MEMOIR ON RUSSIA. FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF THE PRESENT EMPEROR.

Colonist, Volume IV, Issue 319, 9 November 1860, Page 4

MEMOIR ON RUSSIA. FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF THE PRESENT EMPEROR.

Drawn up by the Cabinet in 1837.

This document came within reach of the curious by a Prussian ministerial crisis. It is perhaps the most remarkable one that has ever seen the light. We are enabled to present it only in a condensed form, except where inverted commas mark the very words of the original. It begins by decribing the character of the Russian tribe, and deducing from it the extraordinary development of the empire. The Russian people is worthy to prescribe what in Europe ought to be, what ought not to be. As early as the reign of Ivan 111. and IV., the nobles manifested their patriotism by resigning their political privileges into the hands of the Czar; the result of their self-sacrifice being, that Russia was not; hindered from directing her strength against the foreigner by a turbulent nobility, like that which mined Sweden and Poland. The last dangerous crisis she had to go through was that in the time of the pseudo-Demetrious; since that period she has carried her arms victoriously into every neighboring country, and reclaimed from Poland what she had temporarily ceded in the time of her internal struggle. "It was lent money, and has returned a thousand per cent." " Peter was the living soul of the whole; the consent of the senate was not required to his ukases ; he abolished the dignity of Patriarch, injurious to the power of Government." He was also the founder of the fleet " destined to perform great things in a near future," and well perceived that the acquisition of the Swedish provinces, on the I Baltic was necessary to Russian on account' ol their ports and trading-places. In the acquisition of them he made use of Poland and Denmark. At the same time he obtained sway over the Caspian Sea, in spite of the Persians. The Porte was twice on the point of going to war for that reason, but France meditated in favor of Russia, and to the injury of her old ally.

" Short-sightedness may accuse the father who executed his son, of abandoning human feelings. Peter the Great in this stands great before us, elevated over vulgar judgment. The father sacrificed to the sovereign whatever is highest in family life; his Russians appreciated the superhuman of the deed, and in later times, enflamed by an enthusiastic love of their great fatherland, more than once sacrificed similar hostile elements to the benefit of the country."

There was great practical wisdom in the abolition of primogeniture and hereditary succession in general. The genius of Peter continued to rule under Catherine I. In the reign of Anne the pride of the old families once more burst into a flame, but only to be extinguished for ever, in such a manner that it could not any longer interfere with the autocracy of the Emperor. For some time there were no acquisitions, because the country had to gather strength within. "It does not agree with a cautious policy to tear large districts from*consolidated states, with totally different institutions and religions, particularly if there is time to carry on the annexation leisurely. Moreover, smaller portions are more easily assimilated. At all events, it appears expedient to let the countries destined to be acquired exist for some time under separate but actually perfectly dependent and subjected chiefs, as we have done with Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia."

The dismemberment of Poland was indispensible, because it was the business of Russia to advance towards the West, and "to establish comfortably all Salvonic tribes, without exception in one great mansion." Poland being not a hereditary monarchy but an aristocratic confederation —or, to speak correctly, a turbulent democracy of nobles, and including a variety of nationalities—the fate of the so-called republic,

in contact with a great centralised neighbor, could not be doubtful.

"From loosely connected Germany no successful resistance was, or is, to be feared; there was the form of an empire, but hollow, without spirit and life. As to France, she had strictly no right to resist the partition of Poland ; for Russia did nothing but follow the very maxims so effectually applied since 1552 by France to Germany. In the life of nations and states historical consequences must prevail, because they are a necessary produce of power. The destiny of Poland with respect to Russia had been to protect the giant from the West while in his cradle, then to exercise him in the use of arms, lastly to return into that great bond that embraces all Salvonic tribes." There can be but one Salvonic empire, and that must be Russia.

After the demise of the crown of Poland, and when France, very much to our satisfaction, had started Stanislaus Lesczinski as a candidate, our problem was to conclude an alliance with some powerful intermediate state, with a view of making it bear a greater part of the burden and expenses of war. This state was Austria; and we succeeded in setting her to work for our ends. Under the appearance and pretence of guarding the rights of the Dissidents, a Russian army \ entered Poland; the final result being, that \the weak German Empire indemnified Lesczinski by the cession of Lorraine, which \s afterwards to go to France. Sweden \s powerless, her demoralised sovereign n^lity being in the pay either of Russia or\France. 'Ihe Porte alone saw clear, a*Attempted to occupy the growing power Sf.-'Wa by the rJUrtars of the Crimea. *or fes she was " chastised" afterwards, Austrhjeing bound by treaty to help in ™je kuWss..: "Our whJ.e army fought like onlhero; everywhere the "crescent waned bf o re the splendor 6v our arms; 1 and had\i e achievements of i.ustria in < any way bW commensurate to o irS) the Mussulman Empire in Europe wouic* have seen hs last aready at that time. Bu, t h e Austrian armY which has seldom the: g^d luck to possegi a captain, covered itee!^ •under five guciessive generals, in three

campaigns, with disgrace, crowned by the separate peace of Belgrade. Russia consented to the peace only in order to have her hands free to chastise Sweden, which state had to pay for the temporary supremacy of the French party by abjectly supplicating for a peace, by loss of territory, and by electing Crown Prince, at the order of the Empress Elizabeth, the Duke Adolph Frederick of Holstein."

During the war on the Austrian succession, Russia left the contending parties to exhaust themselves. It was not before negotiations for peace were set on foot that she sent soldiersr into Germany, and accelerated the conclusion of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. "The alliance with Austria against Frederick IL of Prussia, with a view to dismember this latter state, was entirely in keeping with the tendency of our policy. As little as we could allow an independent Poland to exist, so little could we suffer on the eastern frontier of Germany the formation of a power capable of retarding our entrance into that country, even so long as to give the other states time to arm. France had never suffered such a power to grow up on her confines. Owing to this, policy, she was able always to carry the war into the heart of the German Empire, and force the rapidly occupied provinces first to remain inactive, then to bear the burden of war, and to pay indemnities. Such is the secret of the preponderance she exercised for more than one hundred years over the German states. To us the partition of Prussia was the more necessary, as we we might find her opposed to our views on Poland. In spite of the genius of her Ruler, we should"at that time have crushed Prussia, and rendered her innocuous, if the Empress Elizabeth had lived a twelvemonth longer. But Peter of Holstein was blind to the grandeur of our national policy; he concluded a treaty of peace and defensive alliance with the Prussian King. He has paid the penalty to the genius of our country, as did Alexis, the son of the Great Peter."

" Unfortunately the Prussian state continued to exist during the reign of Catherine II.; but nothing proved so much the irre-. sistible power of our diplomacy and position as the fact that Frederick 11., otherwise so prudent a.politician, remained always subservient to our policy, even when the future of his state would have required the contrary." Frederick had learned by experience how easy it was to push Russian armies far into his country. He, to remedy this disadvantage, entered upon the partition of Poland; but, by doing so, afforded to us a certain compensation for our mishap in not partitioning his own country. In Poland, after the death of Augustus, Russia had to restore order, and, apparently, to maintain the rights of the Dissidents against the Roman Catholic bishops, without, however, interfering effectually with the power of these latter to persecute other denominations. The main point, however, was that a Russian army stood in Poland, and that the Polish constitution was altered in a manner suitable to our purposes. At that time, too, the Porte alone took the right view in standing up for Poland. But the Turkish armies were defeated; the Russian fleet met with no obstacle on its way to Mediterranean,* and gained a victory. "The Cabinet of Vienna concluded an alliance wim Turkey, and advanced an army towards to frontiers of Moldavia. But, to make up for that, Prussia was our guard, to keep Austria in check. Besides, our Empress disposed of a more effective means to quiet Austria—Poland. It was deplorable, indeed, that brotthers of our race should fall under the rule of German Princes; but our cautious policy found itself at that time constrained to cede to the necessity of circumstances. The fault, not to have dismembered Prussia, was committed. That state opposed a serious danger to our intention of acquiring the whole of Poland. Austria, France, England, Holland, and Sweden were not better disposed to approve of our annexation of Poland; a coalition of all these powers was to be feared; and Turkey was already under arms. The complete execution of our plan would have had to be deferred to a distant future; yet, renounce it we could not, because it was of the highest importance to enter into the closest possible contact with the German states, this being the only means to establish firmly and to work our influence and preponderance in the affairs of Europe. If the other powers raised objections, we should have at once two allies to bear the brunt of the battle, we ourselves standing in the background."

Thus Russia was disembarrassed in Poland and against Turkey. The " moderate" demands we raised at Fokschan and Bucharest were objected to by France. In spite of the rebellion of Pugatscheff, the disturbed state of Poland, and the valiant resistance of the Turks, we carried our point. " For our empire is placed under a higher protection, which foils all our enimies. In Poland we let things take their natural course; in Sweden the King was impeded by his nobility; the Turkish army was fallen upon and partly destroyed, partly made prisoners; the remainder with the Grand Vizier, surrounded at the foot of the Balkan, and the Porte forced to submit to the Treaty of Kudjac Kainardji. Now, to punish the Turks, we took a much larger slice of territory, acquired the right of navigation on the Black Sea, and the independence of the Crimea, which soon fell under, our beneficent protection. Besides, we took a measure that proved very expedient, and has been repeatedly resorted to since: we

* The destruction of the Russian fleet would have, raised the courage and reputation of our (the French) navy, and would have, probably, changed the whole fate of the war between the Russians and the Porte. This event would have restored to us the confidence, and secured the gratitude of the Turks; it wou!d have made the Court of Vienna feel the weight of our influence, and the utility of an alliance; and it is evident that that would have prevented the wholo revolution of the North.—Count de BrQgiie's " Policy lof all the Cabinets of Europe during the Reiirns of ,Loui s XV,ahiiXVl,,"vol.ii.p.43. ...",'■ ~

I made the Porte pay large sums of money. Again our Empire shone in full splendor." In the war on the Bavarian succession, j the the two contending parties, Austria and Prussia, had to take the field by order of the Empress Catherine; and it was she who ordained the peace of Teschen by threatening to send a Russian army into Austria, if the court of Vienna should hesitate to renounce its claims on Bavaria. Austria was in the position to seek a reconciliation with Russia at any price. "Soon after the Treaty of Teschen, the German Emperor had to undertake a journey to pay his visit to our Ernpi ess. ' Meantime, we did not lose sight of our Asiatic neighbors. The Prince of Georgia was made to thiow up his allegiance to the Porte. The "national work" of making war upon Turkey was resumed. " Our Empress, for this purpose, summoned (liess bescheiden) Joseph 11. to an interview at Kherson; not because we were in need of the arms of Austria, ours being quite sufficient to annihilate the Turks, but with a view of dividing the Turkish forces, and to spare the blood of Russia. England was welcome to instigate the Porte to declare war against us. Austria brought two hundred thousand men into the field ; but it was only in the second campaign, when she had the advantage of fighting side by side with our heroes, that she appropriated a few branches of our laurels." TPressed by the attitude of the King of Prussia, Austria concluded the dishonorable peace ofSistowa, and gave back what territory she had conquered, quite to our satisfaction. Sweden managed for some time to resist us, owing to the fact that Prussia and England were impeding and thwarting the King of Denmark, our secret ally. Being determined to make an end with Poland, we hastened the conclusion of the peace of Jassy, the more so as the French revolution threatened to oveiflowal! banks, Russia had acquired 5792 German square miles, being more than, the whole surface of Prussia. Since that time nothing can happen in Germany independently of our control. Not till that time were we an eminently Slavonic power of the first magnitude, with an increasing force of attraction. " It was a proof of the depth of our political conception, that we rejected all instances to join iii the war against revolutionary France. A nation fanaticised for an idea which it does not comprehend is worse than a maniac; the more its energy of action is appealed to, the more its irritability is enhanced, while, when that energy finds no vent, it is soon consumed and arrested. Had France been left alone, suffered to tear her own intestines, there would soon have followed exhaustion,anda return to a reasonable order of things. She would not have found occasion to rouse that military talent that lay dormant in the nation, and, once awakened, proved for a long period such a scourge to other nations; nor j would the royal family have been destroyed. Poland 'beiag annexed, what advantages could we have drawn from a war against France, whose principles do not portend any danger to our empire ? It is entirely against our maxims to sacrifice our heroes and our treasures for the interest of others. We gained 500 German square miles on the Baltic, and 832 from Persia.

"These were satisfactory, results. After the death of our great Empress, our armies, it is true, fought against France; but then we had at least the satisfaction of seeing them cover themselves with glory, and restore in some degree the sunken spirit of the Coalition. The world witnessed that strange spectacle of confessors of the orthodox Church fighting side by side with Mussulmen for the chief of the Roman Catholic Church and his exasperated children. But the whole undertaking was essentially treason against the spirit of the policy of our country; and the crime would have attained to the highest degree of atrocity if the alliance with the French Republic had been completed, and the hostilities against England, already commenced, carried out. Such a circumstance was averted by the avengers of the country." " The sage Alexander brought things back to their natural course.^ So long as only republics and diminutive ones rose from the mounds of ashes and ruins, every interference would have been imprudent, even though the rest of the European states had been threatened by a similar fate. Even in such a change we should have been interested, except in so far as it is our j task to prevent the other states, particularly those of Germany, from consolidating themselves, or entering into a firmer compact." So soon, however, as our well-founded influence on the affairs of Europe was_ seriously menaced by a, "parvenu of genius," we could not evade the struggle with that man., He girt his loins, knowing that he had not any longer to deal with Austrians. But in a murderous battle our bravery could not make up for all that wanting in our allies. The peace of Presburgh is;a worthy counterpart to that of Belgrade in 1739. The Cabinet of Berlin had covered itself with so much disgrace that Alexander called back his valiant armies; and if he entered, at a later period, into an alliance with Prussia it was simply for the purpose taking the state of the late Frederick 11. under his protection. "We showed to the Frenh.in 1798, and 1799,1805, and 1806, that a close combat with us is a very different at-j fair from a fight with Germans or Italians. Generally, with inferior forces, we gained more victories than the French; but fools only would have made for states, like those of Germany, further sacrifices calculated to endanger still more our position. Our gain was Bialystock, with 158 German j square miles."

3 Napoleon never exercised the slightest influence on the decision arrived at by the Emperor Alexander. The decrees of Berlin and Milan were quite opportune for us; Sweden, by admitting British ships into

her ports, afforded us a ground for making war.upon her and taking 4977 German square miles. Since the loss of Finland, the state of olim CharlesXll. was powerless, a moon of the Russian sun. "We had done a good stroke of work." Soon after, we got 138 square miles from Austria. During our temporary understanding with Napoleon we could turn against the Shah and the Sultan. Having done that, we resumed our work of upsetting the Parvenu. It was a great advantage that a French soldier should become heir-apparent of Sweden: a man like him, a parvenu too, was tractable; he entered into an alliance with the Conqueror of Finland, though no advantage could accrue from it to Sweden. England was made to meditate with the Porte and Persia for our benefit: the treaty of Gulistan gave us 1129 square miles, and a firm footing in the Caucasus. "By the treaty of Bucharest, in 1812, we gave up, pro tempore, the direct superiority over Wallachia, and the greater part of Moldavia, acquiring, however, at the same time, by a rectification of the frontier, the remaining part of Moldavia, together with Bessarabia, and the valuable mouths of the Danube, giving us the control over the great artery of Austria. Besides, a pwtectorate, established by treaty over those two principalities and Servia, fell to our lot, changing the old rule of the Mussulman resting on conquest over those orthodox countries, into a merely nominal suzerainty.

To chastise Bonaparte, Russia stood in no need of a severe winter; the bravery of the army and the will of the people being quite sufficient to expel the enemy. The " notorious" Tugendbund, in Prussia, was a seminary for revolutionary ideas; it undermined the consideration of the nobility, was strongly inclined to democratic principles, and necessitated, for that reason, a consideration on the part of Russia, although it was of some service against France. The celebrated manifesto of Wittgenstein is to be looked upon from the right point of view; it is to be considered not literally, but as a means, effective for the moment, to set the German people in motion for the well considered views and tendencies of the Emperor Alexander.

After the general peace a wide field was opened to our diplomacy. As to Prussia, " she suffer? from a military system which eats up her marrow, and from frontiers extended in the most disadvantageous manner; she maintains, but with difficulty, a place among the great Powers." Prussia either goes to pieces under some serious shock, or must avail herself of favorable circumstances to become the master of the whole of northern Germany. This state of things is highly favorable for our policy. Austria will require a longtime to grow up to an intellectual power. Our chief aim in the work of dismemberment must be, to preserve in Italy, as well as in Germany, the existing territorial division as much as possible, and to favor in both countries, institutions calculated to keep alive: the dissension of the governing and the governed. We have prevented several mediatizings already resolved upon. The loss of Norway weakened Denmark; but the acquisition ot Norway did not strengthen Sweden; on the contrary, owing to mutual jealousy, became a drag. The arrangements suited perfectly well the interest of Russia.

Of the wisdom of the English policy the memoir has the lowest possible estimation. Already, at the time of the first French revolution, it is said to have shown the greatest imbecility; every succeeding Ministry- was equally shortsighted and stupid. Russia owes it to the want of any serious resistance on the part of England that she could annex "convenient slices" from Turkey and Persia. "It was very fortunate that France did not understand her position. Her interest would have required her to become the neutral ally of England, not so much for the sake of France as for that of England. England ought to have considered the Bonaparte dynasty as a kind of necessity. Had the Cabinet of St. James concluded peace with that dynasty immediately after its establishment, Napoleon would have been a willing ally. Fox was almost the only English statesman who understood the situation, and saw behind the veil of the future. Fortunately, the Tories were never seriously inclined for peace, and at later times were favorable to the Holy Alliance. When at last England seemed to approach France, the old national jealousy was revived by the occupation of Algiers." [This would require a short commentary to prevent the application of the passage to altered circumstances.-—Ed. Free Press.]

"The Holy Alliance, propounded by Russia, was but tha seal, in a pleasant form to the dictatorship of Russia. Time Will show whether the German Confederation be capable of resisting any considerable shock. If the smaller states alone had entered into a confederacy, it might have acquired some importance; it would have been a respectable ally, and strong enough to make its neutrality, respected. Actually four of its members are European Powers, preserving the right of peace and war independently. In the event of a war, with two or more of these powers arrayed against each other, the Bund is rent, and: the smaller states are powerless to protect themselves by a neutrality. The war is carried into their territories, and they are forced, with or against their will, to take part." It is an imperious command of our policy not to allow any understanding and good feeling between princes and nations to grow up in Germany; it is, therefore, very salutary that the former are opposed to all liberal tendencies,in the various Chambers. At the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Carlsbad, &c.,,our diplomacy acted in this sense on the German governments, and they received willingly that direction. As to France, any improper consolidation of her power was to be prevented, and we enjoyed for that end the active co-operation

of the returned emigrants, faithful allies, and diligent correspondents of our Government. It was at the order of Russia that France sent an army across the Pyrenees against the Cortes. On the whole, it is our interest that there should always be in Spain a system of government opposed to that prevailing at the time in France. Nor is the interest of England in the Peninsula to be allowed to grow too strong.

Our inheritance is the East and we must not suffer our " activity in that quarter to relax for a single moment. Wladimiresco was made to excite troubles in Wallachia; Ypsilanti did the same in Moldavia; nineteen days later the insurrection in Ajacha broke out, as arranged beforehand. Public opinion and its Greek committees assisted our plans 'in a very satisfactory manner;' the English Cabinet could not go against the popular current, and remained neutral. Alexander the Glorious could conceive the plan to excuse, what he once joyfully exclaimed on receipt of the news of the murder of Patriarch of Constantinople: * From the shores of the Bosphorus to the pillars of Hercules the Cross shall supplant the Crescent!'" Russia provoked the Porte, we had the " fortunately infatuated Europeans " with us, yet left the insurgents to the furious revenge of the Turks. The responsibility for the bloodshed we laid at the door of the other Powers, they having prevented us from succouring the tortured Christians. Meantime, we found leisure to turn once more against Persia, and to acquire Persian Armenia, with the protectorate over her opulent trading population. Our army was kept in constant activity, ai behoves an empire progressing towards such a great and sublime goal as ours.

"Our aim is, and remains, Constantinople, destined in our hands to become the centre of the world and the eternal door to Asia. For a long time England has had the supremacy of the ocean; but the same position which we have attained on land will be occupied by our maritime power. The possession of Constantinople, the Dardanelles, the whole littoral of the Black Sea are indispensable to us. This sea is to become one great Russian port and cruizingground for our fleets. The Emperor Alexander claimed Oonstantinoplej and the Dardanelles when Napoleon proposed a partition of Turkey for him; at a later period, at the Congress of Verona, he himself made a like proposal to ■he French Cabinet. The great Catherine foretold, in prophetic spirit, that the execution, of the grand scheme would be reserved to her second grandson. Our Hero-Emperor Nicolai, has taken the task upon himself. Everything of a higher order on which Mussulman life rested has disappeared, old forms and habits are upset, all higher education and activity are wanting; complete dissolution is near at hand."

Europe will try to oppose our taking possession of Turkey. Our conquest, however, advances step by step, without any considerable sacrifice on our part; it extends already to the vicinity of Stamboul. Our apparent moderation restrains even our decided enemies from taking up arms. Things, too, are not quite ripe yet. The acquisition, fortification, and arming of all important spots on the Black Sea is an indispensable preliminary. We have to continue our struggles with the tribes of the Caucasus; it is sometimes troublesome, but exercises our armies and covers our preparation in the Black Sea. Our moderation jn the treaty of Adrianople deprived the English Cabinet of every pretext for interference; yet we obtained everything we wanted. By fostering Egypt we contrived further to weaken Turkey. Events of the utmost importance for the splendour of our arms are not far distant. We keep the Divan in good disposition towards, and at the same time in dependence upon us. It is most essential to ; confirm the Sultan in his pseudo reforms and to push him on in the same way; but it will be expedient to, throw obstacles in the way of any real im^ provement of the military organisation Of equal importance is it that the Po,<e should never get clear of financial embarrassment. Above anything, also, that uncomfortable feeling of the Chrjtian population is be enhanced, a longing after a Christian, amongst our namesake after a Slavonic government more and flore to be animated, and a rather informalorganisation to be established for the douile purpose of preparing the general inarrection and preventing premature risinjs. The chiefs of the Albanians and Bosjians may be turned to excellent account; And many things be done from Greece. Any approach of Greece towards the $rte should be prevented. With the Greek we have to keep alive, but not exactly to timulate, the desire of aggrandisement. Pfsia must remain quiet; the Princes of Idia are to be excited against the English^ if "possible, brought to form a coalitionagainst them, to be extended at the prppeitime to Persia. In our southern provinces v? should always keep the greatest possible /mount of ammunition and provisions repy at hand. In those no foreigners shouj be allowed to travel. There is no hu/y to finish the war in the Caucasus. Ay further and decisive progress in Asia | dependent upon European complications.! For the present there are no prospects { weakening England materially, eithefin Ireland or in Canada; in which latt^provmce, however, the opposition should j assisted as much as possible. A great fwt would be gained by inveigling Englarf into conflicts with the United States, fn Spain our diplomacy has a wide ild. Louis Philippe should be kept susjpded between soft repulse and trifling # ance'3- Catastrophes in France are not jainst our interest, as they would prodf profitable complications. The Legitijists are sadly in want of consolation, anl should not be entirely given up; but jpy are to be taught to postpone any eff#ve activity until a time when, for instanf, Don Carlos shall have

carried the day. Abd-el-Kadir and WBBR Sheriff of Morocco are not to be omitted.fgi Austria sinks .into weakness, and is witgg out influence in Germany owing to hip|| system of isolation. Viewed from,abro^ii Above all, we ha.wWfm^K9l^BHk, proper time to utilise the indifferent feelinoplfc in the Slavonic provinces. "This power If is paralysed. In the event cf a catas- j/| trophe it can easily be entangled in Tl Germany and Italy, provided a suit- ,i able plan be suggested to Prussia. I The foreign policy of Austria is neither J subtle nor far-seeing, but uncommonly cautious, and great adroitness will. be required to immesh it in difficulties. Prussia cannot be turned to account, except in Germany and against France. Provided Prussia would not. oppose our plans, but maintain an armed neutrality, we might not grudge her the Main-frontier, under the condition that she would cede her Polish! provinces to us. She cannot ;dp : us any%k harm so soon as we have gainecl our ends on the Bosphorus. Austria is, easily to be checked by Prussia and the rest of Germany. Sweden is of little account, be she viewed as possible ally or as possible enemy; that prudent soldier of the revolution strives to confirm a new dynasty on an ancient throne, more by action within than without: he is, on the whole, persona grata to us. In Poland, extensive conscriptions should be made, and the young levies transplanted to other provinces; the nobility, when tbey once make unconditional and unreserved submission, is to be treated with distinction." "Our aim is to give the greatest splendour to the name of the Slaavs, to the name of Russia. The Slavonic Empire of Russia is to be raised to an eminence domineering the world. Is that aim near ? Is it distant? Attained it shall, it must be.— Free Press.

The Salmon Ova.—We have recently given some particulars respecting the nogociations that have taken place between Mr. A. Black,' who left England a few months since with some, salmon ova for propagation in these colonies, and the Goverpmeiit.ef Ta^^f^^w^^ h T^ t^ to so far as Mr. Black fras'* concerned,after'hithaving drawn up a valuable paper on the subject, and the appointment of a select committee of the Assembly to report upon the. undertaking. Mr. Black gave very complete evidence before the committee, and' they definitely recommended that hia plan should be adopted, the total expense of which wa» estimated at c£3ooo, and the principal features of which were the employment of a prepared apparatus fed bj au ample supply of water and ice, —the engagement of a competent manager to take charge of the enterprize, together with one or two experienced fisjerrnan, and :the con* structioni at suitable spots on the Derwjent, of a system of breeding ponds for the reception of the ova or young fish on their arrival. The above sum included tbe salary of £500. for. a manager --an appointment which Mr. Black was : led to expect. The committee determined, However, alter all appeared to have been arranged, on making this payment, contingent on the sate arrival of the ova, and accordingly offered Mr. Black a fixed sum of j£3oo, with a bonus of a like sum contingent on hi 3 success, and also a bonus of j>K>oo in the event of the salmon -becoming effectually colonised, the proof of whioh was to hi their return a second time from the sea. Jlr. Black firmly refused to make his remuneration dependent to. any extent on his succeo, or to be at all fettered by the Australian Association in London, as the committee proposed to make him; the result of which was that, iithoiigh the experiment is to be carried out, fir. Black will have nothing to do with it. At cur last dates Mr. Black was leaving for Mebourue, where he intended to submit his scjeme to tbe Victorian Government, arid wience he will probably start' for this' colony rtth a view to instruct the Government and the people in his enterprize. Mr. Black appears to have ascertained the temperature of the rivers running from the eastern slope of the Snowy Range, which he believes to be admirably adapted to the propagation of the salmon, at the same time that they are contiguous to the two largest markets in the Australian cojogi^— Sydney Herald. :