BRITAIN'S PERIL.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LIII, Issue 177, 5 November 1910, Page 9

BRITAIN'S PERIL.

ADMIRAL MAHAN'S WARNING. n . HI In compliance with several requests, 111 we reprint from tlie ljoudon Daily Mail m Ilear-Admiral Mahan's much-discussed ar- d< tide on the above question: — 111 The huge development of the Herman g> Navy within the past deeaile, and tlio m insurance that the present rate of ex- p< penditure-over C 20.000,000 annually— q' will be maintained for several years to p< come, is a matter of general interna- J" tional importance. Elsewhere, and in an- e> other connection, 1 have had occasion to point out, in the American press, that " the question immediately raised is no ■ what Germany means to do with this force, which is already second only to « that, of Great Britain, .and for which is 1 contemplated ft further large expansion. « The real subject for the reflection ot n every person, statesman, or privata, it patriotically interested in his country s ( future, is the simple existence present, c; land still more, prospective, of a new " international factor, to be reckoned with in all calculations where oppositions of national interests may arise. I< rom this a ' point of view it is not particularly intei- ° osting to enquire whether Germany has far-reaching purposes of invading Great w Britain or of dismembering her Empire, s nor vet whether, on the other side of the ocean, she purposes no longer in fa- s ture contingencies to show that respect 1 for the Monroe Doctrine which she has i hitherto observed, much to American satisfaction. Americans, while giving full i credit to Germany for the most friendly intentions towards them, have to note ■ that in the future she can do as she si pleases about the Monroe Doctrine, so | far as our intended organisation of naval « force goes, because she will be decidedly stronger at sea than we in the United ' States expect to be, and we have over ■ her no military check such as the inter- ' ests of Canada impose upon Great Bn- » tain. (1 THE EIGHT ATTITUDE FOR GREAT b BRITAIN. t Similarly, the people of Great Britain should sot depend upon apprehension of Germany's intentions to attack in order to appraise their naval necessities and e awaken their determinations. Resolu- j tions bated upon such artificial stimulus a are much, like the excitement of drink, # liable to excess in demonstration, as well as to misdirection and ultimate collapse in energy, as momentary panic is succeeded by reaction. Unemotional businesslike recognition of facts, in their proportions, befits national policies, to be followed by well-weighed measures correeponding to the exigency of the discern- n ible future. This is the manly way, nei- t ther over-confident nor over-fearful; ( above all, not agitated. Of such steadfast attitude, timeliness of precaution, a is an essential element. Postponement v of precaution is the sure road to panic j in emergency. In this characteristic of *j precautionary action a democracy like n that of Great Britain stands at a grave t disadvantage towards a people like the j ; German, accustomed to a strong govern- £ ment. A German writer (Herr Delbruck, ], in the Contemporary for October) has fsaid recently: "In Germany we hold a r; strong independent government, assisted r by a democratic Parliament, to be a bet- t ter scheme than the continual change of, u party rule customary in England." This J was substantially the view of James I. p and Charles I. in England, and we know p what came of it; but it is the German p position to-day. Few Englishmen or t Americans will accept it; I certainly do p not; but for the organisation of force J in the hands of a capable government, f ( such as that of Germany has shown it- o self hitherto to be, the scheme is much s more efficient, because the plain people of h a parliamentary country —the voters — t refuse to think about international or n military matters. Yet it is they who g make and unmake governments, now one t part}', now the other; and the Govern- t ment's outlook upon international pre- I paration is always qualified by a look >■ over the shoulder at the voters. This r is much less the case where the people j have behind them the tradition of being f disregarded comparatively. True, no go- f vernment, not the most autocratic, can t wholly disregard national feeling. The 1 question is one of more or less action, and t as between Germany and Great Britain, ; government in Germany, is, as govern- f ment much more efficient for organised r action, even though it makes less for j the kind of development which follows ] personal freedom from restraint. 1 THE NAVY BECOMING LESS 1 POPULAR. 1 This is the fundamental condition < which the British democracy of to-day has ' to recognise as regards their national j security, upon which their economic fu- ' ture—their food, clothing and housing— < depends: that they stand face to face 1 with a nation one-fourth more numerous 1 than themselves, and one more highly ' organised for the sustainment by force 1 of" a national policy. It is so because < it has a government more efficient in the ordering of national life, in that it can ' be and is more consecutive in purpose, 1 than one /balanced unsteadily upon the ' shoulders of a shifting popular majority'' Fortunately for Great Britain the popu-| lar tradition of the national need for a navy still supplies to some extent and for the moment a steadying hand; , but to one following from a distance the course of British action in late years it certainly has seemed that this conviction is less operative; that its claims to allegiance are less felt and more disputed. Yet, in ease of national reverse, following upon national failure to prepare, it is the democracy, the voters, who will be responsible; the voters also who will suffer. The prolonged formal peace which Europe has enjoyed for thirty years affords a precise illustration of the ineffectiveness of populaces to realise external dangers. Continuance of peace induces a practical disbelief in the possi-. bilitv of war. and practical disbeliefs soon result in practical action, or nonaction. Yet observant men "know that I, there have been at least three wars in [i this so-called period of peace; wars none F the less because no blows were exchang- [ ed, or force determined the issues. The h common phrase for such transactions is "the risk of war has been averted." The t. expression is dangerously misleading, ber cause it is supposed that the controlling t element in this conclusion has been the p adroitness of statesmen, whereas the ex- "* istence and calculation of force have been t really''determinative. Force, ton. notj k merely in the raw material, but the orF ganised force of armies and navies ready b —or unready—to move. $ THE WEAKNESS OF TNSULAR COMj; M UNITIES. J Such misconception is peculiarly liable lo arise in communities insular by posi*ltion like Great Britain, or remote from; * the 'jreat nations of the world as is the £ I nitod States. The measure of security * from external aggression which such con- | ditions confer—the "waterwalled bulwark" of Shakespeare —favors greatly * that free internal development for which democracy is probably the most effecJ tive of instruments. But the sense of J tkis security, removing the pressure felt by less happily-situated peoples, begets

an optimistic attitude towards external dangers, fostering unreadiness for war at the same time that it lessens dependence upon organised government. Other national qualities being equal. Continental frontiers promote the establishment of government effective for external action. A~ we all know, the Roman democracy illustrated this fact by the institution of a dictatorship for emer-1 gencies. For these reasons insular democracies are lax and inefficient in preparation for war. aiul in natural eonsequence their wars have been long and expensive. But wars in the future cannot Jie long, though they may be expensive; expensive of much besides their immediate cost; expensive in advantages lost and in indemnities enacted. Democracies can no longer afford to neglect preparation, relying upon their strength o-f endurance and faculty for recovery which ' probably may exceed that of less free j institutions.' The tme for recovery will ( not be conceded to them any more than | it is by u capable general to a routed , foe. The only provision of time for re-1 eovery open to modern conditions is the i time of preparation. What reason is j there in the nature of things that the j British democracy should not maintain an army proportionally as great as that of GermanyV No, except that the British democracy will not. The national wealth is vas'tly greater; but, notwithstanding this, which indicates not only a certain greater power but a much greater stake, the national will so to prepare does not exist. Many distinguished Englishmen advocate measures tending to this result —to the nation in arms; but I doubt if anyone outside of Great Britain expects to see it. There remains the fleet; and it is the privilege of insular democracies that they can pursue the quiet tenor of their way behind the bulwark of a fleet efficient in numbers—that is, in great preponderance—as well as in intrinsic worth. But note that a State thus favored is militarily in the same position essentially as one that hires an army of mercenaries. The only difference is that the seamen are fellowcitizens; an immense distinction, it will be granted, but it does not invalidate the fact that the mass of citizens are paying a body of men to do their fighting for them. It follows that the least the mass can do in self-respect as for security is to pay amply and timely for the efficiency of the body they thus employ. If they do not pay "with their persons," as the French say, they should with their eash. But the only adequate payment is timely payment—preparation.

GREAT BRITAIN'S UNPARALLELED ' PROBLEM. Democracies have had various tasks J thrown upon them at various times, but ( never perhaps one equal in difficulty to ( that which confronts the democracy of ; Great Britain. As it now stands, the 1 British Empire territorially is an inherit- • ance from times not democratic, and the world is interested to see whether the ! heir will prove equal to his fortune. : There are favorable signs; one of the most so that has met my eye has been ! the decision of the Labor Government in Australia that in time of war the Australian Navy should be at the absolute disposal of the British Admiralty. Such sentiment, realised in commensurate action, is effective Imperial democracy. But my reading has not found ' the corresponding reflection of this deter- , munition in the British Labor party at Home; rather it has seemed to me a disposition to undervalue the necessity of preponderant naval force even in European waters. The security of the British Empire, taken as a whole with many parts, demands, first, the security of the British Islands as the corner-stone of the fabric; and, second, the security of each of the outlying parts. This means substantially British control, in power if not in presence, of the communications between the central kingdom and the dominions. This relatioii is essentially the same as that of a military base of operations to the front of the operations themselves. In the present condition of Europe the creation of the German Fleet, with its existing and proposed development, has necessitated the concentration in British waters of more than fourfifths of the disposable British battle force. These facts constitute Germany the immediate antagonist of Great Britain. I do not say for a moment that this manifests Germany's purpose; I simply state the military and international fact without inference as to motives. The geographical situation of the two States reproduces precisely that of England and Holland in the early days of Cromwell. Tt wa« not till the nations had fought and the Dutch were reduced, less by battle than by trade destruction, that the relief of pressure in the North Sea enabled English action abroad. This result was attained more satisfactorily forty yeai's later by the alliance of the two States under the impulse of a great common danger; but whether that alliance would have been feasible without the antecedent settlement by trial of strength is disputable. In the course of the earlier war the Mediterranean was abandoned by the English Navy in order to concentrate in home waters, and this concentration, coupled with the com- ■ mandinw position of the British Islands with reference to Dutch trade routes, de- ) termined then the issue. A CHANGE IN BRITISH SPIRITS. . The British Navy to-dav has in great dogree abandoned the Mediterranean for > a similar concentration. Over Tourfifths of the battleship force is in the "Home" and "Atlantic" divisions. The Mediterranean has fallen from eleven battleships in 1899 to six in 1910. and these six are of distinctly inferior power. What is the. contemporary significance of this fact reproductive' of a situation near three centuries ago? Constitutive, too, of a situation now novel; for during more than two centuries Bri- ; tisli preponderance in the Mediterranean has been' a notable international factor. The significance, as read by an outsider. "■ is that in the opinion of the Government, ' under present conditions of preparation. the security of the British Islands re--1 quires the weakening, almost to abandon--1 ment of the most delicate, yet very essentia], life in the system of communications of the. Empire. Tt is entirely true that for the moment the naval concen--3 tration at home, coupled with the tree mendons positional advantage of Great Britain over German trade routes, eonstitutes a great measure of seurity; p and. further, that the British waters, occupied as they now are, do effectually interpose between Germany and the British oversea* dominions. The menacins feature in the future is the apparent * indisposition and slackness of the new voters of the last hnlf-centnry. over ■. agaimt the resolute, spirit and tremendous faculty for organising strength evident in Germany, e ' l " THE FUTURE PERIL, n e Tn a recent American magazine (Mcy Clure's Magazine, for June. 1910). a Geri- man writer, reported to be a trusted 1- confidential friend of the Empe.ror, has y said: "The weak man cannot trust his h judge, and the dream of the peace advo- :- cate is nothing but a dream." The con>f centration of the battle fleet in home wait ters is correct; the relative abandon;s ment of the Mediterranean for that pur-

pose, if for the moment only, is likewise correct, especially as the "Atlantic" fleet may be considered an intermediatfe body, a reserve, able to move eastward or southward as conditions require; but the clear reluctance to acquiesce in present naval requirement is ominous of. a day when the Mediterranean may pass out of the sphere of British influence, centred round the British Inlands exclusively. This will symbolise, if it does not at once accompany, the passing of the Empire; for a hostile force in the Mediterranean controls not only an interior line —as compared with the Cape route —but an interior position, from which it is operative against the Atlantic as well as in the East. It is difficult to overstate the effect of this upon the solidity of the Umpire, for the. Mediterranean is one of the great central positions of the maritime world. A "weakened Mediterranean force is the symptom that neither as principal nor as ally may Great Britain :be able to play the part hitherto assumed by her in the great drama of which the awakening of the East is the I present act; while among the drama personac are Egypt, India, Australia and i New Zealand.