The Dardanelles Campaign.

Taihape Daily Times, 27 November 1918, Page 5

The Dardanelles Campaign.

FAULTS OF BRITISH STRATEGY. INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS. I THE BRITISH A BRAVE AND CHIVALROUS ENEMY. Received 9.10 a.m. LONDON, Nov 26. Mr. Ward Price writes from Constantinople: I interviewed General Llman von Sanders, who said he found the British a brave and chivalrous enemy, both at the Dardanelles and in Palestine. He telegraphed Ludendorff in August that unless he received reinforcements nothing could prevent a Turkish debacle. The weakness was due to sending all available reserves to Azerbaijan, in Persia, for the conquest of the Caucasus, despite German protests. Discussing the British strategy at the Dardanelles, Liman said: The naval attack in the Straits could not have succeeded, owing to mines. I proposed to flood the Straits broadcast with mines. The function of the forts was simply to protect the minefields from interference. If I bad been attacking the Dardanelles, I vrould not have landed at Cape Helles. The Anzacs would have made their '■ principal landing on the coast of Asia Minor, off Tencdos. Such a landing ; vrould give a convenient base close at hand, while two days' march would have brought the Allies to the rear of the Dardanelles forts, which can only 3re seaward. At the same time I should have landed at the neck of Galipoli, close to Bulair. So Strongly did I expect you tG choose these places that when I took command, months before the landing, I posted two of my six divisions opposite Tenedos. two on the Peninsula, and two at Bulair In regard to the Suvla landing, I would preferred to have landed between Anzac and Helles, where the Peninsula was narrower and the Turks could be attacked from the rear. j !i 'v'- ■'

The landing at Suvla might have succeeded if hard-pressed. Only two battalions of Turkish gendarmes, two squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries of old.guns were there to oppose it during the first twenty-four hours. If the British troops had pushed inlaiid with several columns,, some would have made good a position on the heights. Liman hurried up a division by a forced march. Another cri* tical moment was when a push was made for Chunuk Bair, Lim'an rushed a division from the Asiatic side, which would have been blown to pieces by the British guns if it had arrived half an hour later. There wore only three battalions ( left on the Asiatic side, where great anxiety was felt lest a fresh British landing should be made. It was also a touch and go at Kireichkeuy, on the north side of Suvla Bay. where the Allies attacked three days after landing. LimaD expected a withdrawal after Lord Kitchener's visit, and entirely agreed with the wisdom of the decision, as the Turks were being constantly reinforced. At the end I had twenty-one divisions.-The withdrawal was extremely well carried out, and the concealment devices at Suvla were more effective. Patrols on the last night sighted red flares on the beach, and thought for a while fresh troops were being landed, when news was receved that the British positions were empty. Liman galloped from headquarters to organise a pursuit, but the Turkish telephones were so bad that he was unsuccessful. The Turks advancing in the fog stumbled, on British land mines, and heavy losses were sustained. Ninety mines were found on the front of a single division. Liman saw the preparations for the evacuation of Helles, but was unable to guess the date.