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GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

ROBERT ULATCHi'ORD ON THE SITUATION.

Mr. Balfour onto declared tliat the problem of Imperial defence was' the problem of the defence of Afghanistan, but times have changed since then, and .1: shall propose ail amendment to the following effect: —

"The problem of British defence is the defence of France." '

There it is: the greater danger, the nearer danger thai: uv danger of a German invasion v. England is the danger of a Oniir.a invasion of France. Supposing France were attacked and conquered by Germany, how would our lleet prevent the annexation of Calais and Cherbourg? And what could our 'fleet do to prevent the German conquest of France?

That is why I say that the problem of British defence is the problem of the defence of France. Whether or not we form an offensive and defensive alliance with France the result is the same: the defeat of France is the defeat of Britain, The downfall of France is the downfall of the British Empire. The aggrandisement of Germany is the humiliation of Europe. That is what I call the greater and nearer danger: the danger of a. French defeat by Germany. While such a defeat is possible the Germans have no need to risk an invasion of Britain. They can defeat Britain without fighting her.

That is why we must have an army as well as a navy. Now, what are the sacrifices demanded of us bv the situation? What is it that our Ministers want and ask for? Money and service.

If I were a Cabinet, or ex-Cabinet, Minister, I should go out and face the anger and the ridicule of an ill-informed and self-indulgent people with the following programme:— 1. An immediate vote of fifty millions for the navy.

2. The immediate passing of a Com pulsory Service Bill: to come into inv mediate operation.

3. A Bill for the elementary military training of all schoolboys over the age of ten.

4. Tiie immediate establishment of a general staff for the army and the navy. 5. A large increase in the vote for secret service and naval intelligence. 0. An official appeal to all employers' of labor to employ British subjects in preference to foreigners. Also, if upon careful examination I found it would be to our advantage to tax certain imports of foreign manufactured goods (and I believe it would he to our interest) T would advocate such taxation without a tremor or a ■blush.

But this means conscription and protection!

Call it what you please; I am not afraid of names. I call it compulsory military service and fiscal warfare. If the British people refuse to defend themselves they will liecome vassals; and they will have proved that they are unworthy to be anything better. This is not a party question- it is an Imperial question; it is also a European question.

The Empire is in danger. It cannot lie saved by talk: it can only be saved by sacrifice and work. We shall need all our courage; we shall need all our money; we shall need all our strength. This warning is not written by a politician; it does not come from a Socialist, nor from a Liberal, nor from a Tory; it conies' from an Englishman.

But the cost! Yes, the eos't would be heavy, but consider the stake. The stake is honor, liberty, and the Empire. Be the cost what it may, the stake is worth it.

Besides, as to the cost there are three things to be said: the stake is worth the price; we can well afford the price; and if we refuse to pay the price of safety we shall have to pay the tenfold heavier price of defeat. The cost of peace may be high; but peace is worth it many times tokl. Let 11s think of the cost of defeat and ruin.

Some of us who are no longer young can remember the effect of the cotton famine in Lancashire. Thousands of Workers were starving. 'Mills and shops were closed. Provisions were very dear. The distress 1 in the North of England was terrible. Ana thai was all caused by a temporary stoppage of the supply of raw material and a decrease in the supply of food. But imagine the effect of a disaster to the navy; imagine the effect of a German annexation of the ports of France and Holland. Credit? would be shaken to its foundations. Banks would break, food would rise to famine prices, commerce and industry would be paralysed. 'And then as our power waned we should he starved and crushed into an abject surrender. We should lose India and our colonies. We should lose our fleet. We should lose onr trade. We should have to pay ten times as much as security would have cost us, and after unimaginable 1 suffering we should become "the lonscript appanage" of the men of blood and iron, and should be compelled to serve as German soldiers under German commanders.

The chief danger is the nation's ignorance that any danger exists. To the great majority of the British people these warnings will sound like wild exaggeration. But they ;in> simply the plain and frank expression of opinions held hy thousands- of the sanes't and best-informed men in the army, the naw, and the House of Commons.

The public dread of militarism: the nnhlic relur-tance to par the inevitable eost of safety; and the public complacenev and ignorance of danger are the source of the Pirn-Hermans' strongest hope. W the British people can be kept in their present state of iniiocenee until Germany is qifite ready, the PanGermanic destiny will he worked out in blood and iron without risk of failure. 111. On the day when the King of Prussia was declared Emperor of Germany. Britain ought to have adopted compulsory military service. Had we raised a proper army at that time. I think it is not too much to say that tliere would have been no Boer war. no Afghan war. •no Russo-Turkish war, and no prospect of any Avar with Germany. Tt is essential to the maintenance of the world's peace that Britain should 'be strong. Compulsory military training would make Britain strong; it would make for lieace.

Besides —the alternative i.s' slavery. There are better methods of keeping

I the peace than the way I have been reI commending. Universal disarmament would be better for all than universal arn;au:ent. Tf all t'ie warlike preparations, all the lleets and armies in the world, couid be abnh-'n-d. we should be happier, richer, and safer for the change. Biit Britain cannot disarm while the other nations are armed: Europe cannot disarm while America and Asia are armed, Dismiss even- soldier on the globe. and there will be universal peace. But is Russia I -■ -!y to dismiss her trocjw? Is Gent;::::"? Is France? Is Britain? Tlu> r t who suggested it would be : ;:n amiable crank. Fa'ling universal disarmament there is still a better course than that at present followed by the Great Powers. It were better to have the United States' of Europe than the Disunited States of Europe. But we shall have no United States of Europe while one of the Great Powers is bent on working out he.r destiny l»v methods of blood and iron.

These two arrangements being as yet impossible, the next liest course is the maintenance of the balance of power. 'That course requires that Britain shall' be prepared for war. While she has' not a sufficient army she is not prepared for war.

Next a word as to the strategic po*v ( t-ions of the German and the British navies.

It is generally understood, not only in German and British naval and military circles, but in the naval and military circles of America and Europe, that in ia*y contest between Germ'any and another nations hostilities will precede a declaration of war. The Germans do not intend to give warning of their attack. They mean to attack suddenly. Before any declaration of war is made they intend to do, on a larger scale, what the Japanese did at Chemulpo and Port Arthur.

Let us consider what this implies. It implies that until it suits Germany's book to strike we have to remain continually on the defensive. We have tffl maintain day and night a sleepless watcli; we Have to keep continually in the North Sea a fleet of sufficient power to meet the whole concentrated naval forces of Germany at any moment. This fleet must never relax its vigilance, must never extend its line too far, must l»e always ready for action, because we shall never know the day nor the hour when the Germans may attempt their coup.

Such is the strategic position of the future. And I hope that even the complacent noodles who edit Libera] newspapers will understand that such a strategic situation demands a navy of overwhelming force, manned by officers' and seamen of a vigilance and courage more than human. JiV. Although I have often described myself as a Little Englander, 1 have been cognisant of certain considerations which the more aggressive Little Englander seems commonly to ignore. Granting that we got most of our Empire by robbery under arms—though often at the expense of less capable robbers who had got the booty in no honester way—granting that we had no moral right to snatch colonies from t,he French, the Dutch, the Spaniards', t'he Mohammedans, or the Zulus, who had stolen them before us, there still remain several knotty questions to be answered before we hand over the stolen property to any other people. We cannot give Australia back to the aborigines, for we have civilised them off the face of the earth. If we gave New Zealand back to >the Maoris we should simply' be transferring it to Japan, America, or some European Power.

If we have no right to our colonies, neither has any otlier foreign Power. And iftaen, again, there is the question: Would any other Power govern out colonies better than we. or leave them to govern themselves as fully as we?

Ido not want war: I want peace. 1 am not an enemy of the Germans, but a friend. I like Germany; but I love England as a man loves his motliej, or his wife, or his comrade, or his home. And the Empire is in danger; and we are unreadv; and we need a man.

lam not a partisan. I 'have not been "bought" by any party. I am not* on sale. I am risking serious financial loss and incurring much hatred and abuse in a single-minded and unselfish attempt to serve my fellow-countrymen. Hireling scribblers and honorable office-seekers are not sufficiently honest or intelligent to believe that; but it is tmie. .

11 repeat, itlien, the warning given more than once by British and foreign statesmen, soldiers, and sailors: the Empire is in danger; it is unprepared to meet that danger; it will never be prepared to meet that clanger wiiiie tJie Control of its' naval and military affairs is left in the hands of the well-meaning but incompetent members of the present Liberal Government.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TDN19100210.2.67

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 311, 10 February 1910, Page 7

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,865

GERMANY AND ENGLAND. Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 311, 10 February 1910, Page 7

GERMANY AND ENGLAND. Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 311, 10 February 1910, Page 7

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