AMERICA AND GERMANY

Taihape Daily Times, Issue 220, 24 April 1917, Page 2

AMERICA AND GERMANY

LONDON, Feb. 12

What were Germany’s motives in risking war with the United States? That is the question which everyone is asking in view of the developments of the last few days. Many theories have been advanced more or less dogmatically, and to each, though not to all, some objection may be urged. The wisest and most reasonable assumption is that Germany took account of all the possibilities and all the dangers of the policy she decided to pursue, and that, weighing all the possibilities against the dangers, she came to the conclusion that in her existing military and economic straits the risk was one which she had no alternative but to take. Any idea that her decision was in any tsense a hasty one may be entirely dismissed. For months past she must have been preparing for the submarine campaign of super-frightfulness which she .is now launching. She may have hoped that American warnings were mere bluff, and that, in any case, President Wilson would never go to the extreme length of declaring war. She entertained the same' hope about Great Britain’s attitude at the commencement of the war when she launched her legions against Belgium and France. But, though she hoped for the best, she was fully prepared for the worst, and there can hardly be any doubt that this has been her attitude also towards the American danger. And one can imagine very much the same line of reasoning being pursued in Berlin in both instances. America also has “a contemptible little army” of little more than a hundred thousand men, and, in the military sense, at least, Germany counts confidently on the United States being unable to influence a military decision on the Western front at any rale until the spring of next year. And by that time the optimists in Berlin calculate that if only they can staxwe England into surrender the war will be over, and Germany will be in a position to dictate peace on her own terms. FIGHTING FOR VICTORY.

It is conceivably possible, of course, that the enemy’s position is very much more desperate than we imagine. As to this there is reliable information available, for it depends entirely on the question whether the food supplies of the Central Powers are sufficient to last out until the next harvest becomes available. A statement attributed to the Austrian Pood Controller suggests that Germany’s partner at least is already almost In extremis. But you never know whether statements of this kind are put out with the deliberate purpose of deceiving. No good purpose is to be served, therefore, by accepting any such dangerous hypothesis as this. We err at least on the right side if avc assume that the efforts Germany is now making represent not an effort of despair, but a last desperate rally to snatch victory out of defeat by throwing all her resources into the scale during the coming spring and summer. If this is the true reading of the pcsiton, it follows that Germany now pins her main hope to her submarine campaign, though it is not impossible that von Hindenburg may endeavour to frustrate the allied offensive in the west by himself conductling a great defensive-offensive drive somewhere between the sea and the Swiss frontier. His plans in this particular will depend in large measure on the reserves that he still has available. But all indications are that during the opening weeks of the Allied offensive at least Germany ought to be able to render a very good account of herself. Spring condfTions begin to prevail so> much earlier in the west than in the east that some little time will elapse before the Russian armies also come into play, and of this factor we may be quite certain that von Hindenburg will endeavour to take full advantage. And forcer as he has been forced to take account of the eventuality of America coming into the war on the side of the Allies, we may be quite sure von Hindenburg recognises that if Germany is to obtain a decision it is a case of this year or never.