HOTEL COMMONWEALTH CASE.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume XXIV, Issue 81, 9 April 1902, Page 2

HOTEL COMMONWEALTH CASE.

THE JUDGMKNT. The following abridged report of the separate judgments given by the Appeal Court Judges is taken from the N.Z. Times . The Chief Justice having recounted tbe circumstances of the case, said that no charge of corruption had been made by either side against Mr Stanford; hut counsel for the appellant hud contended th.it by his financial dealing with Mr Mcintosh there had been shown ground for the charge of bias. His Honor did not think, if this was thd only ground, that the motion for the writ should be granted. The arrangement referred to h .d ended on the 6'.h dune, and the mere fact that the Licensing Committee had hid financial dealing* with one of th-ise interfiled in obtaining a license was not sufficient in itpt-lf to iaise a suspicion of bias, liut there * remained the ground of the promise mado in the letter ftom Mr Stanford to Messrs Eichmond and Bellringtr, a promise thet a license would be granted to a c*rtain built on a certain piece of land, if certain conditions were fulfilled—namsly, if the plats were satisfactory, and not less than £3OOO were spent on the building. What had really been done was the removal of the license from the Village Inn at Bell B'ock to the Commonwealth Hotel in New Plymouth. This was a distance of si x miles, but the law s'ated that no license should be removed from Oie hotel to another a greater distance tbau a quarter of a mile. The letter of the Act had not been violated, and the Court could not say that the licencei had baen illegally granted, but what 1 had bean done wa<i that the spirit or intention of the Act had beeu set at nought, and iho provisions of the law evaded by Magisterial sanction. His Honor dealt at some leogth with the question of Frethy's right to appeal, and held that he had the right to apply for the writ of certiorari. Dealing with the question of bias, he faid that he knew of no ease—and none had been cited —where, real bins having been proved to have existed, the Court would stay iti hand. Nothing was mow important than that the Courts which had to administer justice should b» properly constituted —that is should be impartial and unbiassed. When it was proved that a biassed or interested Judge sit, then the Court was not properly cc s'itntpd. Tbe very basis on which a just decision must rest bad bean taken awiy. His Honor quoted authorities to show that on the ground of bias the motion for a writ of certiorari must be granted. As to tbe argument that there was only one tribunal todeal with the application for a license, and that in quashing tbe order the Court did not provide a remedy, Sir R. Stout pointed out that there was power in the Governor to remove the com-1 mittee, and that power still existed. The Governor might appoint nnoihor Magistrate to the • district, and when there were two Magistrates in the district, his duty was to appoint one to act on the Licensing Committee. Th's was cot a case, then fore, in which, there could not be an unbiased tribunal. In regtrd to 'he ground of incon- ] venience, he pointed out that this wax not a case i'.i whi h an inaoer<nt person was being put t> ineonyniencs. K there was <i defect i<\ the exis'ing tri hunal it. h)d h'ttn breupht about,.by the pirtifs themselves. His Honor nllowed the appeal, with costs to the »p----pellant on the highest scalp, and as from a distance thn costs in the Court of Appeal, £SO, with disburssments. Mr Justice Williams agreed tha' there was no inference of the existence of bias to be drawn from the pacuniiry [relations which existed between the Magietnta and Mcintosh. It had been very rightly admitted that the

' Msgis'rate was not improperly in- ; fluenced by these rsktions. Tbe sog- ' ges'ion of bias in the present case rested mainly on th« correspondence betwew 1 Messrs Bellringer and Richmond and ' the Magistrate; and that the {meaning, the lettnrs actually conveyed to Mo j Intosh was that a license in 'he »i'u%1 tion mentioned would certainly bigranted was shown by the fact that 1 O'Driscoll, his assignee, took a leas« of land in that situation and expended a ' large sum of money in bui'ding a hotel upon it. The natural eftVt of the arrangement, and of the want of public notification of it, was to prevent any applications being made for a new license by anyone but Mcintosh or his nominee. After the a-surat c 9 given by the Magistrate in h-'s 'etter of th« 23rd August, 1900, and the performance by O'Driecoll of the conditions

Jmposed in that letter bv erecting a building, it would bo difficult, if not impossible, for the Magistrate fairly to consider the merits of o f her applications or the validity of objections to O'Driscoll's application. It was an irresistible inferer.ce that before O'Driscoll bought from Mcintosh, the latter must have nude'bim 'acquainted with the correspondence, and with the assurance Mclntoah had received from the Magistrate that if the one licens i lapsed the other wou'd be granted. It was impo sible to separate O'Driscoll from Mcintosh. j He had himself assisted in causing .'hu (likelihood of bias in the Magistrate which had rendored the Magistrate j incompetent to hear his cpplica'ion. If jhe hud rendered incompetent the only , tribunal which could have heart] hi* ! application, it, was his own fault. The. | duty rf (,he Court to grant the wri r . of crrtiwari web plain, although the applicant for the writ was an outir. 1 stranger to the proceedipgs Hu did ' : not. doubt the bona fides of tlm piriiV-, ' or tliM' ».he Mi.gis'.rate honestly believed that he bad a right to do what

be did. The qu sti n of go. d fai u, lu.wfv-r, did not arise. Mr Justne Denniston said the expression by a member of a licensing committee as to his views as to the necessity for a house in a particular l iocdh.v would, in ins Honour's opinion., be quito justifiable. In the present! case, however, tho committee bad gi'Ur beyond the wide latitude allowed by law. He did not. believe that the letters between Richmond and Bulllinger and the Magistrate were th> beginning of thn transaction. He thought Mr Stanford must have bee» approached and his conclusion;! ascar-

tlined befoie tbe beginning of tilt coi. espondenue. In auy case, it watt cle r, looking at the correspondence,. that the Magistrate bad privately pledged himself to grant a lioene* to a hotel opposite th« railway station. Any improper motive or inducement on Mr Stanford'a part was. not only not proved, but had been, expressly disclaimed by those who ' were moving to upsat his decision. i He did not think tha Court could assume that the Magistrate, having been held by the Court to be incompetent to act in this particular case, would refuse to temporarily transfer his jurisdiction to another, or that if he did refuse (he Executive" would support him. His Honor cotb'idnred that the appeal should be allowed-

Mr Justice Edwards thought the Magistrate was «nt itlfcd to say that, in 1+ his opinion, another iN>tel was required in New Plymouth, and that e> particular house was requirea u> a particular locality. It was proper C® the part of a Magistrate to commit bi'jwli to any expression which involved or »?emed ta involve, a promise foT * liesiiHe for a new house. There w«r!» consideration* mora important than tot question whether the public required an additional hotel in New Plymouth. It was of the highest possible importance that the administration of justice should be free from all suspicion of parcialitv. Ho inferred nothing against the honour or probity of the Magistrate. A mistake had been made, and in the interests of justice it must bear its c Mis'-quences, The appeal must be allowed. The Chief Justice accordingly announced that the appeal must be allowed, with costs on the highest saale, aod .£SO costs in tbe Court Mow. Mr Skerrett, for the respondent, applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, and fore stay of proceedings. The Chief Justice asked how proceedings were to be stayed. Mr Skerrett asked for an order that the judgment should lie in the Supreme Court pending the judgment of thai Privy Council. His client was entitled to an appeal to the Privy Council, aod unless the judgment wen staged the appeal would be nugatory. The Chief Justice said that Mr Skerrett wanted permission for bis otttnt to sell liquor for three months and then he would abandon his appeal to tbe Privy Council. After tome argument, the Chief Justice announced that the Court reserved its decision on tbe point.