ITALIAN SET-BACK.

Taihape Daily Times, 17 January 1918, Page 3

ITALIAN SET-BACK.

THE CAUSES ANALYSED. the causes of the defeat sustained by the Italian armies, a correspondent of the Sydney Sun states that Italian psychology was attacked by most insidious and dangerous methods. The Prussian worked with extraordinary cunning and cleverness. He worked in Rome, amongst the politicians, and he worked in the army amongst certain mildly disaffected and untried elements on the Upper Isonzo. There is no direct evidence connecting the German with the Turin riots, which preceded the political crisis. But is direct evidence required? Mills and food stores were suddenly burnt. Firms which arc now known to have been financed by the Germans before the war declared they had no stocks of foodstuffs, though later they were found to have plenty. Plain hunger fell upon the city. 'And the busy red agitators, who arc misnamed pacificists, lor they believe in a class war which they themselves can lead, seized on their opportunity. Political sects threw out the Government. And within three days of this “political offensive” the front opposite the Second, Army was cracked.

The Italian Army is filled with gay and gallant youngsters, mere children in knowledge and cunning, guileless, but brave and lovable, states the correspondent, Those sections which have gone through offensive actions, been tried in the fire of heavy fighting, are steady and reliable. But other sections arc volatile, easily depressed, easily elated. None attack better, or die more willingly. None pursue victory with more childlike confidence and enthusiasm. But they have the defects of their qualities. They are too trustful, too ready to believe the influences of the day. My experience is that an observer becomes fond of the gay “ mandarines, ” the sunny-nat-ured, golden-skinned, generous sons of Italy, who fight, play, and die, with a song on their lips. Some of them are small in stature, but they are yet good-looking, and generous with their blood as with their money Though obviously their armies cannot be compared in thrusting power anti smiting power with the great, heavy-artilleried armies of France and Britain, their soldiering seemed to have a peculiarly fine enthusiasm and boyishness about it. PACIFICIST PROPAGANDA.

There is no doubt that amongst certain' sections of this second army the Gormans' pacificist propaganda bad considerable sway. German aeroplanes dropped tempting messages. The Italian youngsters failed to detect what were lies. German messengers, disguised, brought contradictory orders The Italians failed to discern the trap. Perhaps there was here also a reflection of Eussiau demoralisation. Cadorna knew that German divisions were coming to attack him, arid he knew that Austrian armies had been reinforced, But he had no suspicion that some of his men had lost their souls. When he found out, it was too late.

On this front the safety of all depended upon each unit. For Cadorna had grouped his armies for offensive tactics. Where defensive positions were necessary 'they were (slenderly held. Theoretically, the garrisons were sufficient. But the Germans dashed through Cadorna's defensive positions in the Natisono Valley. They attacked Monte Nero, which was taken by the Italians in 1915, and working round it won Caporetto. With the advantage of tw r o wonderful military roads, built by the Italians, the Germans rolled up the Italians’ left flank and debouched through the Natisone Valley on to the Friulu Plain. Cormons fell. Cividale, the key position to the road system, fell. The Carso army, taken in the rear come back, and Gorz, passed again into Austrian hands. POISON GAS ATTACK.

Much has been 'written about the gas attack, sudden bursts of heavy fire from guns whose presence was unsuspected, and determined change by fresh German and Austrian troops. It is undoubtedly true that the Germans brought all their instruments with them to the Isonzo. They made specially free use of their new mustardoil gas-shells, which are not lethal, but dispiriting, discomforting and demoralising. Those shells burn clothing and skin, and set up a bewildering itch. Mackensen was well supplied also with poisonous gas-shells, and seemed to rely greatly upon the effect of gas upon the Italians. These, Second Army troops had never sustained a gas attack, and found the gas shells very trying. Indeed, the Italians, have had only one really strong gas attack against them during the war. It was before their Isonzo offensive in 19.16; it caught a division in course of preparation and it claimed 7000 victims, dead. This was by far the greatest Single disaster suffered by any army during the war. But the Italians lifted their heads after it. And they would not have let their heads go down in the Second Army merely because of gas-shells, or a fierce and sudden bombardment or of a surprise attack by unexpected hordes in fog and rain in semi-darkness.