GERMAN NAVAL POLICY.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume L, Issue 61, 2 November 1907, Page 3

GERMAN NAVAL POLICY.

(Loudon Times Military Correspondent). It is the natural order of things that German)' should desire to possess a powerful fleet. Germany has seen her coasts blockaded ou three separate occasions stare the y<ar 1848. The annual va'ue of her se.borne trade is 372 mililops ater tag. Of this total, 294 millions aru carried by Germ-in merchant vessels, of three million tons gross register, valued at otcr 40 millions and manned by lU.U J0 seam a. Ten per cent of tin world's commerce and 79 per cent of German seaborne trade are carried in German bottom*. The value of German trade with the British Empire is over 109 mflUniij annually. Germany is beeming more and more dependent every year upon foreign supplies of food tor 'her people, and of raw materials for her growing industries. In the event of interruption of these supplies she would be faced by a serious economic crisis. It would be difficult for her to wltnstanj a powtrlul Continental combination unless she could count upon ft fret sea. These facts and figures taken to-gether-explain the reason why there are now X 36 Serman wtnhlp* built and building, and why Germany b likely to become, if she is not already, our most formidable rival on->the sea. England has Anot her long btatorj been face to fao»)M|fc-«ach redpubtabls nv-jli as the-4Mgm£ Philip of Spain iud ihe sbipa-»WL men, bat sot the ports over agdbttt otir shores. Louis XIV. and Nappltoifhad the armies, but an insufficient number of ships, and no organised porta.# the Channel The -Dutch had the and the ports, but not the army. The Germans possess the armies, the ships, and the ports; they possess numbers; they are a selfcontained nation in all that relates to maritime activity; and they can bout, above all, a spirit of enterprise and of sacrifice, a tenacity of purpose, and a knowledge of the science of war whuii ate unsurpassed. The eventuality of a ocntest with this mighty Power must never be out of our thoughts for a single hour. A succession of programmes stand out like beacons along the track of German progress. It was not until defensive measures both on land and on sea had beeu perfected, and not until secure bases bad been provided at home, that Germany launched out upon her world policy.

The beginning of the nineties coincided With the virtual completion of the defensive deployment, and marked ths initiation of an offensive naval policy Wis is made clear by a memorandum accompanying the German Navy Estimate* about this time, and alio by Ad mini Hollmann'i blunt declaration in the Beichstag in the year 1891. Lit ■poke out boldly for an offensive na/y. and he was supported by inspired pamphleteers, who declared in the most 2m phatic manner that the only efflcidios form of defence at sea was the offensive. The Naval Budget at this period .was •till small, amounting to 4% millions only, but a few years later the two programmes of 1888 and 1900 chaiigtd the complexion of affairs. By the for mer, the navy was destined to include 19 batleships, 8 coast defence ships, 12 large armored criusers, and 30 smaller cruisers. The irritation caused among Germans by our seizure of their steviers during the South African war »aabled the German Government to enlarge its programme in 1900. There was scarcely any concealment of the tact that this programme was aimed at England. According to the law of Jup; 14, 1900, and supplementary measures subsequently taken, the German navy is intended to consist, by the year 1917, of 9 battleships, 14 luge armored cruisers, 34 smaller cruisers, and 102 destroyers; by 1920, of 38 battleships, 20 cruisers, 38 smaller, and 144 destroyer!, besides submarines and torpedo-boats. The building scheme has been published. It shows that 77 millions sterling are to b$ spent upon shipments and their armament in 12 years; that the persjinel is to fie increased from 41.000 to 68,401 men; that all ships from 20 to 25 years old are to be automatically replaced, and that the total sum to be devotee to the navy between IUOO and ll>(7 is. to Se 180 millions stelling. Inquiries recently instituted show that there are, on an average, 400,000 tons net of British and German merchant shipping in the German ports of the Xortn Sea and the Baltic on any given day of the year. The quay fron.ugt, «n the German North Sea allows 114 ships, each SOQ feet in length, to be berthed alongside the quays simultaneously. Very slight preparation would -enable the tonnage to be increased. The powerful coast defencei and the retired positions of the chiet German harbors allow the embarkation jl an army to take place in security. A study of the railway system and oi the distribution of the Uerman army appears to show that 200,000 men might be concentrated at the North Sea ports within 36 hours without antecedent mobilisation. The last class which passes to the reserve is always at the disposal of the army corps commander, while, .since 'MojXU men are anaually recall :d to the colors for training, and the pease strength of the army u over GUU,OUU men, it would not be difficult to find the required number of troops without dislocating or seriously affecting the Uerman army. if Napoleon were willing to strike us in August, 1805, with what was practically the whole field army of Irance, although he knew in July that Austria and Russia were massing troops against him, why should the Uermans be so touch more timid! The national risk .would be infinitely less for them thau lor Napoleon,. since they have over four million trained mp to supply the 200,000 or 300,000 required for the' expedition. Uoccess might bring the greatest Empire In the workt'sjistory to the ground in a fortnight. loaf'is the great standing temptation military decreptitnde offers to-Ken of ambition and resource, Fajlpyi might entail no vital injury upon Germany. That is the solace for men. of unsteady resolution. Danger for danger, the risk continuously and complacently incurred by England to-day would prove greater, in case of sudden outbreak of war, than when tbe Grand Army lay round Boulogne, and .we, with our fleets and 700,000 men under arms at home, offered up prayers in *ur churches against a fog. It wou l J be greater than at the time of the Armade when Parma's soldiers, had the crossing ben effected, would have encotmt eied land forces superior in strength. Writing on this subject in the pages of the Deutche Bundschau in 1900, General von der Goltz, whose repute as a Ugh authority is word-wide, made the following interesting declarations: "Tbe national energy of Germany," he wrote, "has need of space, and thesoil of our country has become insufficient. The dream of a greater Germany has become a law for the present generation under the iron hand of necessity. . . • War i with England has nothing improbable! about it. . . . Violence is a right for people who fear for their existena.-. | .... The progress of Russia on the | side of India, is not independent of her relations with Germany. Turkey, oar friend, is on the flank of the British line of communications with the East. Resistance by Germany is far from liejng impossible, and our chances of suecess against England Improve day by day." Considering our general naval superiority,and for so long as this superiority is effective and enduring, we cannot picture any plan of invasion made in Germany whfch does Jiot conclude by demanding the initiative and surprise as indispensable conditions for success. To give us time to moMlisfl and ssseniM® our nattered squadrons, ana to collect out h'-tfTofjeneous land forces, would hi an act "f folly upon which we eould not count. German diplomatists may te'! n<. if they please, that no plan for the invasion of England has ever been made.This is to say, in bo many words, that the Uerman General Staffe has neglected its duties, which have been defined i'i the clearest possible manner by Von Moltke. But that great soldier was not in the babifr of sending his plans abroad so that German Ambassadors might pratle about them in foreign capitals, and it is possible that his successor* have been equally reticent. If a headlong offensive by the German Navy can destroy, or even neutralise for a few days or hours, that part of our Navy which is near the Thames, the Med way, and the Straits of Dover, ai insuperable obstacle presents itself to the rapid embarkation of a numerous Herman army on the shores of the United Kfigdom given always vori Moltke's reservations as the 'wind, weather, circumstances, and luck." Between tli* Thames and the Wash alone there are •even or eight places where there are four miles of beach on end where a landiean take place, and further to tli--North there are many more. The problem of invasion is one that ean only he solved l»v blood and iron. fven then not necessarily for all Our success or our failure to preunties depends, under Prgvid-

ence, upon the goodness or badnesa of the arrangements. To suggest that a great country like England cannot make itself perfectly secure it it pleases is an untenable proposition. What do wo require for security t The writer will only suggest the conditions which i.e would dislike most if he belonged to the German General Staff. A battle-fleet permanently stationed in the North Sea, under a single command, stronger than the German fleet, in full commission throughout the year, invariable ia strength, and possessing under the absolute control of its commander all the adjuncts and accessories of sea powe* — namely, adequate, secure, and conveni* ent bases, ample cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, and storeships, to gether with a fleet of transports ready to embark 10,000 marines at an hour' 3 notice.

On land we require, in any case, a| much improved plan of mobilisation for j all our faces; we require a definite plan of operations to meet the contingency under discussion; a plan upon the sufficiency of which the Chief of the General Staff shall personally and sxplicii'v stake liig reputation. We require that every officer and man should know what lie has to do, and that he should be tsady and able to do it. We require a billeting law, and to practise billeting, without which reform operations on land can only end in chaos. We require to put all this machinery into practical and frequent operation until I we have made it perfect.