WHY KUROPATKIN FAILED.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume L, Issue 60, 24 August 1907, Page 3

WHY KUROPATKIN FAILED.

Reviewing Kuropatkin's book ou. the IRusso-Japauese war, a contributor, who J=i;;tis himself "Cheronese," writes iu the Outlook a-5 follows:

i iiuropatkiu liae been compared much to liia disadvantage, with Naiwleou. But the great Corsicun was his owu chief of state during most, of hU campaigns. KuropatkiiL was tied by the telegraph wire tu St. i'etersbuig. Ilia owu plan, which was submitted to the Emperor, and was marginally noted "Just 60" by the Sovereign, was to take up a retired base and not make any forward movement until all preparations, which were to be complete and long in arranging were finished. The General wished, in fact, to adopt the old Kussiau policy—tlut of Aparaxine, of Kutusoif, of Barclay—which consisted in forcing the enemy to seek one out at home, thus exposing a long line of communications to atropy AlcxeilTa representations, iiuropatkin was ordered to make a lorward movement before his army was ready. I When this is known, and it has not been denied, it is absurd to say of the latu I commander-in-chief that " it was a strategic plan, as he conceived and applied | it, that led hiln to defeat more than all |lua laults of whictt he accuses his subordinates." Among other things nut generally knows, ut all events out of itussia, was the peculiar position uf Kuropatkin as War Alinister before the campaign, 'lie Emperor, who had selected nun principally ou account of his Asiatic reputation, where he lad been [Skobeloila riglrt-aaud man, had the greatest confidence in Kuropatkiu. But a near relative of the Sovereign then entrusted with x high 'military coiulnand surrounded by a clique of well-born oHicers, hated the .Minister on account of his simple origin and his detestation of jobs. In this clique was General Sacharoir, who succeeded his chief in the portfolio of War. in it were also Admiral Aiexeieff (who was nominated Viceroy of the h'ar East), iiaulbars, and Grippenberg. Thus Kuropatkin ou taking up supreme command at Harbin, found himself directly opposed by Alexeieff, whilst til-; commands of two of the three I armies Composing his forces were entrusted to nominees of that court party which, did everything it could to deprive him of the confidence reposed in him by the Emperor. Nor can Kuropatkin be truthfully accu*d"i>f seeking to defend himself by pronouncing an indictment against the he had organised as .Minister of War and then commanded. Fur his recommendations, notably as to the strcflgth of Port Arthur garrison, had been over-ruled, and at the commencement of the war he was now in command of tie armies. When, however, the commander-in-chief attributes his reverses in a degree to the defective knowledge of the enemy's plans, movements, and strength, the critics have reason on their side for blaming him. For although a commander in the field does not organise his own intelligence department, he should be the first to find out his defects and to insist on a change of methods. Tie real difficulty in this case was thab the Russians were surrounded by a hostile Chinese population that gave them false information, whilst it faithfully reported to the Japanese all it could find out about the Russians. The gaps in the effectives that were not filled up, more especially the deficiency in officers, which resulted in the armies being a quarter of a million men below their effective on paper, were terrible handicaps to the Russian. This was due to tin: want of an effective reserve system for supplying officers, and to the inability of the single line of the Siberian raOn-ay to carry all that was required. For the first defeat the Minister of War was to blame, for the second he was Slot responsible.