CAN GERMANY ATTACK?

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 122, 22 June 1909, Page 4

CAN GERMANY ATTACK?

As a contribution to the general uneasiness on the subject of the German menace, the organ of the Rational Defence Association puts forward seriously the theory that Germany docs not need a lleet even equal to the British before risking a war. A resume of this article, which is entitled "Germany's Plan of Attack," is made by the ;Spectator as follows:

"The Germans believe, for various reasons, that fPllcrman naval force, even though weaker by 25 per cent, than ours on paper, would be .sufficient to obtain victory. In other words, while we were counting upon victory because their force was only threequarters of ours, they would consider it fully equal, if not superior, to ours. The grounds on which the Germans hold this belief—as most assuredly they doarc as follows: —ln the first'place, they would be the assailants', and would thus have the undoubted advantage which always belongs in war to the attack. They could choose the time and pla:e and would strike the first blow. Next, they hold that, owing to the principles of construction upon which they have

worked, their navy, ship for ship, has a superiority of gun fire oyer ours. Into these questions we cannot enter in detail, but will say that, assuming, their contention to be true, German)

would no doubt have an immense advantage, because in the last resort naval actions must always be decided by gunfire. Gun-fire is the absolute essential of the fighting-ship. Just as a soldier is a man who has the capacity for kill-' ing his enemy with a l'ifie, so a battleship is a ship capable of destroying ■ other battleships by gun-fire. Granted

equal capacity to keep alloat and to use her guns, the victory is to the 1 big ship with her gun-fire as' to the big battalions. Thirdly, the Germans believe that their armour-plate is superior to the armour-plate used in British ships; therefore they claim not only greater offensive,'but greater defensive power. Fourthly, they claim the -better scientific training of their officers and the superior discipline of their crews'. Their officers are more learned, they assert, and 'the men are more sober, less enfeebled by disease, and better educated than ours.' On this matter, however, it is idle to boast. Only the arbitrament of war can decide.

"Fifthly, the Germans believe they wsses's a superiority in naval strategy >vor us awing to the fact that they

are in 'possession of a naval plan intended, in the first place, to bring about the disorganisation of our naval -preparations, and, in the second place, to facilitate the landing of an invading force on our shores.' The writer of the

article ill National Defence professes to have s'een a secret German naval document that sets forth the plan in question, a plan which he therefore describes. The essential condition of this plan is the absolute readiness of the German lleet to sail at a moment's notice. .No formal declaration of war is to be made, and the plan contemplates advantage being taken of the fog which so often envelops' the North Sea. Here it may be noted that the German naval strategists are declared to rely very greatly upon the- power of their' navy" to navigate in safety during periods of fog. Importance is attached to the remarkable achievement of the' squadron of Prince Henry of Prussia, which in December, 1897, got into Portsmouth harbor during a dense fog, past all the forts and guardships, quite undetected. Again, w e are tpld by the writer iu National Defence that' it is contended that German navigators have reduced the navigation of the North Sea in fog almost to the dimensions of a mathematical certainty. They have, as it were, mapped it out, and from a given pointy to a given point can tell by the rotation of the engine, with almost complete accuracy, where they are. It is an enlarged application of the practice between Dover and Calais, where on a dark or misty night the cautious captain stops his ship after 2000 revolutions to find out where he is.'" GERMAN REASONING.

A different summary of the considerations which' weigh with thinking Germans on this subject is very confidently given by th e National Review, as follows: "(1) That a determined 'nation in arms' of sixty millions must overcome in any struggle, by land or sea, a:i irresolute and unarmed community of forty millions. (2) That a nation'governed by men of action and experts in the art of war enjoys incalculable advantages oyer' a " ipitiou governed by talkers—not, to say wind-bags—and amateur strategists. (3) That although the British Xavy is at present powerful, Great Britain cannot afford'to maintain her superiority since she has saddled herself with' old-age pensions. (4) That British military impotence would in any event paralyse the British >ileet and prevent it from assuming the offensive, yy'j'thpp lyhich success in war is impossible, (,i) That any nayal reverse would cause such a panic to nn unarmed people like the British, dependent, for sustenance on oversea supplies', as would compel the Government to surrender at discietion. (U) That British statesmen are such simpletons that they can always be fooled bv verbal or written assurances into abstaining from serious counter-primara-tions. (7) That sentimental Kadieais. plus the Labor party and dissatisfied Nationalists, can always be relied upon to play Germany's game and hamper the Itritish Government, even were the latter alive f., Il,eunecessities. (8) That a powerful section of (he' British Press can always be manipulated through the Press Bureau of the Wilhelmslrasse or the l'ras Bureau of the German Embassy in London, in the interests of Germany. (In this connection'we would call attention to the suggestion of a Kadi.al co«lc!>ip"rary that Germany's clandestine construction of tlreadiioughts was due to the need of finding work for her unemployed! Did this originate in the brain of a British fool or of ~ Herman knave';) (!)) That England is pcr w ai(ei|l|j, ni|rei|dv andean easily be surprised wijcpeypr Ccrma'.iy chooses to strike. (10} That the Gernmrj high sea lleet is always' on"a war footing, v.'|| ■{.■.■,'„ i||c firitish squadrons >»' c' sen'. , I. iliwirjraulseij, lfiul.'imilimed, and unready, (il)' 's%d the cosuiupo|itsp financier of London, who is rnridy an |?ngllsl|i|in;|, cap be relied npoll to dt'iil a deadly blow \„ British credit at (lie critical moment, (12) That ill the ~ve|it of a (,'ejiiiaii invasion British action might be paralysed bv the blowing-up of the Admiralty, the War Ollice. the Post Office, and other Government departments', and by the .:i-i„;'.;!Jon of transport through the destruction «t lif'h]!(cs bv German residents in .England, iicurty uii of whom arc t.ra.iued' .-o.lj.iers. ' '(!,))' But 'the [•foulest German asset is tile inveterate and niylijcilije p/df-complacency of the or iiuarv Knglisbina||. w]|icb reiplei's l|il|| physically incapable of realising that his' cimiui'v i» in danacr until it is too late 10 avert It,"