THE BRITISH NAVY.

Colonist, Volume III, Issue 207, 14 October 1859, Page 3

THE BRITISH NAVY.

( From the Tims. ) ; : .', The French papers appear wonderfully impressed with the proceedings taken in this country in respect of its Navy, but it is highly instructive to remark that the particular feature which is regarded with astonishment on the other side of the Channel never provoked a single observation among ourselves. The French are amazed at the magnitude of our resources, and at the prodigious exteHt of.the operations which the|e resources permit;;" jus to undertake without hesitation or misgiving. Englishmen were struck with .the deficiencies reported y Frenchmen are surprised at the' resolutions adopted for supplying them. A Parisian journal declares that all the dockyards of all maritime powers in the world could not, even by combining their efforts, accomplish in a single year what we propose to effect before this time twelvemonth—viz., the construction of 26 powerful men-of-war, including 15 line-bf--1 battle ships. In this reflection there is probably some truth, but there is another r circumstance in ;the tase mom remarkable still; and that is, that : this performance will cost us next to nothing in; comparison with the gross sums which have been voted from year to year. Millions after millions have been supplied; and expended with the result: of a defective fleet, when all of a sudden it is resolved to raise the. strength of this fleet 50 per cent., and we .are assured that the thing can be done for spttie £900,000^ It; must not be forgotten that a good deal -of this work consists rather in conversation than constructiop, and that even the new; ships' to be .launched have been for some time in, course of building; but after all allowances on this score, ■the contrast between what money fails to do when it is loosely expended,rand what it can be made to do when it ia rigorously applied to is

We ,do not expect much from Sir J. Paking'ton's explanatory figures. He has' undertaken to present a strict acoount of the Dockyard expenditure for the whole period reviewed by Lord Clarence Paget, and he affirms that tie document will show the application of every sixpence of the public money. We do not dbtibt it; but for all this, it is possible that the case may be left just where it stands., Nobody supposes that our naval charges are materially'affected by peculation or embezzlement. We have not come to that pa9s in this country. LordlClarerice Paget' himself expressly stated that vhe did not suspect any malversation whatever; in fact, he weut the length of explaining the manner in which he conceived the funds to have been wasted. What he, said was, not that. .£5,000,000 was absolutely not accounted for, but that it was unacconnted foe in substantial returns —that there was no equivalent for it in ships actually afloat. This seems undeniable, and it will signify very little therefore the general conclusion whether the money has been swallowed up in one kind of "accidental" expense or another. There is no escaping from the dilemma in which recent disclosures have placed us. Either ,£900,000 will not do what it h expected to do, or twenty times that sum ought to have done a good deal more than it ha 3 done. It deserves.to be noticed, as characteristic, of our national temperament in such matters' that the present inquiry was provoked, riot, by any increase of charges, but by a deficiency of results. The announcement which created 30 much sensation was, not that Ministers wanted an extra million for the Navy, but that the Navy wanted a whole squadron of line-of-battle ships and frigates. If moneys worth had been forthcoming there would have been but little talk about money. Even the reference made to the French' marine did not affect the question in its essentials. We have before remarked that the actual proportions of the French fleet are not more than commensurate with the natural requirements of that power. Our own shortcomings were positive, not comparitive. Our line-of-battle fleet was weak, not simply as contrasted with that of our neighbors, but as compared with that which we possessed in former times^s In explanation of the fact, it was said; that all our efforts were, absorbed for a certain period in the construction of smaller vessels, and that^as, there, was a limit to the general rate of shipbuilding,; what was gained in one department was necessarily lost id another; On this remark we can only say that, if the facts are so, the result, when illustrated by the acknowledgement of the French journals, becomes very satisfactory. If the. construction of ships of war can only proceed at fa given rate, and that rate is higher in the case of England than in that of all the maritime Powers together, it is clear that, with good administration, we need never be uneasy about our position on the seas. All we hope to do is' to vote reasonable supplies, and to provide proper management. The first are never refused; the latter, we trust, may spring at last out of the investigations now pending. , ; A country like England must always work at some disadvantage in the maintenance of its navy. This is part of the price paid for supremacy. France and Russia may regulate their fleets as they please, but we cannot be left behind. We must needs keep up with the progress of naval architecture and nautical science; we must have the best of ships, and the most powerful of armaments. .The,_consequence of this obligation; is, that we must beat the.change of experiments in every new discovery, while other nations may avail themselves of our conclusions, and follow us at their leisure. Even the proportions of our Marine njiust be governed to some extent by the development of other navies, but, on the other hand, it mu3t be recollected that pur fleet discharges a variety of duties for us. It answers the purposes both of ; frontier fortresses and a great standing army. We can regulate our military establishments by our own wants alone by the demands of India and the colonies. We have few fortifications except around our great arsenals, and, if we want a larger navy than other Powers, we possess, as is now admitted, infinitely greater faciI cilities.for creating and maintaining it. It cannot have escaped the notice of the public, that except for these " accidental expenses," which run away with untold sums, the entire cost of our Dockyards might be regulated with something almost like precision. A given establishment will turn out so many line-of-battle ships, so many frigates/ and so many smaller vessels every year, and it is perfectly certain that the wear and tear of ships will neyer, under ordinary circumstances, be equivavalenti to the new supplies. Supposing, for instance, that our,annual accession of strength is represented by half-a-dozen ships and frigates, it is beyond all question that this number of ships and frigates wil] not have fallen to pieces during that period, so that our aggregate force ought rather to be on the increase than otherwise. In fact, if it were not that ships get out of fashion, and were left in arrear by new models, our rate of building might be very safely reduced. We have obtained, during the recent desbates, some very useful dements of reckoning. We have been told how much a line-of-battle ship costs, and how much a frigate. We have learnt how nuroy vessels of various Classes the Royal yards can turn out every year under ordinary conditions; and, finally, we have] heard from tb« First Lord of the Admiralty what amount of strength the British line-of-battle fleet ought to possess. Now, from data like these, we do think that a system might be constructed of some regularity and certainty; nor can we understand how it is that the '• theory" of proceeding in such matters should be so constantly upset. Why should there be demands so sudden or extraordinary as to interfere with contemplated arrangements ? Admitting that the construction of gunboats was an exceptional case, that is only a single instance in a long series of years. . If the regular production of our Dockyards includes, as we are told it does, vessels of every class, —not only line-of-battle ships and frigates, but smaller vessels also,—how .is it that all of a sudden, there arises an urgent call for this or that descrjption of vessel, to the exclusion of others ? Thesejare some of the points wbioh we hope: to see cleared up by the forthcoming explanations. The worst of the whole "matter is its mystery. Sir, John Pakington himself must have .felt, that there was something wrong, or he would not have instituted inquiries; naval men gene-, rally must feel so, for they are always the first with their protests, and the public jump naturally to the same conclusion from a simple comparison of, expenditure with results. All agree, that there is po foul play, but all suspect that there is bad administration, and this we to £Q on with,