THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 418, 25 October 1861, Page 3

THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

(From the Saturday Review.)

The battle at Manassas Junction has already realised, and even surpassed, our expectations that the war in America would be characterised by peculiar incidents. "We were prepared to see errors in generalship, and shortcomings in the handling ofthe troops; but we were not prepared to hear of a battle long meditated, and deliberately begun, coming to such an extraordinary termination, or of an entire 'Grand Army' giving way to such a panic as prevailed among the Federalists on the 21st of July. It was not more complete at that engagement between the English and French, in Henry Vll.'s reign, which was called thenceforth the Battle of the Spurs. We are still at a loss to understand how this panic arose. Perhaps the official reports, wh2n we receive them, may throw some light upon its origin, but the present accounts are vague and contradictory. The suggestion that it was due to General Johnstone's unexpected arrival with 20,000 men is at variance with the statement that he had joined Beauregard on the previous evening, and that his arrival was known to the Federalists themselves. That il was produced by a flank movement wliich Beauregard made when the attack upon his front was fully developed, is plausible, but is only a supposition. That it should have begun among the camp followers and spectators in the rear, and have communicated itself to the troops in front, seems very unlikely. We are inclined to believe that it was not one of those sudden seizures of alarm to which raw soldiers are liable, but tliat it was gradually developed from the running away of a few frightened men into the universal flight which it eventually became. Little excuse would be required to turn away men from their difficult task of forcing the enemy's lines, whose courage or patriotism was msde of no sterner stuff than that of the 4th Pennsylvanian regiment. It is to be observed that this gallant body of men was on its way towards Washington at ten o'clock. Its engagement was over. Its time had been up, perhaps at half-past eight, and it started homewards with the full knowledge that a serious battle was at hand, and within actual hearing of the cannonade. We can only wonder that such men went to the front at all. Either General Scott had overlooked that their term of service would soon expire, or he knew so little of their honorable nature as to imagine they would neglect the pressing engagements which probably awaited them in Pennsylvania, and would give their services to the Union instead for a few hours more. General Patterson, in the northern part of Virginia, wa9 belter informed of the disposition of his troops. He had nineteen regiments reckoning on their speedy release'from, duty, and fifteen of them refused to defer that'jiefiod a ain>la hour. With a force composed of such vanishing quantities; he naturally Imitate tQ come within wacH of a numerous

enemy. Instead of keeping General Johnstone in check, he was obliged to guard against being himself cut off. The mutineers at Spithead, in 1797, declared their intention of disobeying all orders until their grievances were settled, unless the enemy should put to sea; the 4th Pennsylvanians at Manassas found iv the presence of tlie enemy only more cogent reasons for asserting and acting on their rights. They 'guessed* there was hot work behind them, but they left it to be done by those who were lawfully bound to do it. A certain regiment wears its number behind as well as in front of fhe cap, iv honorable remembrance of the day when, being unexpectedly beset iv rear and in front at the same time, the rear rank faced about and boldly withstood the attack. The remarkable behaviour of the 4th Pennsylvanians might be commemorated in a similar way, only they should wear the number behind only. The distinction might likewise be fairly awarded to those officers who are described as being among the first of the army to recognise and act upon the principle of sauve quipeut. When these incidents are disposed of, the issue of the battle appears in perfect accordance with the circumstances under which the action begun. The want of any map on a sufficiently large scale to show tho details of the ground prevents us from estimating the value of the Confederates' position ; but in general terms it i 3 compared by eyewitnesses to that of the Alma. Now, at the Alma, there wes required a supeiiority of numbers on the assailants' part to neutralise the advantages which the possession of the heights, the command of the river, aud the artificial defences gave to the Russians. At Manassas, the superiority of numbers seems to have been on the other side. Mr. Davis, indeed, acknowledges to employing only 15,000 Confederates, but he refers perhaps only to that wing on which the chief attack was made. We cannot comprehend how the total force could be so small. There had, at any rate, been ample time to throw up such field works as would make a naturally strong place almost impregnable. General Beauregard is a military engineer by profession; he has seen service and given proofs of ability in Mexico; and ho had as many weeks as Menschikoff had days to fortify the line of his own choice. If, in spite of all his skill and of all his resources, he had been driven back by an army even equal in number to his own, his prospects of future success would have been small indeed. There are other circumstances which would have told in his favor in any action. He has managed to keep his arrangements secret, he is supported by better officers, and he is regarded with confidence by his men. The Federalists had no good information about the strength of the heights they proposed to attack, or about the number of troops available for the defence. They flattered themselves that the position was strategically bad, and that the enemy would fall back to Richmond rather than risk a serious battle in that neighborhood. Tiieir continual dread of masked batteries is in itself a tribute to the skill of their opponent. The events of the 21st of July will only add to their nervousness on that point. It was some hours after the first shots were fired ere the battle became general, and the falling back of the Confederates, if it was intentional, speaks well for the steadiness of the men, and the efficiency of the officers. 'Better,' says a Greek proverb, 'is an army cf stags headed by a lion, than an army of lioita headed by a stag.' Beauregard has, if the accounts of him be true, some claim to be classed as a lion. The New York Times does not scruple to place the Federalist officers among the stags. * The rebels,' it says, ' had rather encounter two or three of our Brigadiers than one private—it is understood that Beauregard has issued orders to his sharpshooters not to hit- the men with epaulettes.' Paragraphs of this kind falling into the hands of the soldiers are equally prejudicial to their confidence as to their discipline. That the mischief exists there is no doubt. Just before the battle of Manassas, tho Ohio regiments protested against being led by their Brigadier, General Schenk. He it was who commanded on the 17th of June, at that curious reconnoisance, in a railway train, when the troops were taken by steam under fire of a battery, and then deserted by the engine which should have been ready to take them back.

Ofthe two Presidents—who, of course, exercise considerable influence over the course of affairs, if they do not determine the actual operations—Mr. Davis has the advantage over his rival in having received a military education, and in having apparently more natural taste for military affairs. At the late battle, he commanded the centre in person. Mr. Lincoln is accused of forcing his commander-in-chief to yield to the popular clamour, and to undertake that advance against the enemy of which his better judgment disapproved. General Scott has always remonstrated against attempting any important operation before his raw levies should have been metamorphosed into something like trained soldiers. He pledged himself to bring the war to a successful end by the Ist of May, 1862, if he were left to manage it in his own way; but he fixed on the Ist of November as the earliest date for taking the field. His opinion was over-ruled, and no precautions on his part could secure the army against tlie danger he had foreseen. Tlie general plan had long been formed. An advance upon Richmond had been contemplated ever since the safety of Washington had been secured. The other movements in Virginia were in connexion with it; they were conducted with varied success on both sides, but were not signalized by any battle worth particular notice. They were principally directed against the division of Confederates, about 10,000 strong, under General Johnstone, which occupied Harper's Ferry. About the end of May, troops were put in motion with the view of cutting it off from tbe main body, and by the middle of June they threatened it on three Bides. On the north 15,000 or 20,000 men under General Patterson were moving down from Charabersburg. On the south-east, 6000 had advanced from Washington toLeesburg,andonthesouth-west, Generals M'Clellanjand Cox were closing in from Western Virginia by Bomuey and Beverley. On the 16th of June, General Johnstone abandoned Harper's Ferry, and fell back towards Winchester andStrasburg, from which plea there is a direct railway to Manassas. The Federalist Generals had failed to cut him off, but otherwise their operations had been satisfactory. Western Virginia was recovered to the Union, and some slight victories won. GeneralJ Patterson obtained an advantage over some of the Confederate troops at Hainsville, on the 2nd of July, and at Martinsburgon the 4th. M'Clellan had surprised a small camp at Philippa on the 2nd June, and on the 12th and 13th July he beat in succession Colonel Pogram and General Garnett. The former surrendered, the latter was killed in rallying hia men. By the 15th of July, the Federalists were ranged almost in a semicircle running from Alexandria and Washington, through Charlestown to Romney and Beverley. On the 16th, the grand army of the Potomac began its advance upon Manassas Junction. It moved on cautiously and slowly till tho 21st. Then, trusting to General Johnstone being still kept in check among the Alleghany mountains, it 'rushed, singing patriotic songs, into the battle* A few hours later, it was hurrying back, in wild confusion to take shelter within the entrenchments of Washington.

General Beauregard had little to gain and much to risk, considering tlie nature of his troops, in a close pursuit. An active cavalry and artillery might have slaughtered some hundreds of fugitives but night was corning on, and the defences of Washington, which iiave been in construction ever since the w,ir began, ought to be proof against any such an attack as ho could immediately have made. Ir, whilst the flush of success is on his men, and his lines are secure against an immediate lepetition ot the attack, he wero able to throw a superior force into the neighborhood of Winchester and dofeat the Federalist forces tliere, he would be turning his victory to better account. Richmond is for the present secure. It cannot be approached from the North so long as tlie Confederate army can maintain itself at such a point as Manassas Junction, and some time would be required to organise an expedition from Fortress Monro or the shores oi the Chesapeake,