The Gallipoli Tragedy.

Taihape Daily Times, Volume XI, Issue 3342, 21 November 1919, Page 6

The Gallipoli Tragedy.

IROYAL COMMI‘S'SION‘S REPORT. STORY OF MUDDIEEMENT AND ' INCAPACITY. “ ' LONDON, Nov. 17. Following is a precis of the secsnd report of the Gallipoli Commission. In a general review, the ‘report says:—— From the outset the risks of faillll‘-3"‘ of the expedition, outweighed the chances 05 success. The problem was never fully investigated ‘by competent experts._ No correct appl'CC"-_al'.ioLl of the ditficulties was arrived at . The Commission considered that Woolfe. Murray should have prepared a general plan, audit Was the duty of the Sec--J retary of War to ensure that this was« done. The naval operations‘ in November 1914 and February and March 1915 naturally led to a great strengthening of the Turkish positions. There was undue delay, considering the situation aftcr the failure of the attacks following the first landing, while- the’ plan of attack from Sulva and Anzaci in the beginning of ‘August were open to criticism. .The attack at‘ Sulva. was not pressed as it should have been. ‘Orders given by General Hammersley were confused, and his staff work defective. General Sitwell, the senior brigade commander, did not show sufficient energy and decision. General _ Stopford did not“ take. sufiicient means to inform him-[ self of the progress of operations. He and his staff were partly responsible! for the failure to supply the" troops: with water. The Commission is of, opinion that Stopford’s difficulties] were increased by Sir lan Hamiitou’s intervention. While recognising Sir lan :Hamilton’s personal gallantry and energy, he should have examined the situation disclosed by the first landings more critically and weighed the: probabilities of success and failure ‘more impartially, having regard to the I resources at his disposal, and submitted_a comprehensive statement to thefl Secretary of War for and against the continuance of theoperations. H After Sir Charles Munro’s advice to evacuate had been confirmed by Lord Kitchener, more prompt decision should have becntaken by the War ‘Cabinet. A considerable amount of artillery was available in Egypt and Mlldl'os for the Suvla operations, but l was not utilised. ‘ The Commission finds that on the‘ whole the food supply was satisfactory, but provision for the evacLw.tioli of‘ wounded, especially hospital ships, as insufficient. This was due to the ant of a general plan. The supply] of medical requisites was on the whole adequate, except in the case of Aus~| tralians and New Zealanaers, x-.-no ere short of ordinary medicine, esecially Castor oil, and the variety of ood for sick men. NAVAL AND MILITARY ACTION. The question of joint naval and ilitary action was not considered. ecause months must elapse before he troops were available. Mr# ‘hurchill, at the war Couneii on May J 4th, stated that.if he had known?‘ ree months ‘before that an army of 0,000 or 100,000 would be available in ay, the attack by the Navy alone ould never have been undertaken. awards the end of January diplomatic fforts to secure the co-operation of reece and Servia. failed, and attention as turned to the Dardanelles, but §_xiety as to a possible German offenive on the West front delayed the def: I arture of troops until March. There ‘as a diplomatic side to the. proposed xpedition. The Commission's itlterim eport indicated that Russia wanted elief from Turkish pressure in the aucasus, while in addition there was ope that success at the Dardanelles 'ould unite the Balkans against the entral Powers. The disastrous effect I 13 possible failure was not altogether bsent from the minds of the War] louncil. On the military side there‘ *as doubt as to the fle~et’s abilityto uarantee a landing, and in view of his risk the General Staff was not proared to recommend the attempt. The frector of Naval Intelligence, wnilel enerally in agreement with the Gen-! ral Staff, and fully ConCurl'ing‘ill e great risks involved in'l.he joint nterprisc, thought the staff under-

zited the value of the fleets heavy covring fire at the disembarkation point. he War Council did not think tho taff’s opinion was not Wholly :Lpplic--ble to existing ‘conditions. Tim {all f the Namur and Liege forts led to e conclusion that permanent works ere easily dealt with !by long range uns, while the value of naval ‘Domardménfc was greatly advanced by airraft_(ob‘serval;ion, also the _devclop--ent of submarines Len'coul-age-.'i the ope that the Turkish communiations through the Sea of Marxora. would be vm'.V vulnerable, he .' queistion of the T€l7ll‘u‘=ii:.t--ent of 3. colnmantler vsrss «~11-:-{lss_el:l‘ill Fcbl'ua.r)}. h‘i‘r' W‘, Bl'rC§'ood’S name was first c-.onsidel'ecl, blit 3‘-the scope of the-0p(!l‘:1tiO11S beclaune 1112-.rg'e'd it was tholxglzt advisable. to elect ‘an ofiicor “of highc;l-‘rank an'd

greater experience; Sir lan Hamilton was chosen. General Birdwood went to the Dardanelles ‘and made :1 reconnaisance, and the telegrams which passed between him and Lord Kitchener showed that the‘ latter intended Jthe troops to be used in a minor capacity only, while General Birdwood lfully appreciated the , formidable icharacter of the Peninsular defences, and anticipated. that lkzrgc military operations would be necessary, General Maxwell .telegra.phcd Lord Kitchener on February 24th that Ga-llipoli was practically a fort, against which attack from any quarter without heavy guns would be hazarduous. He advised Lord Kitchener of the recommendations of Colonel iMauc:orps, formerly French military attache utCfonstantinople, wherein the latter sug— r gested an attack on the Asiatic side, as the least -diificult. Colonel Mau(‘.or[.S regarded a landing on Giallipoli as extremely hazarduous. Sir lan Hamilton’s evidence showed that hei was given clearly to understand that his force waslmerely a second string, that the Navy could for-cethe D-arden-elles on its own, and that the mili-I tary must ‘not. chip in unless the adimirals definitely chucked the sponge. * Sir lan Hamilton ‘added that heicould iobtain practically no information reigarding -the position before he left, ‘ and was not supplied with information 3 prepared‘ by the General Staif in 1906, nor was Colonel Maucorps’ view comb municated to him. The War Ofiice’s int‘ormati'on on the whole subject walsl of the most meagre character. He received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that the occupation of the asiatic side was strongly to be deprecated. Sir lan Hamilton, after arrival, conferred with Admiral De Robeck. The latter gs'a.id' -the War Oflice was too sanguine in thinking the NaVy’s guns could prevent a. Turkish lodgnient’ on the Peninsula. The Germans had grappled with the situation and got troops scientifically disposed and heavily entrenched. The enemy had nothing to fear, owing to the flat trajectory of naval guns. ~ Sir lan Hamilton, in a private letter to Lord Kitchener, said: “Gallipoli on the spot looks a. tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your oflice.” Sir lan ‘Hamilton, after witnessing «the naval 'b{ombandJnent-’, ‘rtcleg‘,ra,phe_tl {to Lord Kitchener: “Reluctantly‘driven to the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by the navy than once seemed probable, -and { if the army participates it will not assume the subsidiary form hitherto! anticipated.” To this Lord Kitchener replied: “You know my views thati the Dardanellcs must be forced. If :1‘ large military operation is.ncCcsSal'y it must be undertaken and_ carried through.” Sir lan Hamilton stated at I the conference aboard the Queen Eli-ii zabeth that Admiral Do Robeck said’ it was quite clear that they could not I get through without the help of troops. Admiral Wemyss concurred, and no voice was raised to "question this momentous decision. Admiral De Robeck, reporting to the First Lord, said the assumption that the forts could be de— i stroyed by naval fire had been conclusively pdisproved. The analogy of‘ the Belgian forts was quite misleading, as these were destroyed by howitzer‘ fire. After this Mr Churchill saw‘ clearly that a combined operation w'as.; essential, instead of his original plan? for achieving it without involving the: army. Sir lan Hamilton, on April -_i‘rll,} told Lord Kitchener that he had not' enough -ammunition to destroy the en-" tanglements by field gunsyand howitzers, and therefore must rely on other methods. The commission is unable to ascertain the precise ‘date ‘whereoii,' after the failure of the naval ‘attack, military operations were decided upon. When the decision was taken nlucll ineptitude was displayed in loading transports, whereby men, ma’feri'al, and

‘stores were shipped in diiferent vessels resulting in delay. Much unnecessary material was also taken. On May 14:11 the War‘ Council discussed the sil‘u'.ition.. There, were insistent demands for men for France, while we were saddled with requrieiments in Egypt and elsewhere. The ’ Council had, therefore, to consider the ‘wisdom of continuing the Dardanelles campaign. There was -.1 tendency to tsend more reinforcements, but nothing lwas immediately (don,'e beyond L-0-rd Kitchener asking ‘Sir lan I-lanli’l~t\on how many -men were required to ensure I success. He replied that if the pre-3 sent. situation was unchanged he wouldt need an additional army corps.,,rSirll lan Hamilton reckoned he could ad-] vance with half the loss of life ifi he had a libenal supply of guns and munitions, especially high explosives. Lord Kitchener replied on May 18th, expressing disappointment ‘that his preconceived views as to the conquest of poitions necessary to suppprt the, troops on land, were miscalculated, and"? it now became a. questionwhether he could support a twofold operation draining our resources. The intervention of a political crisis blocked decision on Sir lan Hamilton ’s request for twenty-four days, and in Mr Churchill ’s opinion the Cris.is prevented an unbroken stream of reinforcements. Provision was made to send two divisions. Then Lord Kitchener cliaiiged his mind, and sent! only one. Mr Asquith agreed that the political situation caused delay, but; thought there was -.1 shortage er available troops. The Commission, 110Wever, thought the crisis was the main cause. When the new Cabinet was constituted several new members had; to be convinced that the expedition was justifiu-blel DISCUSSION OF EVACUATION. I

Lord Kiichener, at the end of May, inforrncd the Dardanelles ‘Commitéfee

that the difficulties of the enterprise had proved more formidable than was anticipated, and [that much ‘greater effort than originally I)’.-lrgained for was now required, and -for the first time there was a hint of evacuation heard. Lord, ‘Kfiltehener "prepared a memorandum on May 28th. He submitted three solutions: (1) Withdl*.lwal_: (2) to seek, if possible, an immediate military decision; 3) contifiue to push and make what progress was possible. In regard to the withdrawal Lqrd Kitchener declared that the disadvantages were so great that it could only be justified in order to avoid great disaster, and he ‘threw his weight into favour of the third solution, bee.-.luse it avoided a blow to our prestige. -and kept the door open to Ball~:an inter\'elition and ensure a strategieal position preventing active Turkish operations in Egypt, i\{esopotamia,' and the, Caucasus. Early in June Russian reverses relieved the Turkish position. Sir lan Hamilton telegnapliecl that he foresaw this might enable the Turks to-throw a quarter of a million against him, and urged that some equivalent for the Russian eo-

operation was now vztany necessary. Three fresh divisions were despatc.hed,i When they arrived :1 mistake was ap-} parently made in employing them at] Suvla without an admixture of seasoned troops. Moreover, their oificersl were, generally speaking, inexperienced, and tthg failure which followed was the precursor of evacuation. Eventually Sir Chas. Munro Went to G-allipoli to report. He came ‘to the covclusion that with the exception of ‘thy Australian and N:w Zel.l:lnd_ Arnxy Corps the troops on the Peninsula wercunequal to sustained ofl:'ort owing to inexperience, ofiicers’ want of training and defective staff work. General Birdwood lagreed with Sir Charles Munro regarding the diffi-I culty of making progress, but opposed evacuation, considering the Turks‘ would view it as 8. 00mpletg vistoz-y. which would exert a bad efl:'ect onl Mahometans in Egypt, India, and Persia. Further, the laterness of the season -and uithg probabiility of hi-at] weather would make the withdrawal

dangerous. Generals Byng and Davies agreed with Sir Charles Munro: “in regard to evacuation. Lord Kitchener on November 3rd Wired General Bird-

Wod: lam coming to see you. I believe the Admiralty will agree to force the Straits. VVC must do what we can ‘to assist‘them. Examine the best landings at the head of the Gulf of Saros. We may pel'llapg have to gevacuzlte. Suvla. All the best fighting ,men that can be spared, including ‘your Anzac boys and everyone I can sweep up in Egypt, might be eoneen—itrated at ‘Mudros ready for this enterprise. You will have command of the ‘whole force. Munro will go to Salonika. ‘Please work out plans. We

must do it right this time_ labso lutely refuse to sign‘ an order for evacuation wliich would be the gl'aVOSt disaster and condemn a large percentage of men to death or imprisonment-. It appears that Admirals Roebeck, Wemyss and Keyes held strongly- that the fleet should attempt. the Strait in order to -relieve the army, -but between November 3rd and 4th Lord Kitchener’s proposal to seize the-Bu-lair Isthmus was !.=3.dversely criticised by the Admiralty and General Bird~ wood. Therefore‘ Lord Kitchener on oNov'.enlber 4th Jtcle_~graph'ed.' lGen‘eraTl ‘Birdwood that naval‘ operations might ‘not be renewed. “The more I look lat the problem the less I see a way lthrough, so you had better quietly ;and secretly work out any scheme to remove the troops.” On the 22nd iliord Kitchener telegraphed the Prime ‘Minister, “As German‘ assistance to ‘the Turks is new practically avail» able, our position is unteinable. Evacuation seems inevitable.” Lord Kitchener on the 15th had reported to the Prime Minister the result of his personal inspection, and said, “the country is more diificnlt than I imagined. To gain what we hold has been a 121037?‘ renmrka.ble feat of arms. Everyone has done wonders both on sea. and 11-and.”

Sir Charles Mlunro telegraplled‘Lord Kitchener pressing for ,3. decision. From November 25th to December Stli Admiral \Vemyss with remarktlble pertinacity. advocated {L renewal of the naval attack, but Admiral dc Robeek, who was then in England. placed his views before the ‘Council and as a result of 3.. War Cabinet meeting on December 22nd, Lord Kitchener telegraphed (Sir Cls‘arle:Munro, “Owing to political consesequenees there is a. strong feeling against evacuation. If the Salonika troops are placed at your disposal, could you make Suvla retainable‘? Navy would also take» the offensive.” Sir Cll=arles replied that he did not think there was any reasonable chance of success as thhc navel guns could not search the Turkish positions. On December 7th Cabinet, mainly on Lord Kitehener’s advice, decided to evacuate. .A;dmil'al Weymss again telegraphed on learning the decision urging renewal of the offensnve. He added, “I am convinced t.he time is ripe for a. vigorous offensive. I am confident of success.” but the ‘Admiralty declined. Lord Fisher appends a memo. regretting that official duties precluded his zittendance at the sittings. He is therefore unjustified in attaching his name to the report.

SIR THOMAS MACKENZIE;’S VIEWS. SCATHING COMMENTS. LUNDON, Nov. 18. Sir Thomas MacKenzie supplies ;-, supplementary report. He regrets that the evidence is not publishd, making the narrative inadequate. Whilo substantially agreeing with the filming‘. he 110105 Stronger views upon certainof them. He believes 1.10 forcing of the Dardenells was pract'lc« able had the authorities approached tho problem adequately and should only have laullchcd a combined attack after proper preparation. \V‘hcthor.' Sir lan Hamilton was the right man to command can never be *ans‘.~.'Cz‘vd

because he was hurriedly despatchcd, imperfectly instructed, and inadequately equipped. Though Woolf Murray attended the War Council" he expressed no opinion,_ tendered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a decision was arrived at to prepare :1 naval attack. ’ When Murray was asked why he ‘had not prepared a plan, he replied that he was overshadowed by’Kitcllener. Sir Thomas M'r'cKen2;ie believes the vital period for determining success or i’a‘ilure was betweeri August 6th and 10th, when General Stopford and his ofiiC'el's threw away a golden opportunity and gave the Turks time to reinforce. The failure at Suvla. ‘Was not due to the 01)position of the Turks, but to General Stopford’s failure to provide water for the troops. Sir Thomas McKenzie directs zrttention to the evidence of SeVeral witnesses as to the frittering away of life through General Huntv:l'r\Y+3sio::’.g repeated fronlnl ‘alttacks and quotes Colonel VVilson.’s evidence that lives had to be sacrificed almost with futility. He also quotes Sir lan Hamilton’;,- admission to 1..0r.1 Nicholson tlmt. lives were user‘. instead of shells. Regarding the t.ren‘rment of the wounded, Sir Charles xMaclceuzie quotes 'H'owse’s matured opinion “That he personally would recommend his Government when the war was over. under no conceivable eomlitions to trust the Imperial nuthoritiezs niwith medical '3.rrangements for lhe care of Australian siek and Wounded.”