THE AMRITSAR RIOTS.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume XI, Issue 3525, 12 July 1920, Page 5

THE AMRITSAR RIOTS.

GENERAL DYER ’S DEFENCE.

QUELLING AN INCIPENT REBELLION.

eßceived 8.50 am‘

LONDON, July 9

I A White Paper has been issued, giV~ illg the defence of General Dyer.-He KDoints..ollt he Knew the military dangers of the position and the cloud in Afghanistan_ He also realised the "gatherings in Jallianwallaghbagh ‘were not fortuitous, “but were aslsembled with the express intent to {challenge Government authority and édefy him to fire upon them." This ‘was an infant. rebel army. He was conscious a great offensive inoveinent lwas gathering, and to sit still and await complete mobilisation would be fatal. He could not regard the Jallianwillaghbagh assembly as a mere political gathering. He looked on Amritsar as the storm centre of the rebellion. He also knew attempts were being made to.-seduce his troops. If he had shirked the challenge there would have infallibly followed a general mob movement inside and outside Amritsar, which would have destroyed European population and involved in its ruin the law-abiding Indian population, leading to similar results throughout the Punjab. General Dyer contends hrs object was right. The force used was not excessive, and achieved the desired effect. ‘Also no less force would have achieved the effect.

RESUMPTION OF TRADE‘ WITH ‘ RUSSIA. ‘ ' ,_ ______.. SOME OF THE‘ CONDITIONS. Received 10.10 am. NEW YORK, July I]. . The New York Herald's Spa correspondent states Lloyd George and M. Millerand flatly refused Poland’s request fo receive the munitions and supplies delivered to the Allies by Germany.

I The Echo de Paris says Lloyd }George, after consulting , representa‘tives of France and Italy is sending a Note to Moscow making the resumption of commercial and probably political relations dependent on immediate armistice to Poland, stating the Powers thereafter will fix the frontier in agreement with Moscow. In the event of refusal he will send help to Poland. The Echo de Paris con-tends a prerequisite to the policy of bringing France in touch with Moscow must be Mosc-ow’s recognition of the Russian debt and guarantees of Russia, and z".x~o’xn Poland respecting the future. .