latest mobilisation was that the motor lorries playled a most important part. It is probable that in future campaigns (if any should take place) the oil-driven motor waggon will, wherever possible, oust all other methods of transport. This will have the effect of greatly enhancing the movements of artillery and cavalry. Obviously, these considerations may have guided the War Office in its unusually extensive mobilisation scheme, effected apparently for the specific object of breaking a strike, but most likely for other reasons equally important.