EUROPE.

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 359, 2 April 1861, Page 3

EUROPE.

The prospects of the continent of Europe are quite, as lowering as those of. America. Dark clouds are working up from.all points of the compass with a very wild and threatening appearance. The storm may possibly blow over, or discharge itself locally, but there is every indication that another general continental hurly burly may b3 at hand.

Austria* obstinate to the-last, positively refuses to sell or cede Venetia, and' Garibaldi has pledged himself that there shall not be peace till Venetia is once more Italian. That his wish for half a million of soldiers by the spring will be ,'gratified is doubtful, and that ve\y doubt increases the complication of the crisis, for an army of that size would settle the question. Italy is strong enough to resent the retention of Venetia, but not strong to make sure that it can release'from foreign dominations this last of the Italian provinces. Garibaldi can do nothing without Victor, Emmanuel. The part he has designated for himself is to land on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and by raising revolution there assist the Hungarians. But this to be successful must be a contemporaneous movement with an advance by the Italian King on the Quadrilateral. An isolated movement would only lead to defeat. Victor Emmanuel is not yet quite ready to move. His Neapolitan dominions' are not yet consolidated. Disaffection is still too prevalent. He cannot move without Napoleon's leave. Nor, indeed, is the kingdom as yet conquered. Francis 11. holds out unexpectedly long at Gaeta, and may perhaps keep his ground all the winter, in which case the spring will come before any adequate provision can have been made for the campaign. He has only a small garrison in the fortress, but it is well provisioned, y and its natural defences are very strong. That it must, ultimately fall if not relieved is certain, but the ex-King buoys himself up with the hope that something may turn up in his favor. A continental war might have the effect of letting him out, and a movement of sympathy in his favor could be got up without much difficulty. A reaction to some extent is alvvaj's to be counted on.

The attitude of France is as it has been for years past, an attitude of preparation. Whatever may come, Napoleon is resolved not to be unprepared. The hammer rings without cessation in all the French arsenals and dockyards. The army is being reorganised, and under that phase an extension of it is concealed. Iron-clad ships are being multiplied. The Gfloire will soon have several companions, and shot-proof gunboats, for service in shallow waters, are being prepared with the greatest rapidity. All this, of course, does nor. absolutely portend war. These preparations may, to some extent, be m.£ant^mo!e!y to strike terror and so to do the work of war. Napoleon puts himself in a position to threaten, and then, if threats are not enough, he has the means to strike a heavy blow.

His designs point towards German}'. A French statesman lately said lhat there' was not a single continental Power that had not some < sore point on which Napoleon could lay his hand. Prussia is always invblvinV itself in broils with Denmark about the Schleswig-Holstein question. This territory lies between Danish Denmark and Prussia It belongs, legally to the former; it has become virtually Germanised in language and commerce.; The greater will always draw the less. The people would not objec to belong to a strong nation rather than to a weak one, and have no very strong national ties. Prussia, which has grown from a province to a kingdom, by annexations, longs for this bit of territory ; Denmark will not surrender it without fighting (or it. The quarrel has been going on for years, and Napoleon has the opportunity of stepping in and deciding it whichever way he likes. He can bribe Prussia by offering her, the territory, in consideration of course of an equivalent on the Rhine; or he can support Denmark as an ally, just as he supported Italy, and then comes a war with Germany, in which, if he can only succeed in isolating the other powers of Europe, he may calculate on an easy vie* tory, and the Rhine provinces as the reward of his skill. He is sure to carry France with him, for the prospect of territorial aggrandisement and military glory, wiUabe too tempting for the nation to|esist. The.cost and-the suffering will be" forgotten. The few who may disapprove will be overborne by the hurrahs of the crowd, and the liberty of speech he has just granted will serve to show how truly he gives expression to the aspirations of French sentiment.

But would Europe be neutral in such a struggle? There lies the risk. Much as they dislike and distrust each other, the great Powers will not relish the prospect of being conquered in detail. Yet, consistently with pushing forward his general policy, Napoleon will as little as possible incite them to union. What he has most to dread is a European coalition against him. It was that that ruined his uncle. It was that alarmed him after the victory of Solferino, and led to the premature peace of Villafrarica.

There is a report of a secret treaty between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, by which these Powers mutually guarantee to each other their possessions, The wish is probably father to the thought. The recent .Warsaw meeting was intended to pave the way for something of this sort, but it failed. The three sovereigns were personally amicable, but their policy did. not agree. Russia, the most powerful and least invuU nerable of the three, asks. what Austria cannot concede.—a revision of the treaty of Paris. That treaty was fatal to Russia as a naval power in the Black Sea, and to forbid a navy there is to take away theright arm.of power in an act of aggression • and this is especially aggravating, just as the sick man seems hastening to his doom. Russia is impatient, therefore, to revise that treaty, and would concede a good deal were that done. But Austria cannot do it, and will not do it. She has her own visions of annexation down the Danube, which are incompatible with a Russian occupation of the Principalities. If the three Powers could and did combine, it would check Frances game for the present; and it is, therefore, Napoleon's policy always to foster discord between them. Austria and Prussia have drawn hearer to each other of late, feeling that they have a common enemy to deal with. But then Prussia did not help Austria when its trans-Alpine dominions were being wrenched from it; why should Austria help Prussia to save its trans-Rhenish provinces? Moreover, if ever ;so willing, Austria may not be able to "give Help.She has as much at home to deal with as she can manage. Napoleon has only to give the signal, and Kossuth is let hose upon Hungary, while Victor Emn-aiuel would advance upon Venetia. Neitle of these liberators feel it safe to stir in opposition to his wish, while they have boih consented to'bacome his instruments if lie will make 'their policy his own. While if Russia interferes, Napoleon has the Polish card to play—a card he has several times ostentatiously shown that he holds in his hand. He is not the man to patro.iise a revolution out of love for tl.e idea, bit he would not hesitate to arouse one, it' by so doing he could embarrass his enemies. The restoration of Poland to'the map of Europe may be an impjssibility, bus to raise the cry would hamper the three Powers, and leave hi;r, free to win two or three decisive battles on his own bank of the Rhine. And if he couM secure military possession of the coveted provinces, hp. could cause a vote to bo taken in favor of annexation, in the manner so saceessfußv" carried out by the French prefects.in Savoy and Nice, lie would be ready then to make peace. To secure a growing influence in Turkey* he has recently allowed a French capitalist to negotiate a large loan for the Sultan at a very exorbitant rate of interest, and the revenues of several provinces have .been pledged for .repayment. British influence has been used at Constantinople to persuade the Sultan to economise expenditure rather than,borrow at such an extravagant rate» and from such a dangerous creditor^ but all in vain; and thus, in case of default, which is certain to occur, Frenchmen who have a lien upon the provincial revenues of Turkey will appeal to the Emperor to enforce their claims. And how can the Emperor possibly show himself deaf to such an appeal? He must come in as agent for the mortgagees, and foreclose.. The great "Eastern question," which it has been the labor of Loid Palmerston's diplomatic life to keep at bay, seems drawing nearer and nearer as that, statesman's life wanes'.to its close. lib may yet live to see a. consummation he has toiled so hard to postpone.— Shj&mjflemtf,