THE BRITISH NAVY

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIII, Issue 274, 10 April 1911, Page 2

THE BRITISH NAVY

CONCENTRATION IN HOME WATERS. PERILS OF THE FUTURE. "The security of the British Empire, taken as a whole with many parts,'' wrote Admiral Mahan in a recent article, "demands first the security of the British Islands as the corner stone of the fabric; and, second, the security of each of the outlying parts. This means substantially British control, in power if not in presence, of the communications between the central kingdom and the dominions. This relation is essentially the same as that of a military base of operations to the front of the operations themselves. "11l the present condition of Europe," lie continued, "the creation of the German Fleet, with its existing and proposed development, has necessitated the concentration in British waters of more than four-fifths of the disposable British battle force. These facts constitute Germany the immediate antagonist of Great Britain. I do not say for a moment that this manifests Germany's purpose; J. simply state the military and international fact without inference as to motives. The geographical situation of the two States reproduce precisely that of England and Holland in the early days of Cromwell. It was not till the nations had fought and the Dutch were reduced, leas by battle than by trade desti uction, that the relief of pressure in the North Sea enabled English action abroad. This result was attained more satisfactorily forty years later by the alliance of the two States under the impulse of a great common danger; but whether that alliance would have been feasible without the antecedent settlement by trial of strength is disputable Jn the conr.se of the earlier war the Mediterranean was abandoned by the English Navy in order to concentrate in home witters, and this concentration coupled with the commanding position of the British Islands with reference to Dutch trade routes, determined then the issue. The British Navy to-day has in «reat degree abandoned the Mediterranena for a similar concentration. Over four-fifths of the hatlcship force is in the 'Home' and Atlantic' divisions. The Mediterranean lias fallen from eleven battleships in 189!) to six in 1910, and these six are of distinctly inferior power. What is the contemporary significance of- this fact reproductive of a situation nearly three centuries ago? Constitutive, too, of a situation now novel; for during more than two centuries British preponderance m the Mediterranean has been a notable international factor. The significance, as read by an outsider, is that in the opinion of the Government, under present conditions of preparation, the security of the British Islands requires the weakening, almost to abandonment, of the most delicate, yet very essentia), link in the system of communications of the Empire. "It is entirely true that for the moment the naval concentration* at home, coupled with the tremendous positional advantage of Great Britain over German trade routes, constitutes a great measure of security; and, further, that the British waters, occupied as they now are, do effectually iftte'rp'ose between Germany and the British oversea dominions. The menacing feature in the future is the apparent indisposition and slackness of the new voters of the last halfcentury, over against the resolute spirit and tremendous faculty for organising strength evident in Germany."