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LUSITANIA TRAGEDY.

EVIDENCE OF THE CAPTAIN.

ADMIRALTY ’S WARNINGS.

INSTRUCTIONS NOT OBSERVED.

Some -of the evidence given by Captain W. T.'Turner, of the Lusitaiiia, bofpre the Wreck Ciomniissioner (Lord 'Mersey) at the ‘secret inquiry, held on June 15th‘ amd 18th, 1915, at the Central Hall, Westmin-ster, is published in a I?arl‘iamenta'l'-‘y paper just issued. the ~Lusi'tania. was sunk by a German submarine, with the loss of 1134 lives on May’ 7, 1915, and at the inquiry Capt'ai.n_Turner was examined’ at length as to the course he. took, and the ‘instructions he received with I'cga.l"d to the avoidance bf submarines,

Captain Turner said he ,rec<eive(l an Adniiralty instruction‘on March 22, saying: “Most important that vessels passing up the Irish or English ‘Channel should keep mid-Channel» course.” On May SEII he got a wireless Admiralty telegram saying ‘that submarines were active off the south coast of Ireland. He also received that day a message saking: “Take Liverpool pilot at bar, and.avoid heafilands. Pass harbours at full speed, steer’ nlid—Ch'annel course. Submarines at Fastinet.”

On the 7th, the day of the disaster, he received the message, “Submarines active in southern part of Irish Channel. Last heard of 20 milres south of Coniingbeg Light Vessel.” Later came another Wireless message: “Submarines five miles south of Cape Clear, proceeding west when sighted at 10 am.”

Asked why, with this information before him, he Went so close to Old Kins-ale -‘I-I<2a'yi, wi;tness' saihi h.e did so to get a fix. They were not sure what land it Was; they were so far off. He had an lapproxinmte idea. of where he was, but Wzinted to be sure, so that he could get a proper course and navigate the ship safely. He eonsideredthet he followed threVA.dmiralty instruct-iolns as well as he could. When’ the ship was torpecloedv he was in what he would call practically mid-channel. He now thought he was about ten miles off -land. He‘ did not think it was necessary to go further out. He thought ten miles was a sufficiently wide berth to give the Old H4ead‘of Kinsale, -tlnough‘li'e thought at the time he was fifteen miles off. The Commissioner: OE Old Kinsale Head, what is the width of the Channel there-°.?—140 miles. ,

The Aftoriney-General: You rdally do not think, do you, that you were in mid-Channel, or anywhere near it?-—— I did not think it was mid-channel‘ exactly, but I thought I was far enough off the land.

You did not think it necessary to be in mid-chaninel?—No.

Why did you ‘disobey tll~ev Admiralty instructions‘?—My aim was to find the land_ . '

You never for a moment tried to csarry out what ‘the a.Admi.ra.?rt_v had laid down‘i——l “thought I was trying my best, anyhow. In reply to other questions, witness said tliiat a thick flog might have come on, and, not knowing the exact position of the Ship he. might have gone ashore. Therefore he Wanted To know his proper position. He had received a general warning that zig-zag-ing Was a. ~safeg'u'3.rd against successful submarine attack, but he did not zigzag because he understood ‘that “it was only when you saw a submarine that you should zigzag.” (The W'arn-i ing said thai this course——zigzagg'ing——— i-s almost invariably adopted by war-

sfhipé» Whien cruising in an area known to -be infested by subm:arines.”). V

The Commissioner: But the Whole point is thaf it is 'the submarine that is Looking at you?—Yes. The Commiss»iosner: And if you’ are zigzagging,_ you confuse him and put him into difficulties. ' 7:‘ o

."I‘~he.=Atforney-General: When you are torpedocd it is too late‘l?—Of course ibis. h '

' nu you hot see now that you really disobeyed a. very important instrucItion? . ‘

Witness made no :zl.ns~wer, but later he said that, ‘having heard tlle'instl-uc-tions read over agaivn, he was sure that his previous interpretation of it was-' wrong. He did‘ not put on greater speed lest‘ he might have to wait for a pilot rat the Mersey Bar, where the ship would be EL be"rter target for lurking submarines. W-hen stopped because of fog on the morning 9f -the disaster he sounded his fog dh/oirn every minute automatically. It did not occur to him that this might be very dangero.ut, having regard to the -submarivnes.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TAIDT19191231.2.31

Bibliographic details

Taihape Daily Times, Volume XI, Issue 3374, 31 December 1919, Page 6

Word Count
702

LUSITANIA TRAGEDY. Taihape Daily Times, Volume XI, Issue 3374, 31 December 1919, Page 6

LUSITANIA TRAGEDY. Taihape Daily Times, Volume XI, Issue 3374, 31 December 1919, Page 6

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