TANKS AND AEROPLANES.

Taihape Daily Times, 30 June 1919, Page 2

TANKS AND AEROPLANES.

~~——/o)———————~‘ . PART PLAYED IN THE WAR. CANNOT REPLACE I;\'FAI\’TRY A remarkable feature. of the present war has been the number :7.11(,l \'z:l'ltty of mechanical COIll‘l‘l\',«{1I'lCOS to which it has given birth, or has broufght to a higher state of perfection, says Sir Douglas Haig, in his final despatch. Besides the great. increase in mobility of nrotor transport, lreavy artillery, Trench mortars, machine guns, aeroplanes, tanks, gas, and barbed wire have in their Several ‘spheres of action played a Very prominent part in opcra~ tions, and as a whole have given a greater ‘driving power_to war‘. The belligerent possessing a preponderance of such mechanical contrivanees has found himself in a Very favourable position as tcoinpared with. this less well provided opponent. The general superiority of the Allies in this direction during the Concluding stages of the recent. struggle undoubtedly contributed powerfully to their success. In this respect the army owes :1 great debt to science. and to the distinguished scientific men who placed their learning and skill at the disposal of their country. It. should never be forgotten, however, that weapons of this ehe.racter are incapable of effective independent action. They do not in tliemselves possess the power to obtain a. decision, their real function being to assist the infantry to get to grips with their opponents. To place in themua reliance out of proport.i.'on to their real utility. to -imagine, for example, that tanks and aeroplanes can take the place of infantry would be to do a disservice to those who have the future of these new weapons -most at heart, b_v'robbing° them of the power to use them to their best eifect.

Every niechanioul device so for produced is (lependent for its most effective use upon ’ the closest possible aszsociatioir with other arnis, and in p:=.rfieular with infantry and ul'tillel'y. Aeroplanes must I‘e]_\' upon infizmtry to prevent the enemy from o\'errnllning their aerodroines, and, despite their increasing range and \«'el-satality of action, are clearly incapable in themselves of bringing about 21 decision. Tanks require the closest :u'tillel'_\f Support. to enable them rim reach their Oi)jl‘(’,l'iVOS without fulliilg Victims to the enemy ’s artillery. .uml are dL=pend—ent upon the -infanti-vy to hold the position they have won.

As an instance of the interdependonce of artillery and tanks we may take the actions fought crust of Amiens on August 8. 1918, and foll'Owing days. A very large nuniber of tanks were employed in these operations and they carried out their tasks in the most bril~ liant m.annel'. Yet a scrutiny of‘ the al'tillel'y ainmunition returns for this period discloses the fact that in no actions of similar dimensions had the expenditure of zunmunition been so great. Immense as the influences of mechtmcial devices may be, they cannot by themselves decide :1 eanl'paign. Their true role is that of assisting the int':mt.rymen, which they have done ‘in most admirable manner. They cannot replace them. Only by rifle ‘and bayonet, of the int'antrym-an can the decisive Victory be won,