OUR NAVY.

Taihape Daily Times, 10 January 1918, Page 3

OUR NAVY.

CRITICS FOR AND AGAINST. JUTLAND AND THE CONVOY losses. Debate on the question of Navy administration has been proceeding with vigour iu Great Britain, Some typical examples are quotea: Admiral W. H. Henderson wrote a few weeks ago in the Daily Mail: The destruction of a convoy of neutral ships aud its escort and our failure to attempt to provide help for the Russians in the Baltic have again called public opinion to the fact that we have not yet found a man or a set of men at the Admiralty with the instinctive genius for carrying on our naval share of the war, and making full use of the splendid fighting, spirit of officers and men and the very great preponderance of the naval forces of the Allies. Although the truth must so met or later be known, what are the. facts concerning many of the naval operations of the war which have so far leaked out notwithstanding the srreecy with which they have uli been shrouded? Space permits me to give only a couple of criticisms and I will first take the batt 1 e o* ! Jutland. The Germans claimed this as a victory. So did w r e. HONOURS TO THE GERMANS! It was a victory for neither side, and only an inconclusive action, in which the .strategical and tactical honours fell to them —and it is no use denying it. They gained their object of avoiding a decision and of getting back to port, while we failed to take advantage of their discomfiture and missed the chance of our object of destroying them by a failure to understand and apply the principles of either one or the other or both. We missed it because at a critical moment when a torpedo attack was threatened > on tlie rear squadron —w T hich was the only part of the fleet in touch with the enemy, the leading squadrons being in advance of it, and not engaged the whole fleet was turned several points away, as stated by the Germans, instead of the squadron affected. Precious minutes and touch with the enemy were lost, as stated in our own dispatch; because Beatty who kept in touch with us and w T as still engaging the enemy, was unsupported although he asked for support; and because no detailed touch was kept with the enemy fleet during the night, and its whereabouts was apparently unknown in the morningt although it had passed during the night astern of our fleet and was already inside of it and to the south of it at "daylight. There was a failure which ought to have been the subject of inquiry by a court-martial on the facts becoming known to the Admiralty; such inquiry may yet be demanded w r hen free discussion of the events of the battle becomes possible. Calder, whose action in 1805 against a superior French fleet was relatively successful, ivas tried by court-martial. THE LOST CONVOY. Another instance that may be cited is the destruction of a convoy last week, which has already stirred public opinion and led to a request for an inquiry in the House of Commons. It was obvious that the enemy, sooner or later, would, through his spies in the Norwegian ports, know of the existence of these convoys, and would be likely to take an opportunity of attacking them. An inquiry is needed to determine what is the responsibility of the Admiralty for this and other failures, and whether we have, in the psychological sense, the est sort of brains for' directing the naval operations of the war. It may then prove necessary so to revise the staff at the Admiralty, as to secure our utmost efficiency in the superior direction of the Navy, and to relegate administrative ability to its proper functions.