Page 2 Advertisements Column 2

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 333, 28 December 1860, Page 2

ARRIVAL OF THE FBINO£ IH^H 10 OGCQBaR 26. ; ■• • - -iTAr^Yi;^ - '..;; GLORIOUS BATTLE OF THE VOLT UltNO* (/Vw» to ifome New*,* October 26.) ' .'.^J garibaldi's position on *he, volturno, ™ We have already said that, after C^lribaldi's arrival at Naples, the niain body of the troops of King Francis 11. were potted behind the. river Volturno, oof the Jeft or southern bank of which stands the fortified town of Capua.,, They, therefore, vrere&ot only protected by a: considers*^ streim, ; but had the ad Vantage of a strdng UitUtpimt on the hostile bank, and were further assisted by excellent communications' in. their rear. Altogether it was a good position—not by any means impregnable, but Buchas, if Held by good troops, and resolutely, defended, would give an assailant iome trouble. Garibaldi had J pushed his outposts pretty close to Capoa, but as he had no considerable body ot men nearer, than Naples, the.Royalifta took heart, and began to make, sorties from? Qajma, and to 5 threaten some tow jw on the road*) the capital. On receiving this intelligence Garibaldi ordered up General Eber's brigade to the •pot, and ultimately—that is to say, on the 19th September—General Tiirr assumed the command of the whole force, and determined to make an attempt on the Neapolitan line of defence|by crossing the Volturno. The history, of a manas-uvre which ensued is as follows:— I';'I,'; ,' .',,', • ,': The Volturno, though a stream of some magnitude when measured by the Neapolitan standard, is not such a river as would give -much embarrassment to good military engineers. It is in some places only. 50 and in none above 100 yards wide; its banks are low, and of equal height on both sides. Nevertheless/the operation of crossing it in ttie ordinary 'manner was judged to be beyond the capacity of Garibaldi's troops.. Science was their weak point, pontooning was out, of the way, and the less they exposed themselves on level ground to the play of artillery the better they were likely to fare. ; Accordingly, it was decided.not to force the passage of the Volturno, or to assault the enemy in front, but to ascend the stream to a point where . it might be crossed without opposition, and in this manner to turn the left flank of the Royalist army. Another motive also is ' alleged for this manoeuvre. By throwing themselves on the point in question the Garibaldians would get into the mountains, where, as the correspondent of the Times \ expresses it, "their strength. lay." In short, as the Neapolitans were greatly superior in artillery and cavalry, and as they might possibly stand at bay behind their chosen line of defence and show some fight ; at last*; it was resolved to encounter them* not in regular combat, but with the wea- . pons and manoeuvres whTch hkd proved so < successful before. For this purpose about 600 men were detached to the right to cross the Volturno, capture the town of Cajazzo, a few miles to the north-east of Capua, and excite insurrection and disturbance on the left flank of the Neapolitans. In the meantime, to mask this movement, and to attract the attention of the enemy from the menaced points, a general demonstration was ordered along the whole river front, and the manoeuvre was duly executed by three columns of the liberating army under the eyes of Garibaldi himself. As this manoeuvre had no object beyond that of creating a diversion, and as it was in this respect completely successful, the,. Neapolitans have little to boast of—much " less, indeed, than their own' reports announced, but the sequel showed that good judgment had been exercised in avoiding the more regular form of military action. Fhe Neapolitans did fight, and with consiierable determination.' Their' trpops were ,< well posted, their artillery waf well served ( / md they were, apparently, well commanded. Independently of the town of Capua itself, . [hey had some detached posts on the southam side of the river; in particular, a farmnouse, which they held with twocompanies. Fhis position, however was at first soon car-..' ried by one of the Garibaldian columns/, md some of the troops, even/forded the ■ itream and exchanged shots with the eneniy { )n the opposite bank, though not without loss; „ ■ Dut at other points the movement.was less for- ; :unate. One column found itselfinifc road so , jomraanded by a Neapolitan batteiry that it became pxpedient even here to take to the ; ; lilts, while another was lured within range of ■ ' he guns of the fortress, and then .suddenly at* * ;ackedby artillery and cavalry. For a short ime, indeed, the Neapolitans actually had f ;he upper band, and even recovere4jthe farm- ' louse, which they burnt, but in the end Graribaldi remained master of the field— ;he southern bank of the river being cleared, - md the enemy being driven once more into ;he woods under the glacis of tW fortress. ; Fhe total loss on the side of the patriots was ibout 160 men., . . j"u !i \' .It cannot be pretended that-the, Neapolp* :ans had much advantage in t^is affair. Fhey were enabled for a few moments to ivail themselves of their superiority in gunk md horse, and to inflict some loss on an memy whose own courage had carried hiflji ather too far; but,they were pventualty jeaten even on the field, while the real >bject of the engagement was successfully ittained elsewhere. ■ .v. A check, which' .was perhaps, of more mportance than the above, occurred on the IJst of September. Oajazzo, which haii )een taken and retaken b^-thet \Garibalr liana, was captured by tlje.Niapolitansj Piedmoiit also was lost f. and • the^^oyal|st| hus became, to a considerable extent, nasters of the line of the Volturno. The ■■ ipecial correspondent of the 2%n«t t)k«ji lescribej the taking of C»jui^sltt^pii|V