AWAITING AMERICA.

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 1 August 1917, Page 3

AWAITING AMERICA.

‘‘To me Die present pause means that the French and British high commands have definitely laid aside all thought of a victory —a decision —in 1917, and mean, aside from local attacks designed to improve their positions and drive the Germans out of high land and down to the plain, as at Arras and Ypres, to await another year—and America, ’ ’ This view, expressed by Mr. E. H. Simmonds in the American Review of Reviews, is now more or less common property. The lull following the battle of Mossines, in which the New Zealanders figured so honourably, had only one meaning, and that meaning is clearly enough expressed in the sentence quoted above. It would seem, however, from details to hand by mail, that even before Messincs the waiting policy had more or less impressed itself upon the British high command, Both Arras and Messines represented, in the first stage, successful battles for high ground. But while, in the first case, the capture of Yimy and neighbouring heights was made the basis of a prolonged struggle for positions on the lower eastern slopes,' Messines’ was marked by no such sequel. In short, Arras had pronounced secondary stages, Messines had not; and while the fighting following Arras left it open to conjecture that the British were attempting to shift the whole line, or at least to reach Douai, there was, at Messincs, no after events justifying such a presumption. Did, then, the British high command, between the date of Arras and the date of Messines, finally realise the growing probability that a decision in 1917 was impossible? All available evidence suggests an affirmative answer, and further suggests that the British Government was already satisfied of three things: (I) The unreliability of Russia in 1917; (2) the certainty of American aid in 1918; (3) the certainity that British preventive measures (anti-submarines warfare, shipbuilding, home-production, and doiugwithout)) would defeat the purpose, as far as 1917-18 is concerned, of the German submarine starvation campaign. The plan of pause then forcing itself upon the British high command ■was not affected by the brilliant local success at Messines, and in the following weeks it gradually disclosed itself to general recognition. Nor will it be affected by other local successes. These are likely enough to happen, but, as far as human foresight can detect, nothing, would be decisive in 1917 save some internal calamity in Germany. And it would be weak and foolish to rely on such an adventitious aid as that.

The policy of caution, intimated by tli e comparative silence of the British was confirmed some weeks ago by the ( candid utterances of the French. A statement of the French Ministers for War, Mr. Painlove, left it beyond doubt that France had not sufficient man-power to wage on the expensive lino of flic Aisne offensive; and that the French Government had decided to economise in men and to await America Concerning that American aid, Mr. Simonds writes that many divisions will be needed; “We should have to play any useful part next summer, at least half-a-million men on the Western line. And if the war goes into 1919 —as now.seems probable—we shall need a million For this, I think, the French and British will wait. Franco, looking to the future, to the continued existence of the race, can make no more great sacrifices. Even the British are beginning to face the problem of men. When we come they will do their full share, but until wo come neither Avill dare to make great payments in human life for small ; gains. ’ ’ Some idea of the “payments in life” is afforded by the same writer’s further statement that America is expeetto give Brittain and France, “that numerical superiority n reserves necessary to bear the great losses incident to a general, sustained offensive like the Somme (1916, which cost the British and the French not less than 750,000 killed and wounded, and the Germans between 600,000 and 700,000. Herein is' visualised the distinction between local operations and “sustained offensives.” A local success can be achieved by a tremendous artillery concentration, isolating a picked position like Vimy ridge or the high ground at Messines and capturing the same quickly and with comparatively small cost in men. But when an attempt is made to enlarge a quickly-conducted local success into a “sustained offensive” the enemy reserves are poured in and if the enemy possesses, relatively, sufficient reserves, his line will hold and he will punish the prolonged attack. Hence the human expense of the Somme, and the comparative cheapness of Messines. Not until the relative inferiority of the German reserves is very much greater may decisive operations be looked for; and, since Russia is so uncertain, it is to America that the Entente must look for the required degree of superiority in man-power. Meanwhile, in addition to the normal trench-fighting, Britain and France may conduct operations intended to relieve Russia, also other local coups

like Messines, designed to capture high ground, and thus to turn the enemy’s positional advantages (specially in the matter of attrition by artillery) against himself.