THE EX-KAISER'S LETTERS

Taihape Daily Times, Volume XI, Issue 3383, 12 January 1920, Page 5

THE EX-KAISER'S LETTERS

SCHEMES AGAINST BRITAIN. Received 1-0.5 em. The ‘Kaiser’ c'Qrresp_onden_ce with the CZal'_throWs fresh light on the famous Secret Treaty signed by the two Emperors, at Bjoerkoe, in the Gulf of Finland, on July 24th, 1905. The Kaiser declares his object was to break up the Franco- Russian Alliance and confront»-Birtain with a new group», comprising Russia, France, and Germany_ A considerable amount of secret information had already been published, nofablythe series of telegrams between the Kaiser "and Czar, published in September, 1917. The attempt to isolate Britain was more apparent in the drafts than‘ in the form in which they were modified at the .Kaiser’us{wish, in order not to reveal too clearly his intentions. The Treaty was really incompatible with the Franco-Russian Alliance, hence the Kaiscr’s ("£lgCl‘llC‘Ss to. conclude it before: revealing its contentsto France -I Count Witts claimed the Treaty was annulled at hiss instigation, as no responsible Russian stateman signed it, and even responsible Gennan officials recognised that the Emperor obtained much more than the Czar could possibly carry out. " The Kaiser, writing in August, 1904, traversed the progress of the war, and worked out calculations of forces employed. Showing the disparity between Russians and Japenese, making Russia."s ta-silt a heavy one. He suggests. “Should your battleships in the last dash “from Port Arthur fail to reach Vladistock on account of injuries, received in fight, their best chance is to try for Tsingtau, where they will be Well looked after till the end or, the war, instead of being blown up and sunk.”

The Kaiser expressed the belief: “You must win in the long run, but it will cost money‘ and men, as the enemy is Well led -and can only be "beaten by overwhelming numbers. Operations of your army are easier and will give better results when the Baltic fleet arrives and forces the Jap fleet into their ports, thu-s», restoring.your command of the sea, now lost by the inefliciency of the Admirals in command at Port Arthur. Command of the sea is absolutely necessary, and equivalent to final success of «a. land campaign, by depriving the enemy of ability to injure your reserves, muntionlsw and stores. THE SECRET TREATY. SIGNED BY THE KAISER. FRANCE KEPT IN IGNORANCE’. Received 9.35 am. LONDON, Jan. .9 The Kaiser continues: “When war broke out I worked out a ‘plan of mobilisation on my own account, founded upon the number of Japanese divisions of the first line, which would be sufficiont to win with. I did not venture to write you my idea as it is not my business to meddle with‘ your affairs, and I was _afraid of your telling one to mind my own business, as you know better what Russia. requires; but as the first stage of the campaign is practicaLlly over, "I thfiught I’n"s/ending it now it might interest you_” °Shed~ eko -brought messages from the Czar upon which the Kaiser says: “Shcb—eko informed me of your intentions to send out the Black Sea fleet in conjunction witli tll\e- Baltic. He asked my opinion of the pian; ,I confess I iong expected this plan would be executed, it is a sound military idea, and will ensure victory. The best plan is to be silently, quickly preparing without a word to anyone, then at the right moment st.-cam throiigh the Dardanelles. The Sultan will not offer a shadow of resistance, and once you are out We shall- be faced by an aufait accompli, which we shall quietly ac. cept. I have no doubt England will be too, though her press may fume and rage, and a squadron may steam about a little,,7 as they often do in tfie Mediterranean, but.they wont stir in earnest when they see other Powers remain quiet. The main point is it must happen -suddenly, ‘taking the world by surp~T‘ise4” .

In a, letter dated 30th October, 1904, the Kaiser‘ states he and the Chancellor Had secretly “drawn up a.rtic_les of’ Tl'eaty. You wished it to -be as you say, let us stand together. Of course, the Alliance will be purely for defence exclusively against Europea.ll"aggl'essioll. It is very essential that America should not feel threatened by the agreement. ' Roosevelt, as I know, owing to his innate American dislike for the coloured races, has 110 specia.lU;partiality for Japan, although England does her utmost to work upon American feeling in favour of the Jlapanese. Besides, Americans have a clear c perception ‘of the indisputable fact that a powerful Japanese Empire is a lasting danger to the Philippines. As for France, we both know Radicals and anti-Christian P.lrties.inClillo towards England,,but are they OPPOSCF3 to war?‘Which means the certain destruction of this republic. of m‘isel'ablel

civilians. The Nafional or Clerical,

Party dislikes Englvanid, and has sympathies for Russia, but does not dream of throwing in its lot with Russia in this war between these two parties. The Government can do nothing, and England counts upon this ‘neutrality and consequent isolation of Russia. I positively know -that Rouvier declared that France will join in the RussoJapanese war, even if England sided with Japan. To make these republicans doubl§7‘%’r'e that England handed Morocco over to France, to secure the absolute certainty that France will reariain neutral is a motive which gives the English policy its present. unwonted brutal assurance. This unheardof state of things will change for the better. A ‘d The Kaiser, in enclosing a draft of the Treaty, says:—-“Nobody; not even my Foreign Office, knows anything about it. The Work was done by Bulow and me personally. When we 11':-id finished he said, ‘May G'rod’s blessing rest on the purchase of two high rulers; may the mightly triple group, Russia, Germany and France, help to maintain peace forever.’ ” ‘lt is clear the Do-gger Bank "incident decided the Czar to conclude the, Treaty with Germany_ ’ .