THE MARCH OFFENSIVE.

Taihape Daily Times, 12 August 1918, Page 6

THE MARCH OFFENSIVE.

The extent of the information obtained by the Allied commands before the German offensive opened off March 21 was explained by Mr. Bonar Law in a speech in the House of Commons on June 18. “Before the attack began,” he said, “our Headquarters and those of our allies knew that every preparation was being made for it. We knew the position at which enemy divisions were being piled up In front of our lines, and there were all the evidences of an immediate attack. But in spite of that fact the staffs, both our own and the French, were a little doubtful where the attack was coming. They were doubtful for this reason, that their informs, tion made them feel sure that the German forces, through their power of bringing divisions from the Russian front, could in a few weeks subsequent to that date he increased at a much more rapid rate than was possible for the Allies, and that, therefore, the relative strength of the two forces would have been greater a month or two later thah it was at the moment the attack was expected. The attack attained an amount of success which caused everyone the utmost anxiety.. But three months have passed, and

though the battle is a continuous one, wc can look back on what has happened with some confidence. In this whole campaign the Germans had before them three great possible strategic objectives, two of which were tern, iorial. One was the City of Paris, the other the Channel ports, and the third was not only the defeat of the Allied armies, but the breaking of the communications between the British and French forces. After three months, although the Allies had to give ground, it is still true to say that not one of these three objects has so far been attained in this great struggle. I think if anyone in the early days of the struggle had suggested to FieldMarshal Hindenburg that after three months the position would be as it Is to-day he would have treated the suggestion with scorn, and there is clear and increasing evidence in the German press that they are becoming disappointed with the success, great as it has been, which has attended the German army so far. lam sure of this, that in the period of great anxiety through which the whole of this country was passing, if at that time we could have foreseen what the posi-

tion would be three months later our anxiety would have been much less than it actually was.”

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. GERMANY NOT FIT FOR PARTNERSHIP., LONDON, 'August 8. Mr. Balfour, replying to pretests against the Government’s alleged failure to respond to peace feelers and to declare its views on a League of Nations, said he was unable to see anything in the actions, statements, and writings of the German Government, politicians or publicists affording the slightest hope that peace discussions would be fruitful now. An almost impassable abyss separated the Entente and the Central Powers, unless the war resulted in changing the heart of Germany or a complete Entente victory proved to Germany the failure of her policy. Every sign indicated that- Germany’s aim was universal domination. There was small hope that Germany would be a peaceful member of the League of Nations until such ideas were eradicated. The only way of eradicating them was to show that they could not succeed.