VON HUTIER’S METHODS.

Taihape Daily Times, 27 June 1918, Page 6

VON HUTIER’S METHODS.

General Oscar E, von Hutier, who was responsible for Jhe enemy’s recent offensive along the Noyon-Mont-didier front, has not played a very prominent part in the earlier stages of the war, and has not received anything like the same amount of publicity as have such German heroes as Hindenburg, Lndendorff, Mackensen, and Falkenhayn. He is a man just over 60 years of age, having been appointed first lieutenant in 1886, captain in 1890, battalion commander in 1900, and lieutenant-general in 1902. It is interesting to note that he is related to the Lndendorff family on his mother’s side. He appears to have experienced most of his fighting i n the present war on the Russian front, and attracted special attention during the later operations, which resulted in the fall of Riga. Together with Generals von Below, who directed the Italian offensive in October last, and von de Marwitz, whose cavalry corps did much to check the allied pursuit after the battle of the Marne, von Hutier figured prominently in the western offensive of March 21 last, while in command of one of the armies of the German Crown Prince’s group. It was his army which broke through the allied line westward of St, Quentin, and was mainly responsible for bringing about the retirement towards Amiens. Writing from France on March 30 last, Mr. G. H. Perris compared this success with that previously achieved at Riga, and said: —“It is certain that General von Hutier’s plans were based upon his experience in the capture of Riga. The method pursued in that novel manoeuvre is known in detail to the allied staffs, whom, it has since been regarded as a dress rehearsal for a larger action. It was characterised in the first place by the extreme care taken to secure surprise. Thus, not only were the troops trained for the assault brought up ontly at the last moment, but every arm, including the artillery, were forbidden te show any sign of what was impending. The air services were limited, so ;as not to give the alarm, and no telephoning was allowed on the eve of the battle within half a mile of the front of attack, Two hours beforehand a storm of gas shells, burst over the Russian batteries; but it was only with the infantry assault that the destruction of trenches and other works by heavy guns began. Finally, the passage fo secondary through primary units, in order to carry the attack rapidly forward, was successfully practised.’ ’