THE WAR POSITION REVIEWED.

Taihape Daily Times, 11 April 1918, Page 5

THE WAR POSITION REVIEWED.

WEATHERING THE STORSt LONDON, April 9. Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech in the House of Commons, said that the Government proposed to submit recommendations to assist the country and the Allies to weather the storm. The recommendations involve extreme sacrifices by large clashes of the population. Nothing would justify them but the extremest necessity and the fact that we were fighting for all our essential and most sacred national life. Explaining why Parliament was not sumoned earlier since the battle began, the Premier, stated that Government had engaged in.-almost hourly concert with their allies, providing necessary measures to asi'st the armies to deal with the emergency. Dealing with the military position, he pointed out that it was difficult to get a clear, reliable narrative of a battle extending over fifty miles. The staff and the generals were naturally engaged in concentrating attention on the operation of the enemy. Until that' strain was relaxed it would be difficult to ascertain exactly what had happened. MORE CRITICAL STAGE. GATHERING FOR FIERCER OUTBREAK. LONDON, April 9. In the House of Commons intense interest was manifested in the Premier's speech. The House was crowded, but there was an entire absence of excitement. Mr Lloyd George said that we had now entered the most critical stage of the war. The present lull meant that the hurricane was gathering strength for a fiercer outbreak, and before it was finally exhausted there would be many more storms. The fate of .the Empire, of Europe, of liberty throughout the world, might depend on the success with which even the very last of these, attacks was countered. ;-.:'■ Mr. Lloyd George, referring to: .the position at the beginning of the battle said that despite the heavy casualties of 1917, the British army in franco, was considerably stronger on January Ist than on. January Ist, of the previous year. To October or November, 1917. the German strength in France was as two to the Allies three. Then came the callapse of Russia, and the Germans hurried up 'the released divisions, from the East. They had also a certain measure of Austrian £up- ! port, but, notwithstanding the considdrable inumber of .Gjerman divisions from the East, when thei battle began the combatant strength of-the German army in the West was :no,t:quite-equal to the total strength of the Allies. The Germans were slightly inferior in infantry, inferior in artillery, considr erably, inferior in cavalry, and un 1 dqubtedly inferior in aircraft, The Germans, hqweVer, had one or two great advantages. As attackers they knew where and when they meant to strike^ It was always difficult to tell when an attack was coming. The problem was closely considered by the military staff at Versailles, and Sir H. W. Wilson concluded that the attack was coming south of Arras on a Very wide front, approximately by ninety-five divisions, with the object of breaking through the British lines. These con-

elusions were reached two or three months ago. It was one of the most

remarkable forecasts of the enemy's intentions ever made. Sir H. W. Wil-

son also remarked that the attack probably sfuceeed |% jthe extent of penetrating the British line to half the distance of the front attacked Another advantage the Germans possessed was unity of command, The dry misty weather had also helped them. They were actually within a few

\ yards of the front line in some parts | before they were observed| Eeviowing j the various phases of the battle he said there was one time when undoubtedly it was very critical, i.e., when the enemy broke through between the Third and Fifth Armies, and the situation was only retrieved By the magnificent conduct of the troops frustrating the enemy's purpose. The country eould not sufficiently thank them for the supurb valour and grim tenacity with which they had faced overwhelming hordes and clung, to their positions. Once mors the cool pluck of the British tecMfter; who refuses to acknowledge defeat, saved Europe His remarks covered all ranks—generals, officers and soldiers. H drew no distinctions. It would take a long time to name all the ger-erals who had rft&tiujrulfched 'f.b«Tn*»;VRS. Until alfl. the circumstances which led to the retirement of they Fifth Army were known, until its failure to hold the line of the Somnie, leastwise until the Germans had brought up- guns, ''and perhaps its failure to adequately destroy the bridges, were explained, it would be unfair to censure General (Soughj but until the .circumstances were cleared up it would be equally

unfair to the British Army'to retain his services in the field. . The War Cabinet had therefore • thought it ncc- ; esary to recall him until the facts had been - examined and laid before the Government by their military advisers. The enemy had undoubtedly gained a great initial success. It was no use not accepting the facts; but he had failed so far as his main object was concerned. We should be guilty of a great and fatal error if we underestimated the gravity of the' prospect. The enemy was much too near Amiens for comfort and security, and. had- succeeded for the tjme being in compelling one of our grfeat armies to retire. The Cabinet •had taken every step to hurry reinforcements. Never had such large num-" bers of men crossed the Channel in such a short time. Mr. Lloyd George : paid a tribute to the speed with whjich the French reserves had arrived and the loyal assistance they gave. The British position was momentarily established, but it was, clear that the Germans were preparing another, perhaps even a greater attack. The enemy claims of captures of guns and prisoners were greatly exaggerated. We were not only able to replace guns, but had a very substantial reserve, also great reserves of ammunition here and in France. The same applied to aircraft. He was confident our armies, generals and soldiers werfcquite ready for the next encounter. Mr. Lloyd George referred to the material and dramatic assistance of the Americans. The Allies bad looked forward to a large American army in France in the spring, but it had taken longer than was anticiuated to train the soldiers. K America wanted to complete her divisions, it was impossible for her to find troops in large numbers to participate in this battle or campaign, although it may be, the decisive battle of the war. Certain proposals were therefore submitted to Mr. Baker and President Wilson, wiu the result that American troops available were to be brigaded'with the Allied troops,, and their fighting strength immediately brought to bear in the struggle. ; The .Premier deprecated discussion of. the .question of the Versailles Council, but declared that the battl-.

justified.: the .-wisdom of that policy. After.;. the battle commenced, not merely the Government, but the commanders'in the field, were so convinced of the importance of more complete strategical unity, that they agreed to the appointment of General Foch to the supreme direction of the strategy of all the Allied~armles~ on the 1 West front. General Foch was one of the most brilliant soldiers in Europe. When we were in a similar plight during the first battle of Ypres, General Foch rushed a French army there by every conceivable expedient, and undoubtedly helped to win that battle. The Premier urged the nation at Home to stand united for the united control of the. strategical operations' of bur armies at the front. We were fighting a very powerful foe. whose success was mainly due to the superior unity of his strategic plans. The Premier ridiculed the suggestion that our forces had been dissipated by subsidiary enterprises. Not a single division had been sent from France eastward. As regards Italy, but for the presence of the French and British there, the Austrians would presently have been free to throw the whole of their strength on the Western front. The Salonika forces had been reduced by two divisions. There was only one white division in Mesopotamia. In Egypt and Palestine together there were only three white divisions, the remainder being either Indian or mixed. He asked the House to consider what this meant. There was a menace to our Eastern Empire, through Persia and Afghanistan to India.

The Premier expressed great gratification to India for the magnificent way in which she had come to the help of the Empire in this emergency. It v was not the fact that we had three divisions in Egypt and Palestine, and one in Mseopotamia, that enabled us to hold our own; we owed it to the splendid troops of India, who were more than a match for the TurJre on many stricken fields.

The casualties could not yet be accurately stated, but Sir Douglas Haig had assured him that the German claims were quite impossible. Losses, of course, had been considerable. The enemy had definitely decided to seek a military decision this year, whatever the consequences to himself. This meant prolonged battles.

There were still seven or eight months' in which the fight could continue. Everything depended upon keeping our strength right to the end. We could do it with American aid, but even then we could not feel secure unless we prepared ourselves to make even greater sacrifices than hitherto. He knew what would happen if the Government's demands Were not acceded to. We must look ahead. The Germans were calling up the 1920 class, which" would provide for this campaign 550,000 young men for the

battle line. We had .already raised for the army—during, the first quarter of 1918 more than that quarter's proportion of .the original estimated minimum required for; the present .year. It was not merely necessary .to have the men, but to have.them quickly. The" Premier proceeded to discuss the proposals 6f the Bill. He regretted first that it was necessary to raise the military age to fifty, and, in some cases, to 55. The latter age referred to men with special qualifications, training and experience. It was proposed to further use the Government's powers to cancel exemptions. It was also proposed that His Majesty might, by proclamation declaring that a national emergency had arisen, direct that any exemptions from military service shall cease to exist.

MR. ASQUITH'S SPEECH. Mr. Asquith, following the Premier, said that if, as he believed, they were confronted by the gravest peril that had ever menaced the Empire, there was no sacrifice which the House would not be prepared to make. He appealed to the Premier to give a little more time for consideration of the Bill.

Mr. Dillon followed Mr. Asquith .and moved the adjournment of the debate He warned the Government that they wei;e entering upon a mad course in endeavouring to force conscription upon Ireland. He hoped, for the sake of -winning the war, that the War Cabinet's methods off dealing witth ll|e war were different from the methods of dealing with Ireland. Aftr discussing Mr. Dillon's motion for an hour, the Government moved the closure, which was carried by 310 to 85. Mr. Dillon's motion.was defeated by 323 to 80, after which the discussion was resumed. The Premier said time passed. Every day was important. The Government regretted such extremely drastic measures, which would injure many trades, but, considering the emergency, no Government would accept the responsibility'of proposing less. (Cheers). He'would'not say that if this battle went against us the war .would be over because as" long, as we, had a ship afloat we should,not accept a German peace—(loud cheers,)—but if battle was won, as.he believed it. would-ba,-then the doom of-Prussianism be sealed." (More Irish uproar;); The enemy had attacked: a't; the height of his strength. We had been deserted by a powerf ally, and another 'more powerfully Ally, was hot "yet ready to exert one-tenth of' its might. On ' the other hand, this battle "misfit exhaust the German reserves, while America was only now bringing in the/first; instalment of her first troops. .If ",,we wished to avoid the war lasting for years, the: battle'must lie wori~now, and to win it we must be : ready > s ;'to" throw- in all 1 our resources of- tmta. We were now taking,-it might well be, the means of winning a decisive victory with these measures, and witu tShe* |pjromj,'se of Amferican aid we ned not fear the ultimate issue THE MOTION CARRIED. , LONDON, April 10. The Bill was brought in oy 299 to 80.