THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 356, 22 March 1861, Page 3

THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

To the Editor of the Times.

Sir,—Although the following remarks are of a purely professional nature, you will not perhaps consider them misplaced in your journal, which, in its wide-spread circulation will, with your permission, bear them even to the antipodes, where they may perhaps be of some use. "

Every mail from New Zealand brings accounts of the difficulties encountered by our brave countrymen in their war with the Maoris.

Having been engaged some years ago in a war with a similar enemy, in the same sort of a country as New Zealand, under the command of an able officer, who showed a particular aptitude for that sort of warfare, 1 trust I shall not be thought presumptious in recommending to the consideration of those now fighting the Maoris some lessons which I learnt in Cafirelahd from the late Sir William Byre. In attacking an enemy strongly posted, the first line of assailants at least should be in skirmishing order, and the skirmishers should, while advancing, take all possible advantage of coverand endeavor to turn the flanks of their adversaries. This advice appears at first sight uncalled for, as one would suppose that any man of common sense, without having- received a military education, would, if commanding under the above-mentioned circumstances, adopt of his own accord the course recommended; and every officer in the army, wiiether gifted with common sense or not,, must have had such doctrines instilled into his mind. No ensign of the present day could pass his examination'for a lieutenancy without knowing so much, at least, ot.the military art. Yet scenes which I have myself witnessed or heard of in South Africa, and what we now read in correspondence from New Zealand, prove to me that such advice is needed. lam happy to see, however, that it has already occurred to our friends at the seat of war that a soldier is not intended to be a mere human target, and that something may be learnt even from the Maoris. But when regular troops inexperienced in warfare of this nature, have suffered losses, some commanders are apt to attribute their reverses, not to having gone the wrong way to work, but to the supposed, fact that; regular soldiers are unequal to savages in their own wild country. Such an idea was prevalent at one time in the Cape of Good Hope; it was thought useless for the * rothe budje"' (red jacket) to venture into the bush, and our native auxiliaries were used to draw the covert, While the British troops remained in the open.

: Under Colonel, afterwards LieutenantGeneral Sir William Eyre, all this was changed. That great soldier saw at once, with the true instinct of a general, how the savage should be encountered in his fastnesses ; he, like the great Charles Napier, recognised the fact that in mountain warfare especially will discipline and combination, if properly used, triumph over the badly combined: efforts ofirregulars. He dressed and accoutred his soldiers as lightly and practically as possible; he taught them, that wherever the naked savage could penetrate, there the English soldier in his red coat could follow; that the savage never dreamt of plunging headlong through the prickly bush, but made for himself pathsy often so slight as to be imperceptible to an inexperienced eye. By using these paths the most (apparently) impracticable thickets could be penetrated and were penetrated by British troops, and we made our way, in some cases even with pack-horses, carrying provisions, &c, into fastnesses which both friends and enemy had hitherto considered inaccessible to us, and which the Caffres had therefore till then always found saf'a places of retreat. Our loss when actually in the bush was very trifling; when we did suffer it was if exposed by accident or want of caution in the open, to fire from an enemy under cover. This determination to penetrate everywhere, together with a system of constant surprises, was the means made use of by Colonel Eyre to bring the Caffie war to a successful issue. The great difficulty usually met with in a war with that sort of enemy is to get a,t him and make him fight, as from his superior knowledge of a difficult country he has great facilities for escape and is only inclined to fight when he can take you at a great disadvantage. Colonel Eyre rightly judged that attacks on Cafftes should be made principally at* dawn of day, after a long night march. Many attacks of this nature answered well, and even when the enemy succeeded in discovering our approach in time to elude us, the fright he underwei t was of service to us, and the flying columns of the ' great chief,' as Eyre was called by the Caffres, kept them in such a constant state of hot water that they eventually evacuated their so-called • inaccessible' fastnesses, in which we built forts and made" roads-r-the next step towards the subjugation of" the country. To carry on successfully a war of surprises of this description a commander must have good guides, good spies, and good hardy troops, inured to" latigue. Such our African soldiers soon became, and doubtless the material/or such. is in New Zealand; let it. only be properly used. I imagine that the same system which Colonel Eyre carried out fo successfully in Caffraria would answer against the Maoris. It may be summed up in a i^ew words:—Bjess and accoutre your men as most convenient for the country in which they are to act. Teach them that where the savage penetrates, there, the white man can surely follow. Make much of your intelligence department. ,Cairy on a war of surprises' by mean? of fiyisg columns unencumbered with baggage ""and moving much by night. I could write much more on this subject, but fear that I have already, "exceeded the space which you, Sir, will be incltned to allow for a .letter of this nature; I will therefore conclude. \ December 14< L, Q;