THE AMATEUR IN WAR.

Taihape Daily Times, 2 September 1918, Page 2

THE AMATEUR IN WAR.

I HIS DANGER TORETOLD. i —__ j WEEN CIVILIAN CONTROL BEj COMES A MENACE. The Loudon Morning Post some time j ago, when the situation in the West ; was less promising than it is to-day, I diseanted on the dangers of civilian ! vrthority on the conduct of th< war: ! The whole present situation, due to j the intervention of the annatenr .n the •jonduot of of war (says the .-.. aiming I Post), was exactly anticipator, some ' twenty years ago by our foremost | •.■■riter on military affairs. In the ar- | tide "War'' (contributed to tin "Enj cyclopaedia Britannica Supplement," i 1902, and afterwards reprinted as the i first study in his posthumous and now ! classic volume "The Science of War") I Colonel G. F. R. Henderson treated

this theme exhaustively. There could bo no greater authority. From the excerpts that follow it will be seen that Colonel Henderson develops his argument as if precisely the present crisis were in his mind's, eye. Events haveconfirmed' his prescience completely. THE SOLDIER A SPECIALIST.

Having shown that the preponderating influence of the trained mind was made mianifcst in IS6G and 1870, the writer points out how, nevertheless, the ordinary layman failed to regard the soldier as a specialist.- Few Anglo-Saxons, for example, he says: "Are not secretly convinced that with some knowledge of drill they would be most formidable rivals to the officers of the German General Staff, and many _of the fiercest critics of the professional soldier are in exactly the same case as tho Austrians of 1566 and the Trench of IS7O. They believe that they possess the military virtues, that they are fearless, cool, and resolute, and they flatter themselves that they are fitted with sufficient common-sense to enable them to decide wisely and promptly in critical moments.'' In a nation of sportsmen especially, ho continues, there is in this a certain amount of right, but it is forgotten that common sense, to be a useful guide, must be "trained common sense, fortified by knowledge and increased by practice." Moreover willi strategy —the operations which lead up to battle, and those which follow battle —the ordinary military virtues, that j shine in encounters, are not directly i concerned. I BLIND PEOPLE AND REPRESEN- } ATIVES. !

But the popular idea that war is a ! mere matter of brute force, redeemed i only by valour, and discipline, he go? 3 | on, "is responsible for a greater evil than the complacency of the amateur. It blinds both the people and its representatives to their bounden duty." War, ho says, is something more than a mere outgrowth of politics. "War is .above all a practical art, and the application of theory to practice is not to be taught at a university or to be learned by those who have never rubbed shoulders with the men in the ranks. But if war were more generally and more thoroughly studied, the importance of organisation, of training, of education ,and of readiness would be more generally appreciated; abuses would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would bo something more than a political . catchword, and soldiers would be given ample opportunities of becoming masters of every detail of their profession. Nor is this all. A nation that understood something about Avar would hardly suffer the fantastic tricks which, have been played so often by the best-meaning statesmen. And statesmen themselves would realise that when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless."

And the importance of' all this increases with time. The day is completely gone when Cabinets could direct strategical operations j without bringing ruin on their respective countres. Those were times when amateaur was pitied against amiateaur. But the amateur "can no longer expect the good fortune to be <fcted against foes of a capacity no than his swn. The operations of continental larmies will be directed by soldiers of experience whose training for war has been incessant, and who will have at their command troops in the highest state of efficiency and preparation. It is not difficult to imagine, under such conditions, with what condign punishment mistakes will be visited."

MINISTERS AND MILITARY.

The argument then proceeds to show wherein lies the valu-o of the civilian Minister of some knowledge of war. However, deeply he had studied the art of war he could not be expected to solve for himself the strategic problems which come before him.

"His foresight, his prevision of the accidents inevitable in war, w r ould necessarily be far inferior to those of men who had spent; their lives in applying strategicial principles to concrete cases; and it is exceedingly unlikely that he would be as prolific of strategical expedients as those /familiar with their employment. Nevertheless, although he would be more or less bound by expert advice, and although he might be aware that the attempt to control military even so far as regards the preliminaries cf a campaign, is a most dangerous pre - eeeding, yet a knowledge of war coul I hardly fail to serve him in goc.l stead." \

And then, basing on Dr. Arnold's rr marks (in ''Lectures on Modern Elts

tcry") on unprofessional judgment 0 l a professional subject, Colonel Henderson adopts their conclusion that £h * distinction unprofessional judgment that is competent and unprofessional that is presumption and folly "lies originially in the difference between the power of doing a thir- ? and that of perceiving whether it io

well done or net." It is, in a word, the detail of his practice that wc understand least in the profession of another. FRONTIER OF FOLLY.

An so the writer reaches the culmination of his argument—its application of these principles to statecraft — which is so pertinent to the situation at this moment. "The point where civ. ilian control of military operations becomes presumptuous/ 'he says, "as well as the extent of the control, may be easily denned." In the first place to frame a soui"! strategical plan, whether for defe3§e or invasion, requires not only an inornate acquaintance with innumerable details of which only-a professional soldier can really judge, such as methods of supply and transport, the live of fortifications, the effects of climate, the maintenance of the lines of communication, the value of positions, the management of marches, the moral, armament, organisation, tactics and resources of the opposing forces, but an intimate acquaintance with the principles and strategems of war. It

is here that the amateur strategist fails He may have read enough to , give him a good knowledge of princi- ; pies, but he has no knowledge of the ' practical difficulties of war, and his criticism, as a general rule, is consequently of little value. All war Is simple, but the simple is most difficult, and how difficult only those who have made it, who have witnessed \-ith. their own eyes the turmoil, the Confusion, the friction, which, even in the best armies, attend the most ordinary operation, are in a position to understand. Even a theoretical acquaintance, derived from historical study of the practical difficulties, is insufficient. Unless he who prepares i a strategical plan has before his mind's eye a clear picture of all military operations, of marching, quartering, supply, entraining, and detraining embarkation, and debarkation, and a personal knowledge of the difficulties which attend on war, his work will be of little value. It is essential, too, that he should have a thorough knowledge of both officers and men, of the peculiar characteristics of the Army, and of the system on which it works, of its strong points, and its weak. A German, suddenly placed in command of British soldiers, would be much at sea, and vice versa. Every army lias an individuality or its oa~* It is a living organism of a very sensitive temper, and it can neither be properly controlled nor efficiently directed except by those who are in full sympathy with its every impulse."

THE CONCLUSION. | And here is The ultimate conclusion at which Colonel Henderson arivefi sixteen years ago—full of significance now when events so entirely confirm it: "It would appear, then, that while a statesman may bo competent to appreciate the general principles of the projects of operations laid before him, he should never attempt to frame a project for himself. Still less, wEeh once j he has aproved of a plan of campaign, j should he attempt to limit the number of troops to be employed, or to assign the position of the necessary detachments. Nevertheless, a knowledge of war may still be exceedingly useful to him. A Minister of War cannot divest' himself of his responsibility for the conduct of military operations. In the* first place, he is directly responsible* for plans of campaign to meet every | possible contingency being worked out j in time of peace. In the second place, I he is directly responsible for the adI vice on which he acts being the best procurable. It is essential,, therefore, that he should be capable of forming an independent opinion on the merits of the military projects which may ;be submitted to him, and also oh the merits of those who have to execute them."