THE THEORY. OF WAR.
(Fro% the Times, 22nd October;) TnE theory q£^car has always naturally resolved itself mto the two rival branches of attack aud defence, the relative resources of which have been constantly varying. Until the discovery of gunpowder the superiority may be said to have rented usually with the defence, nor were strong places often reduced except through treachery, stratagem, or famine. The introduction of artillery into military tactics reversed these conditions, and gave a general superiority to the attack, except in cases of unusual character. Up to a very recent period the utmost expected of a fortress was that it should enable a small body of men to detain and occupy a larger body of men "for a certain finite time. Beyond this Jittle or no reliance was placed on ordinary fortifications, and it was accepted as a law that after a given number of days the resources of the garrison must come to an -end. Of-late years the superiority of the defence has been once more maintained, with what truth as regards purely land operations it may be hard to say, but certainly with considerable show of reason as regards shore forls and shipping. Although the broadside of a man-of-war constitutes one of the most formidable batteries known, and although three-deckers could be brought against a fort in far greater strength lhan°land artillery against a fortified town, the difference of material is supposed to be fatal, and it is questioned if wooden vessels can ever hold out long enough against the enemy's shot to succeed in battering down stone* walls. Such, at least, was the persuasion generally entertained in the late war, and the experiment tried at Sebastopol gave a partial confirmation to the belief. Just at this moment, however, the - principles of defence have been applied in a manner entirely novel to naval tactics. •Hitherto, war afloat lias been distinguished from war ashore by '■ its "exclusive dependence on the principles of attack Two ships attacked each other like two tigers or two buffaloes, nor could the weaker protect itself against the stronger by any resource but that of flight. Excepting the artifices by- which ancient galleys were occasionally guarded against the strokes of her antagonists' prows, there has been no attempt made to adapt defensive fortification to floating vessels. All that a ship did was to return blow for blow, to manoeuvre for advantage of position, and endeavour to sink her enemy before the enemy sunk her.
The question now raised is whether a ship, though.left buoynant enough to float and steam, cannot be so protected as to defy the shot of a' hostile battery, either afloat or ashore. The theory received a certain practical application during the Crimen war, at the attack upon the forts of Kinburn; but it has since" been revived with greater expectations, and is not only regarded with favour by the Emperor of pf°the French, but has been taken into consideration by our naval' authorities. Lord Hardwicke, whose opinion in such matters is entitled to respect, spoke the other day as if he was all but convinced of the success of the new principle, informing his audience that he had himself seen a wrought-iron panel on a ship's side resist the fire of heavy guns for hours together, and it is evident that if a ship could for this length of time be preserved from injury herself she could penetrate into any harbour in the world, and employ her own batteries in knocking down all before her. Obviously, therefore, if the principle in question could be really established, the tactics of modern warfare, as regards naval engagements and coast defences, would be completely revolutionized. The power of attack possessed by ships would be in some respects diminished, for, as Lord Hardwicke remarked, they could not carry their iron sides and their broadsides together. They would have to be cut down into floating batteries, but they might be armed with a few very heavy pieces, and these, worked with complete impunity, would silence any antagonist in time.
It happens, however, that the theory has been once more disturbed even before the new principle could be said to have fairly prevailed. The defence made a stride no doubt, but the attack has already overtaken it. It is perfectly true that in the experiments conducted at one of our ports, the resisting power of iron was proved as aforesaid, and it is also proved thattheseironside vessels can be built to. float with at least as much safety as an old 10 gun brig. All that was needed for the establishment of the new device was that the powers of-artillery should remaiu stationary; but this will not be, the case. Everybody knows ..how the old musket has been superseded bj|a rifle doing execution with infinitely greater certainty at a far greater distance, and what has been done with small arms can be done with cannon. Nay, the fact is already accomplished, for the other day, after the iron sided target had baffled the powers of ordinary artillery, it occurred to some one to try the capacity of a Government gun rifled by Mr. Whitworth. The result was declared in an instant, for the new cannon slapped her shot through the iron plate as if it had been, so muclTgmgerbread, and ruined the theory of impregnable floating batteries for some time to come. We need not, therefore, be in any desperate hurry to break up our three-deckers, and build, a fleet of iron-sides. How far Mr. Whitworth's cannon may be applicable to everyday service we cannot tell; the " authorities " had better give him an opportunity of applying his invention to practical purposes; but what has been once may evidently be done again, and, if this experiment has been correctly reported, something stronger than .iron armour must be foundlbefore a ship can reckon on resisting cannon shot. The occurrence, however, is in another way deeply instructive. To get the advantage of rifled cannon, we must get rifled cannon, and the acquisition has yet to be made. The gunjvhich
smashed the ship's cuirass at Portsmouth was merely an old Government piece, for, by some complications of apathy, ignorance, jealousy, or caprice, we have never yet carried out the principle which has been so victoriously established, and applied to cannon those improvements which have trebled the powers of the musket. Rifled, cannon, if they can be made practically available, would not only protect our coast against floating batteries, but would revolutionise the whole service of field artillery. The weight of guns might be greatly diminished while their range was greatly increased, and such a change would exert an extraordinary effect upon the movements of an army. In India especially there is no saying what might not be economised in carriage and transport if these reforms could be effectually introduced.
Be it observed, too, that unless our at-, tillery is put in this way of progress it will soon' be of no use at all. Rajahs and Begums have no arsenals, fortunately for us, furnished with modern arms, nor sharpshooters among their retainers instructed in the arts of musketry. Lord Clyde, therefore, could push his guns to the front and clear the way for his infantry with perfect judgment and success; but European ar-. raies now possess marksmen who at; 1400 yards distance could-"pick off every artilleryman at his piece, and silence the best battery ever yet-brought upon a field. We do not forget that in so far as rifled cannon could be said to have been tried at Sebas.r topol they were not thought successful, but; the same* was the ease for a long time with the rifled musket. The. theory was well known generations ago, though the rifle, as the ordinary soldier's weapon,: is but a year or two old. It seems to [ stand to reason that what has been.accomplished with the musket can be accom-! plished with cannon too, and it would'be i suicidal folly to overlook such a resource., Even if these guns should not be valuable^ for range, they must be valuable for force of propulsion, as'this trial^of strength with; the ironside ship sufficiently shows. The | attack will be more than "a-match for the defence if we do not avail*ourselves- of j our full power of aggression;,: In such.; matters we cannot be left behind;. Perhaps ; some economist or philosopher''will ask,: what is to be the end of these incessant, discoveries in the art of mutual destruction? Why, perhaps, the disuse of'-the art altogether. As fighting acquires more and more fatality people maybe somewhat less ready to fight and, at any rate, if the old race between attack and defence is maintained in speculation only instead of practice, it will be a great point gained. If an invention of floating batteries can be extinguished by an invention of rifled cannon, the process is about as cheap an expression of' international rivalry as we can expect on this side of the millennium.
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Bibliographic details
Colonist, Volume II, Issue 138, 15 February 1859, Page 4
Word Count
1,497THE THEORY. OF WAR. Colonist, Volume II, Issue 138, 15 February 1859, Page 4
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