BRITISH NAVY ESTIMATES

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIII, Issue 261, 14 March 1911, Page 5

BRITISH NAVY ESTIMATES

A I'UENCH OPINION. By Cable—Press Association—Copyright. Paris, March 12. Le Temps says that the British Estimates show that the Government now realises that Germany's rivalry in shipbuilding is menacing, also that the adoption of the Dreadnought type must compel Britain to scrap many vessels as obsolete, thus proportionately reducing her numerical superiority—in fact, that the best means of discouraging Germany is not to negotiate but to build. SIR JOSEPH WARD'S SPEECH. i ATTRACTS ATTENTION AT HOME. Received 14, 12.10 a.m. London, March 13. The Standard hopes that the Imperial Government will carefully consider Sir Joseph Ward's spirited declaration regarding the two-Power standard, and that a fitting response will be made at the Imperial Conference. The Morning Leader, though opposing an increase of the Estimates, characterises the speech as a fine one, and emphasises the frank statement that the maintenance of, the two-Power standard is becoming impossible for Great Britain unaided. THE MARGIN OF SECURITY. IS IT BEING MAINTAINED? Writing in the Daily Mail on January 20, Mr. H. W. Wilson states: The most striking feature of the memorandum on the risk of invasion drawn up by the present First Sea Lord is its two assumptions—first, that the strength of the British Navy will be maintained on a basis of two keels to one; and, second, that this entire force can be concentrated in British home waters. Is either of these assumptions justified? And, if not, what is the precise value of the memorandum? We must look at facts as they are—not as we should like to them to be. Now, the facts are that, for the five years during which the Liberal party have been in power, the British and German naval programmes in the most important classes of ships have stood as follow: BRITAIN- . .

18 10 00 Whereas, to maintain the standard of strength in home waters which Sir Ar- ' tliur Wilson postulates, we ought to , have begun 36 armored ships, 20 small cruisers, and 120 destroyers, we actually 1 only laid down 21 armored ships, of 1 which one is for service in the Pacific; ' IS cruisers, of which three arc for Pacific service; and OS destroyers, of which 3 are for the same ocean. Deducting these, our net strengtli for European service provided in the five years was 20 armored ships, all Dreadnoughts, to 18 German, of which 17 were Dreadnoughts; 15 small cruisers to 10 German cruisers; and 63 destroyers to 00 German. Even if we count the four British Dreadnoughts laid down in 1905-6, before the Liberals took office, this is not two keels to one, or anything approaching it. On the other hand, we had some advantage in torpedo-boats—though these are not sea-going craft—as we laid 24 to Germany's none; and in submarines. It is qyite clear that if such a proportion of British t,o German ships is maintained in the British programmes of _ the near future, the German navy is going to draw very close to our own in fighting strength as the old ships are "scrapped." It is in old ships that we are greatly superior to-day. Of battleships other than Dreadoughts now on the effective list Britain possesses 40 to the German 20, but 26 of the British ships and only eight of the German ships are from 10 to 16 years old, and, therefore, on the eve of "scrappin l *." But there is another consideration to take into account, even with the assumption that our entire foree of armored ships, cruisers, and destroyers can be concentrated in the North Sea. At any given moment some of our battleships mnv be laid up by accident or by need for repair. An enemy, having the Intiative, will be able to select his opportunity; and if four of our Dreadnoughts were absent from the fighting line in 1912 or 1913, the British strength in these ships in Home waters would be only equal to the German. Thus the first assumption of the memorandum drawn up by the First Sea Lord is not justified except for the moment. Lnless he obtains an enormous naval programme this year and next year and rumor speaks of modest proposals—it is out of the question to assume that in powerful modern ships the British Navy will stand to the German as two to one. If we deduct six Dreadnoughts from the British total for North Sea service as the minimum that will be needed in the Mediterranean in 1914, we are left with the following force of Dreadnoughts for Britain and Germany in the North Sea:— Complete in 1014 (April). British: 25—1 for Pacific—6 for Mediterranean, equals 18, plus programme of 1911 (unknown). German: 17 plus programme of 1911, equal 21. If the British programme is five, as many anticipate, there will be only 23 British Dreadnoughts to the 21 German. Instead of our possessing two Dreadnoughts to one, two fleets each of equal strength to the German fleet, we shall ha\e one fleet only very slightly exceeding the German force. If there are many British absentees from casualties or Te- ; fits, the fleet will perhaps be actually inferior to the German. But with such a state of affairs all the conditions demanded bv Admiral Wilson have passed away. There is no foree double the would-be invader's strength ready to fall on him; there is no second fleet to replace the main force should it lie deeoved away. It fol- ' lows, then, on the First Sea lord's reasoning, that invasion will lie a real ( and constant menace fsom about, 1912 *• onwards; and that this comifrv, unless

it makes sit onee and without- delay very la rare additions to its (loot, may have to ehoose between disaster j n jho Mediterranean or disaster in (lie NTorth Sea.

Armored 1 1906 . ships. Cruisers. Destroyers .. 3 0 2 1-907 , 1. 5 1908 2 6 16 1909 ... 8 6 20 1910 ,, 5 a 23 •21 18 6G GERMANY1906 ., 3 2 12 1007 ... 3 2 12 190S , , 4 2 ]i 1909 4 2 ].! 1910 ., 4 2 L! — — - ■