The Daily News MONDAY, MAY 9, 1904. THE WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume XLVI, Issue 106, 9 May 1904, Page 2

The Daily News MONDAY, MAY 9, 1904. THE WAR.

It was predicted by many that when fighting on land commenced the Russians would bring such overwhelming forces to bear upon the Japanese invaders that the aspirations of this rising I'miw would receive not only a check but a crushing defeat. But instead of that we find that the mighty Russia is no more prepared ashore than afloat, and the intrepid Japanese by bravery and stategy have forced the forces of the Czar to retire with heavy losses. The ultimate effect of this is, of coui-.se, not easily discernible. There are some who, drawing their inspirations from ! the principles of what they call "absolute war," contend that the enemy's main army must be sought and defeated, and that a decisive defeat of the Russians at Harbin will settle the campaign, and make it impracticable for Russia to renew the conflict with hope of success. It is t.h« master error of Napoleon, who calculated in precisely similar fashion that after his Borodino and the occupation of Moscow—which was "al>solute war" with a vengeance—Russia would make peace. Russia, however, did nothing of the kind, and in a moment all this great conception fell to the ground with a crash, burying the Oruml Army in its ruins. If those who would prompt Japan to penetrate into the heart of Asia are prepared to tell us that Russia has lost her tenacity and her courage, and will sign an ignominious peace after the loss of a single army and before her vitals are so much as touched, then no one could have any military objection to urge to a muri'h on Harbin with all its consequences. But no one is justified in milking such assumption, which is opposed to all the logic of facts and the lessons of history. The real question is, What limits should Japan , set to her military ambitions in or- . der to enable her to outlast Russia in a long war of onduranco '! If we allow, for the sake of argument. - that there are 50,000 Russians in the _ field army south of Mukden, and that in May there will be 1 ISO,OOO Russians in the field ut Harbin, naturally the attack and defeat of the 150000 would lie dictated by the principles of "absolute war" and of . common sense, if success had all the promise held out bysome writers,of i talent. Wipe off the 150,000 Russians—they will take some wiping—and allow at Harbin 250,000 victorious Japanese in their place, and how much nearer ore we to the solution of the problem ? We should simply see the beginning of the concentration of 500,000 Russians at Lake lluikal, and "absolute war" would require their defeat, as it would subsequently of a million Russians on the t'ral Mountains, and of three mil. lions at Moscow, and even then we are no further advanced than was Napoleon, who failed, though lie crossed the Xiemen with JMSS.OOO of I the finest troops in the world. The principles of ■'absolute war" are very tine things in their way, but they are subservient, to the real end of all • warfare—namely, the achievement of nationui aims und the imposition of the national will upon the enemy. There is no apparent reason why this war should ever terminate except through the military, financial and national exhaustion of one or other of the combatant* ; and, if this be ) so, then the principles which Japan must follow to succeed are those of concentration of strength and conservation of energy, making war too j dillicult and too onerous for Russia to continue with hope of final victory. It may be necessary, though there are other alternatives, lor Japan to clear the air by the occupation of Mukden and the defeat of thp Russian army there concentrated, since this force is, in fact though not in name, the UrsU'army of relief for Tort Arthur, and the attack on this ' fortress, save by n coup de main, cannot be surely prosecuted so long as an army of rclk-f remains within - call. Hut Mukden should he Ihelim- , it. of Japan's military ambitions in a first campaign, ami the rest of the short summer season will be fully occupied by the attack on I'orl Arthur and Vladivostok and the organisation of the territory in occupation, so that the next Russian advance ' may be brought up against impenetrable barriers. It is the principles followed by her enemy in the Crimean war, rather than in 1M1:>. that Russia has to dread. No on- would ' venture to compare the soaring genius of the god of modern war with the wit of the groundlings who planned the attack on Sclmstopol. No one would compare the brilliant host . which crossed the Niemcii with all . the pomp and circumstance of war - with that heterogeneous, ill-found expedition which landed in the Criiu-i-o, devoid i>r everything thai makes an army formidable, save its splendid and oft-tried native courage. Vet k this succeeded where the other failed ; the Crimean war left Russia broken, exhausted, and constrained io sign t a disastrous pence, while 1812 made her the first military Power in Europe, Napoleon a fugitive and hia '' army a wreck. It is not with impunity that one ranges the resistless

forces of nature, distance, and climate in the ranks of one's foes. As allies these fortes are invaluable ; as enemies they are fatal. In the long history of war low Rival distant expeditions have succeeded, and must have ended Ijy the ruin of the nrmy and the country embarking- on them. If this has been true of dynastic wars and professional armies, how much more (rue will it not he in future wars bclwivn nations in amis'.' The cables have given us a detailed account of the decisive Japanese victory on the Yahi Uiver. ami litis must be seriously considered by those who expected General Kuropntkin to carry eve*'thing before him on land in marked contrast to the signal failure of the Russian navy to do aught against the foe. The Russian general lias evidently misjudged Ids enemy. When lie arrived at the front lie slated that there would be no serious laud engagement until dune. Probably acting on this opinion ids military arrangements were easily forestalled by the Japanese. who have elected lo force matters rather than allow Russia to strike at her pleasure. The 'decisive victory of the .Japanese on the Yitlu has a distinct bearing on the result of the war, ami is of deep significance. In the first place it proves that the Japanese soldiers are equal, if not superior, to the Russians, and that they possess the indomitable pluck and fearless bravery which are so conspicuous in hand to hand struggles of determined troops. Again, the generals of the islanders' army have shown themselves lo lie strategists of no mean order : the methodical manner and ultimate success of the movement show a wonderful amount of forethought and preparation on their part, resulting in the outwitting of the Kussiuns. All the available invading forces, including a l!o,;iia of gunboats, took part in the assault on the Russian position, and proud must the Japanese be at the result 08 their first land fight, the storming of the forts. Out-generalled, out-numbered, anh out-classed in the artillery. General Kuropatkin's forces were compelled to retire, but it is not yet sufficiently clear as to whether there was an orderly retirement or a rout and a retreat, although the cabled list of casualties goes'to show that every inch of tlio ground won by the Japanese was stubbornly contested. We must now take into account the natural elation of the victors and the very probable depressed spirits of the Russians in this contest, and though General Kuropntkin may yet stem the tide of reverses, the day appears far distant when, as boasted by the Russians, peace will be signed at Tokio, or in fulfilment of the orders attributed to the Czar, the Russian general returns home after having unfurled the Russian flag over the palace of the Mikado.