HOW PARIS WAS SAVED.

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 20 September 1917, Page 6

HOW PARIS WAS SAVED.

DEFEAT OF VON KLUCK.

SUDDEN ATTACK ON FLANK.

The boys of the Lycee de Periguex had a rare treat on their prize day, when the chair was taken by General Clergerie, who, on the outbreak of war, was chief of staff of the Military Government of Paris, and as such was General Gallieni’s right-hand man in the tremendous days when Paris was awaiting hourly to hear von Kluck battering at her gates, writes the Paris correspondent of the Morning Post General Clergerie told the boys how the army of the entrenched camp of Paris was led to attack the right wing of the Germany army just when it was preparing to envelop the left wing of the -French Army on the Oursq: From August 26 the German armies had been descending on Paris by forced marches. On September 1 they 4 were only three days’ march from the advanced line of the entrenched camp, which was being feverishly placed in a state of defence. A circumference of over 100 miles had to be covered with trenches, siege guns hurried up, munitions transported by narrow-gauge railways, food and supplies of all kinds collected for the subsistence of a population of 4,000,000 inhabitants. On September 3, however, the Intelligence Service, which was working splendidly reported, about mid-day, that the German columns were serving south-east, with the apparent intention of avoiding Paris. General Clergerie continued: — “I then had with General Gallieni one of those long conferences which denoted grave events. As a rule they never exceeded from two to five minutes. We of the Military Government of Paris were not given overmuch of talking; we acted. The upshot of our conference was this:—lf they don’t come to us we will go to them with every available man. The first thing to be done was to avoid giving the enemy an inkling of what we were going to do. General Maunoury was immediately cautioned to lie low and elude every engagement not absolutely necessary. In the meantime he was to be reinforced by every means in our power. Our preparations were completed to the minute.”

On the night of September 3, assured that the German Army could only leave on either bank of the Ourcq, Generals Gallieni and Clergerie determined to throw the whole weight of General Maunoury’s army against this rear-guard, cut the enemy’s communications, and take full advantage of his* hazardous situation. With this object the following order was sent to General Maunoury:—"ln view of the movements of the German armies, which appear to be slipping in a southeasterly, direction from before our front, I intend your army to attack them in the flank —that is to say, in an easterly direction. I will let you know your marching direction as soon as I learn that of the British Army. But make your preparations at "once for your troops to be ready to start this afternoon, and begin a general movement east of the entrenched camp to-morrow. ”

At 10 o ’clock in the morning Generals Gallieni, Clergerie, and Maunory met and arranged the details of the plan of operations. In the afternoon they came to ah understanding at Melun with the British. General Joffre gave leave to attack, and announced that he himself would take the offensive on September 6. At noon on September 5 the army of Paris fired its first shot and the Battle of the Ourcq, the preface to the Marne, had begun. “On September 9 an intelligence officer brought me a German despatch, which ran, if I remember rightly, thus: ‘Tell me exactly where you are and what you arc doing. Hurry up, because XXX. . .’’ The officer was nonplussed by those three X’s, but I, borrowing the soldier phrase, told him to translate T am going to bolt.’ True enough, next day we found on the site of the German batteries, which had been precipitately evacuated, stacks of munitions; while by the roadside we came upon motors abandoned for the slightest breakdown, and near Betz almost the entire outfit of a field bakery, with a great store of flour and dough half-kneaded. Paris'hnd Prance were saved. Von Ivluck could not get over his astonishment. He has tried to explain it by saying he was unluekly for out of a hundred Governors not one, would have acted as Gallieni did, throwing his whole available force nearly 40 miles from his stronghold. It was downright imprudence. Of course, it was Gallieni who was in the wrong.”' General Clergerie pointed out the moral for his youthful audience in these words:—“lf y OU want France to be great, there’s only one way: Act.”