THE GERMAN MENACE.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 103, 28 May 1909, Page 4

THE GERMAN MENACE.

HOW DOES KNI'LAXD STAND? (By Tlie Times' Military Correspondent) To what extent, if at all, should the recent revelations ;jri' Parliament attest the organic 'basis upttn which the land forces of the Crown at present rest?

Ui every single examination 01 our military problems Trtiether at home or supremacy of our Navy has ( Hitherto been assumed. Such supremacy is necessarily the primary eonditionjor the security of an oceanic empire united by the highways of the sea, and with- j :>ut this supremacy the integrity of the King's' dominions, except by the conde- { seensidn of a stronger rival, cannot be urisnred. Grave doubt- have now, for the hrst ( time in our modufci history, been ex- i pressed whether we shall bo able to pre- , serve this supremacy against a fOl mid* able Power which, thanks to resolute and uninterrupted efforts, has provided itself with facilities' not incomparable . with ours for the construction, anna- 1 went, manning, and repair of ships of war. This Power has sought to lull us into a raise sense of security while proceeding with its designs— b) a soothing letter despatched to a British First Lord at the moment when its preparations were Ijeing secretly developed to a high degree of intensity, and, secondly, by protestations of friendliness and by declarations of good intentions not amounting to a pledge, representing {he normal diplomatic procedure of every aggressive Power before its pre-parations-arc complete. The extent of our danger must first be measured dispassionately and without exaggeration. It is admitted that our supremacy at sea is at present reasonably assured, errors and omissions of British .strategy* excluded. This satisfactory s'tatc of affairs will last until such time as our pre-Dreaduoughl licet is, if) Mr: As(]uith's words, gradually exrHtdcd from effective competition, and this time is fixed bv tlve Prime Minister, on-the advice of aIT the foremost naval experts, at troiTi five' to eight years. During the years therefore, our pro-Dreadjiought battleships and armored cruisers will become relatively ineffective and will thenceforward cease to count in our comparisons of naval strength. How shall we stand in 1914? Tilt; materials for forming a judgment only allow us to calculate, and even then | without absolute precision, up to March, 1012. By that date the Hermans may have 17 Dreadnoughts aflont, and we shall have 10 or 20, according as we lay down four or eight ships this year. Such is the official computation, and it is. in all conscience, bad enough as it stands. We have as yet no definite assurance that the Government will lavdown more than four ships this year. They will decide according to their information of the progress of Gorman shipbuilding—information which events hav-c shown to be untrustworthy, tardy, and incomplete. It may be ro again, and we cannot count upon more than four ships tWmore arc'Tafd down. Consequently we may not be up to the onePower standard—"fh TJreadnoupJhtfi by Marefi, 15H2, and if more pessimistic j calculations' turn out to lie correct, wo 1 shall be much below the one-Power 1 standard Tn this dominant type or ship., Tn what manner can we hope to re-1 establish our supremacy between 1912 and 1014 when the pro-Dreadnought types will gradually he excluded from 1 effective competition? We shall, no doubt, sooner or later do all we can, but .it remains to be smi whether Germany will not do as much or more. If she pleases she may do as much, and we cannot stop her. It is admitted that her resources for warship construction and armament almost equal ours, .while manning presents no insuperable difficulty to a nation which accepts the principal of personal service. That Germany's prepafations will stop at the point which they have now reached is against all precedents and probabilities. It has always been assumed in Germany that a fresh naval law will be passed in 1011. and there appears at present to "be no assurance whatsoever that Germany will not preserve the advantage which, by her intelligence, foresight, and sacrifices, she , has gallantly won and richly deserved. To such »straignts have we been brought by the odious intrigues and criminal folly of a few members of the Cabinet and their supporters* in the House of Commons whose sinister designs have been insufficiently resisted by the Board of .^lmiralty.

Moreover, the full extent of the da iger is not measured by the mere numer' eal statement of Dreadnought* built and building in England and Germanv. Germany has allies, and we, for the purposes' of war in European wafers, have none. The interposition of Germany's allies in a naval war must be assumed. These allien are Jleditvrranean Power*, and one of them—namely. Austria—intends to add Dreadnoughts to her navy. Either our Mediterranean squadron nm-t have similar ships to oppose them, or we may be compelled in time of war to abandon the Mediterranean as in 17! W.

Broadly speaking, then, the position i< that we have relative though st.eadilv diminishing security at *ea for five y<-ar* to come, and that, after that; lapse of time, all is doubt and uncertainty. This is the best we can say, for the position cannot be better and mav be worse. lr we could Lsay that by persistent and continuous effort we eVutld, with certainty, outbuild Germany, out first duty would be to set to work ami outbuild her. But if. having organised her slips, yards, docks, and foundries in advance* Germany is now able to build ship for ship against us. then in the end the relative position of the two navies may, from J912 onwards, remain unchanged. There is a chance that the strengths of the British and German navies, in thc years which lie before us', may not be very unequal, and this h a new probability, and perhaps a new fact, which we have to take into account.

If we possessed a million men in thc Territorial Force sufficiently trained to tafce effective share in field operation;? at thv outbreak of war, then this new fact, however deplorable. would not necessarily be fatal. We could make a certainty 01 driving into the sea the first echelon of invaders before the second could arrive* Consequently, no army 'of invasion would .be despatched. We have no siich force, and unless we have It the existence of England may remain, five years hence, at the hazard of an equal naval Chance.

U i* true that there still remain a few people, drowning doctrinaires Who clutch at Hie straws of an exploded ' heresy. who rlcelaro that if we temporarily lose the command of Hip, ?ea in home waters we are ruined, because the enemy will starve us and need not land a man upon our shores to secure this result. This is- the argument of those to whom personal service, despite its manifest advantages to the physique and discipline of the people, is more abhorrent than a foreign fop in our midst. Tin' argument is fallacious, because not , all the navies of all the Powers of Europe combined eould blockade the t nited Kingdom after beating our Navy. The Prince of Wales' Commission, on Food Supplied in Time of War showed that VI per cent, of the shipping operating on our main routes of trade «uffices to meet all our annual requirements of wheat, and Hour. Gibraltar, closely blockaded by the Ileets of France and Spain, was constantly supplied by shi])> arriving without escort throughout the siege, and it is absurd to suppose t'diil the hundreds of ports and haveiK on our western eoa*l* could be blockaded effectively l»v all the navies of Europe in coimfinntion. (Ireal losses we should inevftably suli'er by temporary deieat af -en..but. between lo=s and ruin, shortap .pplies and Marva-1 tion. there is a wide gulf. To ruin Eng. 1 land an enemy most iand in Kngland and subdue her. So long a> no enemy can occupy Kngland .with hi* land forces every defeat can be retrieved and naval resurrection N always possible. In the contrary event ilie .surrender of the. remains of our Navy and the demolition of our naval yards will be demanded ill the terms of peace by a t'oe with his iron heel upon our necks, and no resurrection of naval power will be possible afterward*. S» long as we (vnder tu all the powers of and refuse to become a nation in arms we deliberately provoke I'lie inisiortiiiie whirh we fear and encourag,. (Icrmany to persevere in her naval armaments with the object of opposing her strength on hind to our shameful weakness. I he provision of a million suUieiently iranied men in the Territorial' Force w;!i not cost n fraction of the vast, and , constantly-increasing sum* which we shall from now ornvard devote to our Navy, lint whereas our future naval expenditure, the dance of millions notwithstanding, may conceivably leave us, as again>'l Germany, in no belter relative posture than before, the creation of a nation in arms will prevent panic, maintain credit, and prevent a single defeat at »ea from terminating our existence as an independent Stat". „\liiitnry torce U not a substitute for naval force, but the complement of it. Every J strategical problem ir> a conjoint proh-

letu of naval and military force, and it is in fiiis manner that it must always be considered.

On the Prime Minister's showing, we have live years'grace i» to mtl '°" 1 diu-e national training ami to create a nation in arms. The foundation exists in the Territorial Forte which we owe to the foresight and capacity ol Mr. llaldane. Jt is upon this foundation thai we mu*l build, and it may be rcmarked that the organisation has been established 011 the basis of population and is therefore eminently litlud lor our purpose. Lvery statesman who from this time forward neglects to advocate national training as a public duty will deserve, ami will assuredly receive, the maledictions 01 posterity; and every citizen who combats or delays the introduction I ul' tins indispensable reform deserves j to be execrated a« a public enemy, and | will richly merit the worst fate that can befall him.