ARMAGEDDON

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 24 May 1917, Page 3

ARMAGEDDON

BATTLE OF FIFTEEN MILLIONS

(By General Sir o'Moore Creagh, V.C.)

Sooner than we imagine, fifteen million men will be locked in a deadly embrace, on the result of which the des.tinies of Europe will depend; nay, more than that, the future of civilisation. We speak of the coming offensive as the spring gffensive. If the signs are read correctly it will be an early spring offensive. In February of last year the Germans were flinging a mass of shock, 30 divisions strong, into the outer fortifications of Verdun. In April of the preceding year Mackensen was beginning his great drive on the Duuajec.

There is no reason why the 1917 offensive should be delayed beyond March or April. The sooner the issues are put to the test the better for us. For the present finds us superior in numbers and munitionment, and the enemy strenuous attempt to draw level by means of his levy en masse is not yet fully under way. The Allies must by now have determined on their plan, and we must give the Germans credit, for having conceived what they may consider an effective counter-plan, though the cleverest scragy in the world cannot overcome the logic of hard facts. Let us consider the situation from the German point of view, recollecting the guiding principles of German strategy, and, indeed, of all sound strategy.

This is to concentrate in as much strength and act with as great prcmpitude as possible agiinst the foe's cor;tre of gravity; to divert no troops for subsidiary expeditions away from tne centre of gravity ex;?p- such as premise extraordinary advantages and involve only mo'derate risks at the (x:nts which form the cuii:Sivc objective of the war.

It is quite plain,- and very tardily the Germans are admitting H that the greatest and most persidMnt obstacle to the German plans is Britain's sea and land power. By their passivi./ they tacitly admit the defeat, at sea, but on land they believe they have still a chance, and the German Higher Command undoubtedly realties tint for him the centre of gravity is tj b2 found on the Western front, either on that part of is held by British troops, or in the more extended sectors held by unr French allies. x\ T 0 HUN OFFENSIVE NOW.

Yet since ihc determined attack madfe by the Germans at Ho'ogj. and minor attacks at Ypres, they have never ventured to assail the British front. Thcv have preferred to act against us defensively, and to use (heir fixating divisions either against r Jic French, or to supply expeditionary corps to subordinate theatres like Koumania, whore they have, achieved success, and Macedonia, where they have suffered a reverse. What the Germans can do depends, of course, on their resources. At present their forces are so disposed that it is hard to see where they are to obtain any strategic reserve to meet the coming onset. Roughly speaking, their forces are equally divided between the East and West. If the Russian offensive is violent and sustained enough it ought to detain practically the whole of the 135 divisions now concentrated against them, and I sec no possibility of Germany having more than a million men of sorts to feed the wastage on either front during the prospective battles, > the rate of casualty in which should exceed anything yet. experienced in the war. But not only will the Germans have the Russian and Franco-British fronts to consider, but also the Macedonian front, and the Tigris, Caucasus, and Beersheba battle grounds. The Turks are now being so hard pressed that not only is it probable that they will ask for their two divisions to be returned from Riga, but will insist as a condition of their continuance in the war that the eGrmans send them effective help Can Germany afford to disregard that appeal? If she does disregard it then there is an end to her Berlin-Baghdad dream; if she responds to the appeal it means so many men less to make goo;! wastage on the Western front, and so much shortening the duration of the war. I do not envy Hindenburg in his dilemma, but, knowing his partiality for the East, I should be inclined to prophesy that he will risk the West and feed Mackenseu down to the last moment. Hindenburg can only mass Ids artillery at certain points, and it is always open to the Russians, who have come on wonderfully well, both in respect to heavy guns and nuinitionment, to attack at points that upset the Prussian general's calculations. And, however long the Russian front is, any dents in the German line must I react, on their offensive operations elsoI where.