THE RECENT WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume L, Issue 59, 8 April 1907, Page 4

THE RECENT WAR.

| KUROI'ATKIX'S REVELATIONS. London, February 22. General Ivuropatkin published in December a history of the Russo-Japanese War, in three volumes, but the Russian Government immediately suppressed the book. Router's correspondent at Ilelsingfort has, however, obtained a copy of the work and has sent this week to the English papers a two-column summary of its most interesting statements. 'Judging by these, it is not surprising that the Russian Government found it expedient to suppress the book. Kuro!patkin'.s conclusions constitute an aston,isiiig revelation of disorganisation, incapacity and even disobedience of specific and urgent orders on the part of various general officers entrusted with high commands in the fieid. The whole (narrative is a dismal retrospect of unpreparedness, disorganisation and crosspurposes.

With regard to the general causes which after the lighting in July, led to the retreat of the Manchurian army. General Kuropatkin reported to the Emperor, summing them up as follows: The preponderance of the Japanese forces, their incomparably better preparedness for alt'on in a mountainous country an.l in hot weather; their greater youth; their lighter equipment; their plentiful mountain artillery and pack trains; their extreme patriotic .s|irit„ 'their energetic and capable officering; and, finally, the insufficient warlike spirit of our trrops in consequence of the obscurity which surrounded tile objects and causes of the war. For the indecisive results of the battle of Sha-ho the following reasons are given:—

(1) The lack of skill displayed by 'the chief of the Lastem annv in handling the largo force entrusted to him, which gave him nearly triple superiority over the enemy; (2) the absence of firm handling of the troops on the part of the leaders of the Western detachment; {'.]} the unsuccessful tactics and hick of energy on the part of the commander of the Tenth Army Corps, who retired without any necessity from his position on the left hank of the Sha-lio without even warning his neighbor, the commander of the First Army Corps, thus placing him in a serious plight; (4) the unsuccessful operations of the commander of the 31st Infantry Division, who several times unnecessarily retired his brigade; j (5) the insufficient iirmness [of many of the troops, who left the rartks under the pretext of carrying wounded to the rear, or without any pretext at all; (fi) the lack of co-op-eration on the part of the units of the Sixth Siberian Corps. During the fights en the Sha-lio, the senior commanders, General Stacklebcrg and General Bilderling, were responsible for their own tasks and acted entirely independently. Generals Grippc-nberg' ami Bilderliiig are severely blamed, but the greatest offender of all was apparently General Kaulbars. He is directly accused of fatal inactivity in defiance of urgent and reiterated orders at crucial periods of the momentous conflict before Mukden. Kaulbars is held responsible for the failure of the Russians at Mukden; his direction of operations is described as ineffective an unhappy. "The loss of time and tha weakness of the force which was opposed to General yogi con stitute the whole explanation of the failure at Mukden." W lieu all is said and done, however, General Kuropatkin frankly admits in his despatches to the Emperor that, lie himself was most to blame for the Mukden defeat, and bis reasons are duly set forth as follows: (a) lie did not insist sufficiently lie fore the battle began on the assembly o£ a strategic reserve, as large as possible. (b) Believing in the correctness of General TchitchagolTs reports, he reduced his (forces for the decisive moment of the fight by a brigade of infantry and a division of Cossacks. Had lie not .sent the brigade of the loth Corps to guard the rear, and had he insisted on recalling tile Ist Siberian Corps of the First Army to join the main body, lie could have thrown two complete troops against General Xo"i's turning movement. e