WHAT HAVE WE GOT BY THE WAR?

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 423, 12 November 1861, Page 3

WHAT HAVE WE GOT BY THE WAR?

What are our present relations with the Natives of the Northern Island ? We have endeavored to argue the questions raised by ihia cad war,

week after week, as regards the justice or inj justice of Governor Browne's Policy. Subsequent history often explains passing events, and so it is now. Up to the time when the Government seized the Waitara, there had been no display of force; there cannot be said to | have been tbe smallest fear of violence or out* break by tbe Maoris. The seizure of the Waitara was the signal for the Maori outbreak. There was no formal declaration of war, and so now there has been no ratification of peace ; yet th« fighting has been over for many months. Governor Browne's proposals for peace have been almost universally rejected, yet peace exists. This state of affairs proves that the Government was the aggressor ; as soon as the Government commenced fighting, the natives rose; as soon as the Government left off fighting, the war was at aa end. Now, what have we got by this war ? We have paid a good deal of ready money, and run in debt to the tune of £150,000. What is the value of this investment ? 'It was a war for land' say one party— €"Not at all/ says the Governor,' it was a war to assert the supremacy of the Crown.' Aocept the Governor's view. Suppose it were a war to assert the supremacy of the Crown ; has not the result been a most miserable failure ? Is it not the patent and undeniable fact that the natives are beyond comparison lessjoyal, to the Governor, and les3 friendly to the English than before the commencement of hostilities ? There is something most sadly touching in the state of the native mind as described in our last news from the north. They know that they have no chance with the English. They know we can bring troops without number, and engines of war without limit to compass their destruction. But they are desperate. It is most singular, and most convincingly establishes the view we have from the first taken of uative policy, that all the accounts represent the natives as regarding themselves as the aggrieved and attacked party. They seem to I have no wish to attack us. They are wholly on the defensive. They say if they are attacked it is better to die fighting; better that, than to see their race, once the lords of these lovely islands, melt away like the snow on the bill-sides, or worse, degenerate into hewers of wood and drawers of water for the aggressive intruders, fit is a. good death to die' they say:—that seems to be their melancholy language. Now look at the state of the native mind two years ago ; and can any unprejudiced man say that we have got the worth of our money in the way of establishing the Queen's supremaoy in the Northern Island ? Is not the Queen's writ less respected ? Is not the Queen's mail stopped ? Are not the movements of European travellers in the interior more confined ? In every conceivable manner in which you oan measure tbe increase or diminution of the authority and power of Government, and the influence of the law, is it not most evidently and most sadly true, that we are in a far worse position than when we took the fatal step of seizing the land at the Waitara ? As an assertion, then, of the Queen's snpremacy, the event daily proves more and more clearly that the war was a miserable blunder. But it has bad even worse evila—what is to come next? At present it is neither peace nor war. It is a state of armed neutrality. We are like tbe whole ' dramatis person*' in Sheridan's Critic, with our daggers at each other's throats, but unable to move. We surely cannot attack tbe natives again. After this long cessation of hostilities on what pretence can we attack them again ? The Waitara is ours; they Lave submitted to force; according to their j own laws it is ours by right of conquest if not by purchase. That chapter in history is closed. Are we going to attack tbe king movement ? How can we consistently do so when we have left it unassaulted for some three or four! years ? ! We do not believe for one moment that Sir George Grey will attack the natives again, j Diplomacy is bi3 weapon—not war. Well i then, what a oonditiou we are in ? An enormous army saddled on us, and no chauce of speedy release from it. Sir George Grey will never send a man away whom be can keep. We cannot speculate what bis policy may be on other matters, but on this point we may confidently prophesy, that, whatever else be does, he will never diminish the Military by a single man if he can help it. A large army has been the peculiarity of his government whenever he could get it. This then is one terrible result of that ira- ! prudent speech of Governor Browne at the Wai« ! tara. And tbe news by tbe last mail containing the recommendations of the Military Defences Committee of Parliament renders this result still more alarming. We ventured many weeks ago, in laying before our readers the report of the Depaitmental Committee on this subject, drawn up as is well known by Mr. Godley,—we ventured to predict that, in the main proposals, that | report was certain to be accepted by Parliament, : and by the public. Our prophecy has been | fulfilled; for the Committee has reported in favour of laying the largest part of the cost of defending the Colonies on the Colonies themselves. The result could not be otherwise. The moment the question is put—shall the peop'e in England be taxed, or the people in the Colonies be taxed, for the defence of the latter, it needs no conjuror to say what the answer is likely to be in the British House of Commons. Eight or wrong, whether we like it, or do not like it, we must make up our minds to the end, namely, that we shall have the very largest part of the cost of this great army now quartered i n the Northern Island charged on the colonial revenues. Nor can thd Middle Island, claim exemption No part of New Zealand is more guilty than Canterbury in upholding the war. Had the Northern Island stood alone we believe a majority of her members would have opposed the policy of the lute governmeut; but the Middle Island was almost unanimous for the war policy. So then we caunot turn round now, and when the question becomes ore of money, repudiate our share of the burden which our votes and our influence have tended to create. With Sir George Grty's inordiuate love for military expenditure, with a large army on the spot, with the certainty of having to pay the greatest part of the bill, our fiuancial prospeots for the uext few years are such as must cause the least prudent and mo3t hopeful some considerable anxiety. And greatly will the burden be increased by the consideration that in return for this draft on our resources we have the consolation of knowing that the policy which Cost so dear, has achieved to little,

Truly Governor Browne had better not say this was a war for supremacy. That is to acknowledge a complete defeat. Ele had better agree with us that it was a war for land ; because at all events we did get some land, although two ot three hundred thousand pounds for six hundred acres is rather a long price. In real truth, this was a war for land and not for supremaoy. . Here again the history of events is a complete evidence of the policy. We did not fight to stop murders, or to put down the king movement : tbe moment the question became one of land we fought. So we left off fighting as soon as we got the land. The King movement is not put down; the Queen's writ will not run farther or so far as it did; and yet we cease fighting. Can a native be 10 blind as not to interpret these omens? But even as a land policy, has it been suocessful ? Will the natives sell us more land, or be more willing to dispose of land than formerly ? We believe far less so. The war has tended to strengthen aud enlarge the land leagues, because its whole history and conduct has been such as clearly to prove to the Natives that the land, at the bottom of our hearts, whatever we may say to them, or even try to persuade ourselves, the land is what we really covet and are resolved to have. Many years will elapse before we shall cease to feel the evil policy of this war*,;-; •;< , y . We know well tbat the views advocated by this journal on the Native Question are not those at present popular in this Province, or generally in the Colony : but it is not the first instance iv English history in which a community has sanctioned a po'icy which some few years afterwards it came (o regret and condemn. There never wa3 a more popular war than the first American War: yet its authors lived to hear it denounced and condemned by every great statesman and every rational man. So we believe it will be with us. The time is not far distant when every politician in New Zealand will admit that for the sale of that contemptible six hundred acres of land at the Waitara, we plunged the colony into vast useless military expenditure, alienated the native mind, ohecked their civilisation and stopped the progress of the country to an extent hardly credible. It will remain as a permanent tribute to the great popularity of Governor Browne, and the great confidence reposed in Mr. Richmond, that they were able without serious opposition to inflict upon. tbe Colony so great and enduring a disaster.— Canterbury Press.