The Daily News. FRIDAY, MAY 11,1900. LORD METHUEN'S DEFENCE.

Taranaki Daily News, Volume XXXXII, Issue 96, 11 May 1900, Page 2

The Daily News. FRIDAY, MAY 11,1900. LORD METHUEN'S DEFENCE.

In the London Gazette of March 16th appears the full text of General Lord Methuen's despatch relating to the disastrous engagement at Magersfontein. The despatch is a somewhat belated one, as it was not forwarded from the seat of war until more than two months after the action had taken place, a circumstance which is responsible for much of the disfavour in which Lord Methuen has been held and for the currency of many cynical reporte. Had the particulars now for the first time made public been known some few months earlier, the strong feeling prevalent against the general in question would have considerably toned down, and a lot of the execration and approbrium heaped upon, that unlucky commander would have been spared. One thing, however, nay be said on this point, viz., that the war fever having passed its acute stage- the general public is now in a much more judicial frame of mind than it was two or three months ago, and the despatch will therefore benefit by a more fair and discriminating consideration than would hava been accorded it at the earlier date. Commencing with the statement that it was out of thß question to advance any further towards Kimberley (which he states later on he was instructed to relieve), Lord Methuen describes the country that lay between his and the litis of march to BLim toerlcy, particularly the fortified hill of Magerslontein, the key of the Boer position, and concerning which he says:—"So long as this kopje (Magersfontein) remained in possession of the enemy I did not feel justified in marching up the Modder River, for my line of communication would have been iu danger, and my transport could only carry five days' provisions. Had I marched round by Jacoosdal I should have had to fight my way across the river in th& face of a mobile force of 16,000 men. [His own force numbered 10,000.] Had I elected to fight my way through the bushy ground oetween Magersfontein and the Modder River I should have incurred very leavy loss, and, in addition to the guns aot beinj; able t:» rend?;" ma vary great -issist a.ace, they would Lava run a good ibaaoe of behg captured. In any ease 1 had to be prspared for a second "heavy ictian at Spytfsntoin, and a blow dealt to.the encwy's contra at Magorsfoatain tvould render any future fight .it fcpyi:ontein easier than auy success on their loft iJank could have done." Alter pointing out iLe difficulties of reconnoitring and the dinger of further baolior, Lord Methuan goes on to my tbar, on the day his last reiaforcomcnt 'i'iivsd he decM«l. to toniinuo hi" iw.Me AviuivC.'/oy v-'Uo kw-jv. 'a«v

tiona and initial movements of the attack are described in detail, and agree with the accounts already given. Now comes the critical part of the proceedings, as described by Lord Methuen: — " About half an hour after the Highland Brigade marched off it came on to pour, a heavy thunderstorm accompanying the rain. The downpour lasted until daybreak. The Brigade was led with perfect accuracy to the point of assault by Major Benson. The advance was slow, even for a night march. Major Benson, with a compass in eaoh hand, had frequently to halt on account of the lightning and rifles affecting the compasses. I may remark that two rifles went off by accident before the march commenced, and it is pretty clear flashes from a lantern gave the enemy timely notice of the maroh. Before moving ofl Major-General Wauchope explained all he intended to do and the particular part each battalion of his brigade was to play in the scheme. What happened was as follows: —Not finding any signs of the enemy on the right flank just before daybreak, which took place at 4 a.m., as the Brigade was approaching the foot of the kopje, Major-General Wauchope gave the order for the Black Watch to extend, but to direct its advance on the spur in front, the Seaforth Highlanders to proJong to the left, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to prolong to the right, the Highland Light Infantry in reserve. Five minutes earlier (the kopje looming in the distance), Major Benson had asked Major-General Wauchope if he did not consider it to be time to deploy. Lieutenant-Oolonel Hughes-Hallett states that the extension could have taken place 200 yards sooner, but the leading battalion got thrown into confusion in the dark by a very thick bit of bush about 20 to 30 yards long. The Seaforth Highlanders went round this bush to the right, and had just got into its original position behind the Black Watch when the order to extend was given by MajorGeneral Wauchope to the Black Watch. The Seaforth Highlanders and two; companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were also moving ( out, and were in the act of extending, when suddenly a heavy fire was poured in by the enemy, most of the bullets going over the men. LieutenantColonel Hughes-Hallett at once ordered the Seaforths to fix bayonets and charge the position. The officers commanding the other battalions acted in a similar manner. At this moment someone gave the word ' Retire.' Part of the Black Watch then rushed back through the ranks of the Seaforths. Lieutenant-Oolonel Hallett ordered his men to halt and lie down, and not to retire. It was now becoming quite light, and some of the Black Watch were a little in front, to the left of the Seafortbs. The Artillery, advancing to the support of the attack, had opened fire from the time it was light enough to see. No orders having been received by the Seaforths, the commanding officer advanced the leading units to try and reach the trenches, which were about 400 yards off; but the officers and half the men fell before a very heavy fire, which opened as soon as the men moved. About ten minutes later the Seaforths tried another rush, with the same result. Colonel HughesHallett then considered it bast to remain where he was till orders came. At 1 p.m., the Seaforth Highlanders found themselves exposed to a heavy crossfire, the enemy trying to get round to the right. The commanding officer brought his left forward. An order to ' Retire' was given, and it was at this time that the greater part of tho

casualties occurred. The retirement continued for 500 yards, and the

' Highlanders' remained there till dusk. Lieutonant-Oolonel Downman, commanding Gordons, gave the order to retire, because he found his position untenable, so Boon as the Seaforth Highlanders made the burning movement to the right." Lord Methuen describes this as an unfortunate retirement, for he had given Colonel Hughes-Hallett instructions to remain in position until dusk, and the enemy at that time were quitting the trenches by tens and twenties. General Methuen, at this stage of the report, makes the following impertant statements :—" I have made use of Lieu-tenant-Oolonel Hughes-Hallett's report (the acting Brigadier) for the description of the part the Highland Brigade tcok in this action. Major-General "Wauchope told me, when I asked him the question, on the evening of the 10th, that he quite understood his orders, and made no further remark, He died at the head of the brigade, in which kis name will always remain honoured and respected. His high military reputation and attainments disarm all criticism. Every soldier in my Division deplores the loss of a fine soldier and a true comrade." The account of this part of the affair is thus briefly closed : —" The attack failed ; the inclement weather was against success; the men in the Highland Brigade were ready enough to rally, but the paucity of officers and noncommissioned officers rendered this no easy clatter. I attach no blame to this t plendid brigade," The part taken by i.he other troops is, of course, set forth in full dutail, but the account does not vary in any ossential feature from that already published. Lord Methuen praises various officers and detachments, and blame is conspicuous by its absence. " Nothing could exceed the conduct of <;he troops from the time of the failure of the attack at daybreak. There was not the slightest confusion, though the fight was carried on under as hard conl ditions as one can imagine, for the men had been on the move from midnight, and sufferiag terribly from thirst," The rest of tho despatch is chiefly a roll of honour, containing the names of uhosewho specially distinguished them»'e!v?«. While j.urd Methuou does not ge out cf his v/ay to defend himself «»> OS .•ui.CGUVOH passed 1 c 1 1 d o 1 h m-y bs ocasitecS a passive refutation of the isercro charged that have beer, urged "i.*ut ho /Kid ;■ altera?,*.ivc* < n r> that all arrangements had been c-jrt'fully p' uv-icd, ar.d ''.vorfi well understood by i i L uy » . nu% ; ■ i --v.'o duo to a servos of un--j..v-o >.-!•' =adva-.ttuKß and aoi; to ohii-'a-i'H? or any form o*! ,V ... v . I

such a manner as to at the same time clear his own name. That this is the last word on the subject is, of course, out of the question; discussion of the incident is likely to be rife for a long [time to come, but whatever the final verdict may be, the despatch is likely to do much towards softening the severity with which Lord Methuen has hitherto been regarded since the Magersfontein disaster. This has, however, lent suoh an unenviable notoriety to his name that he is hardly likely to be ever quite rehabilitated in the estimation of the British Army or the general public.