The Daily News. SATURDAY, APRIL 8. AN IDEAL PARLIAMENT.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIII, Issue 273, 8 April 1911, Page 4

The Daily News. SATURDAY, APRIL 8. AN IDEAL PARLIAMENT.

Unfortunately Mr. Hine, M.P., in expressing the hope at a Stratford banquet that an "ideal Parliament" might evolve, did not tell the people what, in his opinion, would constitute such a body. It is certain, in the first instance, that no Parliament would approximate to the ideals of each individual, and it is therefore necessary to "strike the happy mean," whereby the majority of the people for whom a Parliament worked might accept [ it as wholly democratic, wholly representative, and absolutely non-partisan. The machinery for the election to place of a representative Parliament—that is, merely one chamber of a Parliament—is in British countries perhaps as perfect as can at present be devised. It is possible, however, that the general ideal can never be reached, where the executive of the Parliament is not selected on a democratic basis. Although a citizen may be assured that a Ministry is selected by its leader from' the best material possible, neither the people themselves nor their direct representatives have any power whatever in the selection. The selected Ministry of a Parliament may represent the ideal of its leader, but not necessarily the ideal of the people. No Parliament, therefore, can be an ideal Parliament until the principle of an elective executive is the base of its constitution. It is not only not in the power of a people or their representatives to decide who shall occupy the seats of the mighty, but the power is given—or at least assumed —by a leader to select members for the executive from outside the popular chamber. In this matter the democratic principle that should guide in such matters is quite ignored. Mr. Hine hoped that the Parliament of New Zealand might yet be represented in an Empire Parliament drawing its members from the King's overseas dominions. Such a Parliament could only be an ideal' one if the various people represented in it were permitted to name the members. The presumption, of course, is that the members of this problematical Parliament would be men of Cabinet rank. Therefore the constitution of the Parliament would be absolutely in the hands of oversea premiers, irrespective of any wish an elected chamber of the people it represented might have. Under the oneman nomination system it would even be possible to send to an Empire Parliament men whose colonial positions had not been secured as gifts from the people. An elective executive could only be ideal if it were drawn solely from the popular chamber. The only just basis for an executive placed in office by a majority of votes of members of both houses would be that the upper chamber was also an elective body. ,No other system could produce either an ideal colonial Parliament, an ideal executive or an ideal Empire Parliament, capable of upholding the views of a vast number of people scattered to the four corners of the earth. There is much that is vague about these suggestions for an Empire Parliament, and much that is difficult in getting together a body capable of deciding momentous questions agitating parts of the whole of the Empire. An Empire Parliament without executive rtbility would be useless. An Empire Parliament, the Powers of which were merely advisory, would seem to be unnecessary. An Empire Parliament with powers superior to the Imperial Parliament and the colonial legislatures would confuse and not help great issues. In fact, if the Empire Parliament, however ideal it might be, had supreme powers, the necessity for decision on vital Imperial questions by the Imperial Parliament and the colonial legislatures would be mere waste of time and money. An Empire Parliament might "deal" with inter-dominion matters and

not decide them. The excuse for its existence would lie merely in its ability to set the Imperial Parliament right on ' vital questions affecting the Empire. It might over-ride the Acts of any of the legislatures represented in it, if it had executive power. If it had not executive power its value would be merely senti- i mental. In the absence of any guide as i to what might constitute an ideal Em- ; [ pire Parliament, one concludes that no j practical detnil has ever occupied the j thought of Imperial statesmen. The as- J sertion that it would be a very good 1 thing for the Empire cannot be proved until it is constituted. To be an Empire Parliament it must be a people's Parliament and not a Parliament whose members are mere nominees of leaders for the time being. If it is to decide questions of great moment, it is unnecessary for the Imperial Parliament as at present constituted to bother itself with vital questions, or for mere colonial Parliaments to endeavor to throw light on questions which a homogeneous body in London may be set up to deal with. The statesman who submits a workable scheme for the constitution of this vague body will clear away the mists. He will have to prove many things, the most important of which will be the supercession of lesser legislative bodies by a greater one. He will also have to show that Imperial matters are at present so badly managed that it is necessary for a new ■ body to amend them, or at least to convince the peoples of the Empire that they should foe amended. In the meantime, in preparation for the glorious day when there shall be an Empire Parliament in London, either with or without executive ability, the people of the oversea dominions must struggle to obtain "ideal" Parliaments of their own. The most necessary and urgent step in this direction is the insistence that execuJ tives chosen by one man or a party caucus shall disappear.