The Taihape Daily Times. AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1917. MACEDONIA OR MESOPOTAMIA.

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 8 October 1917, Page 4

The Taihape Daily Times. AND WAIMARINO ADVOCATE

MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1917. MACEDONIA OR MESOPOTAMIA.

(With which is Incorporated The Taihapo Post and Walmarlno News).

The persistent mention of Falkenhayn being at the head of a huge concentration of forces at Aleppo gives some colour to the rumour 'that a Gemano-Turkish offensive is intended. Recent files from Europe seem to indicate that Allied war authorities are of opinion that Turkey can be most effectually and more rapidly and easily defeated by an Asiatic campaign than through 'the Balkan corridor from Salonika. The .only time of the year that a campaign of any magnitude can be carried on is just commencing, and General Maude has lost no time in getting in the first blow. At Aleppo, Falkenhayn is at the northern extremity of the Syrian railways that run southward through Damascus, past Jerusalem and Beersheba, thus giving a Turkish base north and south of Palestine. It is not clear whether Falkenhayn is contemplating a move against General Maude in Mesopotamia or against our forces at Gaza, near Jerusalem, following the railway down through Homs and Damascus. , This would mean little more than an attempt to drive the British out of Syria to the cover of men of war at El Arish, or right back across the Sinai desert to Suez. But as Egypt never was in any real danger there, can be no serious thought of any trouble there now. If Egypt had been vulnerable Germany would have spared no effort to possess it when she had the preponderance of man power and equipment. Now Egypt is out of her reach and any campaign to get a footing there would of a certainty end in disaster. Then Falkenhayn is not bent upon a Syrian mission; if he is concentrating large forces at Aleppo as rumour indicates, then his object is either to move against Maude, barring the only road that British Mesopotamian forces can have in moving westward through the Taurus mountains towards Constantinople. That General Maude now contemplates the performance of this task is tolerably evident. Britain has sole possession of the Persian Gulf and the rear of an expedition of this kind cannot be interfered with. Rail-

ways and other means of transport would be safe, both by water, along the Euphrates and by railways that General Maude may possibly have in construction. From Aleppo, Falkenhayn could only take large forces by two routes, one of which, the Euphrates Valley, would prove so long, tedious and beset with extreme dangers in case of reverses, that it may be abandoned. The other is via the railway line from Constantinople to Bagdad, which runs a few miles north of Aleppo, and passes through the Taurus mountains at Adana. This is the only gateway into Asia Minor from Arabia, Persia, and Mesopotamia, and it is reasonable to assume that Germany would defend it to the very utmost of its man power. There can be no denial of the fact that Adana is the strategic key that B'ritain must take if Constantinople is to be assailed from Asia, as it was by who entered the city by a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, which is less than a thousand yards across. It is maintained by British experts that a landing at Alexandretta would be an extremely perilous undertaking, as the Adana country is alluvial flats surrounded on the land side by mountain fortresses. If the conquest of Turkey is contemplated it must be accomplished either by the capture of Adana, or through the Balkans by a march on Sofia. The Berlin-Bagdad railway must be broken at some point, and the question is, where will the cleavage take place? Will it be from the B’agdad end ? and through Syria, with another “Gallipoli” at Alexandretta, to seize the Adana gate, or will it be from Salonika, Greece and Albania by a march on Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria? It is contended by some, and quite reasonably so, that the issue in Asia will be determined on the Mesopotamian plains and in the Syrian but should a successful campaign be possible, and in view, against the railway through the Balkans, such an achievement would leave the Turko-Asiatic campaign high and dry; without munitions from Germany the Asiatic campaign must collapse, and the enfeeblement of Turkey become a natural corollary. The more the question is considered the more difficult it becomes to see which course the Allies will adopt. The point in favour of assailing Constantinople from Mesopotamia is that the only season for successfully pursuing warfare on a large scale is just commencing; while it is the worst time for attacking from the European side. To form an opinion from the evidence available at present is difficult, but we are still inclined to the opinion that the Balkan route would be quicker and less costly than that from Mesopotamia and Syria through the Taurus gate ? at Adana, j The landing place J;o attack Adana is surrounded with high and most difficult mountains, and we may be sure they are well fortified; and now we are told that Falkenhayn is concentrating an offensive army just by, at Aleppo. This army may be the result of indications that Britain is moving important forces eastward, and that Germany is not quite sure where they are bound for. Bulgaria has no hope of gaining what she entered the war for, and Austro-Hungary is weary almost to falling out of the struggle; Turkey has yet some virility left, but if General Maude keeps the eastern forces busy, it should not be an Herculean effort that is required to find a vulnerable spot from and we still incline to the Balkan prospect.