LEVIATHAN SHIPS OF WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LII, Issue 39, 11 March 1909, Page 4

LEVIATHAN SHIPS OF WAR.

DO THEY REPRESENT THE BEST NAVAL POLICY.

(By Herbert Russell in the London Daily Express.) The Neptune, which is to be taken in hand at Portsmouth to-day, will be the greatest warship that the world has thus far seen. This statement is the basis of the present article. Before we rhapsodise over the prospective, possession of the most formidable fighting machine ever yet reared, let us pause and consider whether (strategically, economically, and politically she materialises the most advantageous naval policy lor this country. •1 am well aware of the arguments of the largest battleship school. Their .premise Is that we want a ship to win • battles, to fight with every certainty of success any opponent against which she may he matched. This is a perfectly sound proposition. But have we sufficiently realised the consequences likely to be effected—now being effected—in the struggle for its attainment! Admiral Edgar von Ahlfeld, whose criticisms of the British Navy were recently quoted iu the Express, has indicated one of the grayest of these. The passage is worth reiterating:— 'Recently the British Admiralty introduced the policy of superiority in the size of battleships, and this policy proved a fatal mistake. Contrary to the expectations of the British Admiralty, none of the rival naval Powers were alarmed at the increased expenditure, but, following Great Britain's example, built Dreadnoughts with all possible speed. The rapid construction of 4 Dreadnoughts has produced a serious disadvantage for England , . . and enabled the rival naval Power to begin the race for naval supremacy on equal terms." In other words, by involuntarily effecting a process of relative obsolescense, we nave so far minimised our quantitative superiority as to render what once seemed a hopeless task now perfectly feasible to a rival of strenuous purpose and, sufficient wealth. Of course, the naval designer would not consider an aspect of this character in evolving the all-big-gun leviathan. It is his sole profession to devise the most potent fighting machine upon a given displacement, nothing more. But naval design should be more in harmony with naval policy than it is nowadays. Accepting the two-Power Ktandari, plus a 10 p&*ent. margin, as ' 'the. normal measure of our necessary sea -strength, let us consider how this power can be most effectively distributed, i Naval battles are fought and won iby men and. guns. The hull that bears itht*rc owes heT qualities of efficiency entirely to the degree with which she can give niost effective opportunity for the ■employment of them, i Does the. Dreadnought design do this in sufficient measure to counterbalance ■the disadvantages which arc following hi the. wake of her advent! No less an authority than Admiral of the Fleet Sir Orald Noel answers in the negative, i "The Dreadnought," he said, at a retent dehate by members of tie United Service Institute, "is no better than any Other battleship." Aad tier* k a large and growing school of naml thought 'which thinks the same, i It it. be, indeed, true that the Drea 1.nought—l use the name as generit o? ■the type—is no better than any other ■battleship, then she must be distinctly twoise, inasmuch as the principle she materialises is opposed to the best interests of our naval supremacy. Take ofc in this way. Dominion of the seas means world-wide unity. This in its turn means numbers. We might taild a ship of irresistible aggressive .powers and invulnerable resisting powore, but the mere possession of her •would not make us mistress of the sens, i If the economic aspect counted for nothing, it would assuredly.be prefert aible to build Dreadnoughts—or super- ' Dreadnoughts in preference to any other type of warsliip. But the economic aspect is one of the most salient. We can spend soi much money on an annual programme of naval construction, and no "more. Are we spending it to the be>t advantage! I Plentv of thoughtful and competent critics will shake their heads at tins query. The Dreadnought policy represents three faulty .principles: (1) The concentration of the greatest degree m fighting power in the fewest number of hulls; (2) enhancement of risk coupled •with limitations to mobility; and (3) a hostage to foreign competition of which all possible advantage is bran;.' • Tf' the relative superiority of tlic Dreadnought design could he demonstrated as against any other type of warship, then there would not be so much to urge against this restless progress of .displacement. But to what degree will 'the Veptune of 20,000 tons he superior to the Duncan of. 14,000 tone, costing --" less than half the money! The former carries ten 12-inch gun-.: the latter four 12-inch guns and a scci ©ndard battery of 6-inch guns which h could probably be sacrificed for two ''» more 12-inca guns without undue ens', croaclhmerit of weight. I,' ■ In, any case the striking power of the f two shins ie identical, only that the bigI,' ger one can deliver more blows in a f" given- time' than the Smaller. |» fa speed, the Dreadnought has the adf vantage of three knots, over the Duma ii. I But, then, let us hot forget that the one ¥,', has the weight-saving turbine, and the Jf'' other Nthe reciprocating engine. It % * would hff m feasible to build a twentyW: one knot Duncan as a twenty-one knot Ef, iDreadnought., Wt • In armour resistance it must be con- &' ifessed that the larger ship has the adft. . wantage. The argument that she is a K. steadier gun-platform is fallacious, beWli- qualities make her flounder badly in »K Tough weather. Again, as to tactical Esfs utility, it it an open, secret that the jSsi Dreadnought is the most unwieldy balWg&. tleship to manoeuvre in the fleet. Bggt* ■ But the question, I would put is this: gk Whether two "modern Duncans, giving Hp the greatest combatant value on their Ej|>T. 'displacement of 14,000 tons, and for fM>'- their cost of one million, would not be Eg? better for this country than one NepHg&tuae, of 20,000 tons, coating two Eg|p The two smaller ships combined could HJflf&mount the same, number of heavy guns, HsfH? not more. They would carry nearly Ififetwice the number of men.—no mean f:iHBSfof in determining a battle. They w«uM Hssfe..splitting the risk of loss or misha,". would double the element of »• ■>- And while singly they would he HSfp&tpfy outclassed by the larger ship, BMBKith«.ngure-o'f merit would probably HHKiSjHsdeitifaly less tntfn in the ratio ■^H^^ttj^^| l worthy of